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Much of cognitive science research and almost all of AI research into problem 
solving has focused on the use of verbal or propositional representations.  However, there 
is significant evidence that humans solve problems using different representational 
modalities, including visual or iconic ones.  In this dissertation, I investigate visual 
problem solving from the perspectives of autism, psychometrics, and AI. 
Studies of individuals on the autism spectrum show that they often use atypical 
patterns of cognition, and anecdotal reports have frequently mentioned a tendency to 
"think visually." I examined one precise characterization of visual thinking in terms of 
iconic representations.  I then conducted a comprehensive review of data on several 
cognitive tasks from the autism literature and found numerous instances indicating that 
some individuals with autism may have a disposition owards visual thinking. 
One task, the Raven's Progressive Matrices test, is of particular interest to the field of 
psychometrics, as it represents one of the single best measures of general intelligence that 
has yet been developed.  Typically developing individuals are thought to solve the 
Raven's test using largely verbal strategies, especially on the more difficult subsets of test 
problems.  In line with this view, computational models of information processing on the 
Raven’s test have focused exclusively on propositional representations.  However, 
behavioral and fMRI studies of individuals with autism suggest that these individuals 
may use instead a predominantly visual strategy across most or all test problems. 
To examine visual problem solving on the Raven's tet, I first constructed a 
computational model, called the Affine and Set Transformation Induction (ASTI) model, 
which uses a combination of affine transformations a d set operations to solve Raven's 
xv 
problems using purely pixel-based representations of pr blem inputs, without any 
propositional encoding.  I then performed four analyses using this model. 
First, I tested the model against three versions of the Raven's test, to determine the 
sufficiency of visual representations for solving this type of problem.  The ASTI model 
successfully solves 50 of the 60 problems on the Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) 
test, comparable in performance to the best computational models that use propositional 
representations.  Second, I evaluated model robustnes  in the face of changes to the 
representation of pixels and visual similarity.  I found that varying these low-level 
representational commitments causes only small changes in overall performance.  Third, 
I performed successive ablations of the model to create a new classification of problem 
types, based on which transformations are necessary and sufficient for finding the correct 
answer.  Fourth, I examined if patterns of errors made on the SPM can provide a window 
into whether a visual or verbal strategy is being used.  While many of the observed error 
patterns were predicted by considering aspects of the model and of human behavior, I 
found that overall error patterns do not seem to provide a clear indicator of strategy type. 
The main contributions of this dissertation include: (1) a rigorous definition and 
examination of a disposition towards visual thinking i  autism; (2) a sufficiency proof, 
through the construction of a novel computational model, that visual representations can 
successfully solve many Raven's problems; (3) a new, data-based classification of 
problem types on the SPM; (4) a new classification of conceptual error types on the SPM; 
and (5) a methodology for analyzing, and an analysis of, error patterns made by humans 
and computational models on the SPM.  More broadly, this dissertation contributes 
significantly to our understanding of visual problem solving.  
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Stated most broadly, this dissertation is about problem solving, and it lies at the 
intersection of three areas of scientific research:  autism, psychometrics, and artificial 
intelligence (AI).  Within each area, I argue that there is a gap in the literature having to 
do with theories of problem solving, and in particular with theories of visual problem 
solving.  This dissertation aims to fill in some of these gaps. 
Problem solving has long been identified as a key component of intelligence, for 
humans, machines, and animals alike (Newell & Simon, 1972).  It is intimately tied 
together with notions of goals and agency, and can be loosely defined as the process of 
acting from some set of starting conditions to achieve a specified end goal (Barbey & 
Barsalou, 1999).  From an information processing standpoint, problem solving can be 
defined more specifically in terms of representations and reasoning.  An agent begins 
with some starting representation(s) of a problem (and whatever other potentially relevant 
representations the agent can access, e.g. from the environment or from its internal 
memory), and then uses available reasoning mechanisms to operate over these 
representations to eventually reach the end goal, which is also represented in some 
fashion. 
This description is left intentionally vague to remain inclusive towards the incredible 
diversity of problem solving that abounds in intelligent agents of all kinds, even from the 
perspective of a strict information processing view.  Representations can be internal to an 
agent or external, and they can exist in numerous modalities, such as propositional, 
visual, spatial, auditory, haptic, proprioceptive, interoceptive, etc. (Markman, 1999).  
Reasoning, too, can take many forms, from classical notions of deductive and inductive 
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reasoning to less formal variants such as analogical reasoning, reasoning using simulation 
or models, etc. (Leighton & Sternberg, 2004). 
A considerable amount of research on problem solving, especially as it relates to 
human or human-level intelligence, has focused on pr blem solving using propositional 
representations (e.g. Newell & Simon, 1972).  There ar  many reasons for this focus, 
three of which I mention here.  The first reason is that propositional representations are 
extremely powerful and versatile.  Propositional accounts of problem solving have been 
successful across many different domains, from logic and puzzles to communication and 
planning.  Propositions also support composition and can represent distal information, for 
instance as pointers into separate data structures (N well, 1994), and propositional 
systems like the theoretical Post production system have been proven to be Turing-
universal (Minsky, 1967).   
The second reason is that human language is fundament lly a propositional form of 
representation, and for eons, language has extensively shaped human thought and 
communication.1  As a result, when we verbalize (whether internally or externally) our 
introspective perceptions of how we have solved a problem, we first necessarily convert 
whatever other forms of representations we might have actually used into propositional 
form.  (Consider how our communications about problem solving might be different if 
human beings came equipped with small projectors on their bellies that could convey 
visual representations of our introspection!) 
                                                
1 The extent to which language influences thought has long been a controversial topic in the cognitive 
sciences.  Opinions vary from one extreme position—that language is merely a tool for communication and
is a transduced form of the stuff of which “thought” is made—to the other extreme position—that thought 
is fundamentally rooted in and composed of linguistic representations.  Regardless of where on this 
spectrum science eventually leads, there is no question that language does play a critical role in our 
cognitive and communicative abilities. 
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The third reason is that conventional digital computation also uses fundamentally 
propositional forms of representation, and for the better part of a century, this particular 
computational paradigm has exerted enormous influence on our beliefs about the nature 
of intelligence.  From a theoretical standpoint, the analogy of “mind-as-computer” helped 
conceptualize information processing as a framework within which to explain and 
understand intelligence.2  However, it is a fallacy to equate “information processing” with 
“propositional information processing.”  Information f any kind may be computed upon, 
but the dominance of our digital, propositional computers has biased the kinds of 
information processing frameworks that we consider towards strictly propositional ones.   
As a result, then, of the sheer efficacy of propositi nal representations, our 
propositional language, and our propositional computers, the vast majority of accounts of 
problem solving, especially the sorts of high-level problem solving that we associate with 
human-level intelligence, are propositional in nature.  However, these accounts do not tell 
the whole story.   One missing piece of the puzzle of intelligence can be found in the 
notion of visual problem solving.  Accounts of visual problem solving have been in 
existence for a long time and surface in a variety of contexts, ranging from high-level 
domains like creativity and scientific discovery to simple tasks such as short term 
memory recall in children who have not yet developed v rbal fluency (e.g. Clement, 
2008; Hitch et al., 1989b; Nersessian, 2008).   
However, despite the prevalence of descriptive accounts of visual problem solving, 
these accounts have historically not been as rigorously defined or as deeply investigated 
as comparable propositional accounts (Glasgow and Papadias, 1992; Larkin and Simon, 
                                                
2 The “mind-as-computer” analogy suggests, in its weakest form, that intelligence can be usefully modele  
to some extent as a set of computational processes, and in its strongest form, that intelligence itself consists 
of computation. 
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1987; Naryanan, Glasgow, & Chandrasekaran, 1995).  Again, there are many reasons for 
this lack of focus, of which I provide three here.  First, the knowledge contained in a 
representation of any modality can be re-represented, to an arbitrarily good degree of 
precision, in propositional form.  As a result, visual representations have often been 
dismissed as peripheral at best and purely phenomenlogical at worst, in either case being 
clearly subservient to propositional representations.  For instance, while most information 
processing accounts would agree that inputs to an intelligent agent are often visual or 
perceptual in nature, and outputs are likewise perceptual (e.g. motor commands), the 
dominant view of the processing that goes on between th se two endpoints has assumed 
that perceptions are converted into or out from propositional representations in order for 
high-level information processing to take place.  This versatility of propositional 
representations also drove much of the debate on whether mental imagery really exists or 
is simply an illusory phenomenon that overlies propositional computation, because any 
processing characteristics of an account using visual representations could be simulated 
using propositional representations, and so positing a visual account was considered to be 
un-parsimonious, and indeed unnecessary. 
The second reason is that, throughout the history of esearch on problem solving, it 
has not always been clear what is meant by visual representations.  Different research 
threads adopt different definitions, ranging anywhere from external, high-level, diagrams 
that contain textual information to internal, low-level, neuron-like representations that 
contain only patterns of light-based activation.  While there is similar diversity within the 
family of propositional representations, propositions enjoy the comfort of being directly 
specifiable at their core using formal mathematical definitions, whereas no similar 
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fundaments of general visual representations have come into widespread agreement and 
use.  As a result, different definitions of and assumptions about visual representations are 
often conflated in the literature, which has led to an overall lack of cohesion and 
integration among theories of visual representation and problem solving. 
The third reason is that, from a practical standpoint, visual processing algorithms are 
relatively inefficient when implemented on propositional computers.  Biologically, visual 
processing is massively parallel, yet the majority of digital computers in use today are 
serial or have at most a handful of parallel processing streams. Only recently have serial 
processors become fast enough to handle visual computations of any significant size, and 
the development of computing hardware that even comes close to matching the levels of 
parallelism found in biological visual systems is far rom fruition. 
As a result, then, of the tendency to subsume visual representations into more general 
propositional accounts, the lack of formal specification of visual representations, and our 
serial-processing computers, visual problem solving has not received the same kind of 
focused and sustained research attention that propositional problem solving has received.  
These twin biases in research—towards propositional accounts of problem solving and 
away from visual accounts of problem solving—would perhaps not be such a problem if 
it were acknowledged that visual problem solving remains an unexplored factor in many 
problem-solving domains.  However, when combined with another unfortunate tendency 
in problem-solving research, these biases create a very significant problem indeed.   
Consider the fact that there can be multiple ways to successfully solve the same 
problem.  To explore this idea, I first define the notion of a problem-solving strategy: 
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Definition: A problem-solving strategy consists of some combination of 
particular forms of representations and reasoning that together 
attempt to solve a certain type of problem. 
 
A problem can be considered to have an associated se  of problem-solving strategies 
that can solve it to varying degrees of success.  Within this set of all possible strategies, 
certain highly successful strategies may be preferrd for various reasons.  For instance, in 
the context of human cognition, a preferred strategy might be one used by most people, 
for evolutionary, neurobiological, or cultural reason .  In the context of intelligent 
machines, a preferred strategy might be one that is readily implemented in algorithmic 
form.   
The majority of research into problem solving, across many different problem 
domains and within contexts of both human cognition and AI, has determinedly pursued 
the identification and study of preferred problem-solving strategies.  This is entirely 
reasonable, given our goal of understanding general processes of problem solving in 
human cognition and in artificial intelligent agents.  However, a major conceptual pitfall 
in the study of problem solving has been the assumption that the preferred strategy for 
solving a given problem is the only strategy for solving that problem, without taking i to 
account other potentially relevant and successful strategies that may exist.   
Within the context of the imbalance in research betwe n visual and propositional 
accounts of problem solving, this general conceptual problem has specifically manifested 
itself in the following way: 
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Dissertation Problem Statement:   
Many information processing accounts of problem solving, having 
first identified a preferred propositional strategy for solving a certain 
problem, fail to consider the possibility of visual strategies that can 
also solve the same problem. 
 
For the remainder of this chapter, I first identify more precisely the kinds of 
propositional and visual representations that this dissertation examines, particularly 
within each individual context of artificial computational systems (which I henceforth 
refer to as AI systems) and human cognition.  Then, for each of the three research areas 
that I mentioned earlier—autism, psychometrics, andAI—I discuss how the general 
dissertation problem statement is motivated by research in this area, and I present the 
research questions, hypotheses, and research designs that guide my work. 
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1.1 Visual Versus Propositional Representations 
This dissertation contrasts information processing accounts of problem solving that 
use either visual representations or propositional representations.  I define these two types 
of representation according to the approach suggested by Nersessian (2008), in which 
these two representational types can be characterized along two different dimensions: 
1) Iconic vs. propositional: The term iconic refers to representations that are 
analogical, in the sense that they carry some structural correspondence to what 
they represent (Chandrasekaran, 2011). Propositional representations, on the 
other hand, carry no such correspondence between format and content.  
2) Modal vs. amodal: Symbols used in an iconic representation can be eith r modal 
or amodal, depending on whether they are rooted in perceptual states.  I focus on 
modal representations in the visual modality. 
There are four possible types of representations that emerge from this categorization: 
1) Amodal propositional:  A linguistic description of the shapes and relations in a 
problem would constitute an amodal propositional representation.  For example: 
is-left-of(triangle, circle).  
2) Amodal iconic:  A diagram indicating the spatial layout of shapes with each 
shape described linguistically would constitute an amodal iconic representation, in 
that the representation does show some structural correspondence with the 
problem, but the linguistic symbols are not themselves directly related to 
perceptual inputs. For example:  triangle ─ circle.  
3) Modal propositional:  A linguistic description of the relationships between 
visual shapes, using the visual shapes themselves as the representation’s 
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constituent symbols, could be considered to be a modal propositional 
representation.  For example:  is-left-of(▲, ●).  However, this would not really be 
a propositional representation, because such represntations by definition cannot 
contain any non-propositional information, which would include modal symbols. 
4) Modal iconic:  An image showing the spatial layout of shapes as well as their 
visual appearance would constitute a modal iconic representation, in that the 
representation shows structural correspondence with the problem as well as with 
the visual perceptual state generated by looking at it.  For example: ▲ ─ ●. 
Of these four types, I focus on contrasting amodal propositional representations with 
modal iconic representations. 
1.1.1 Representation in AI systems and in human cognition 
In the context of AI systems, it is a straightforwad matter to examine a system’s 
internal representations in order to evaluate into which category they fall, because any 
representation will be implemented as a data structu e that can be directly inspected.  An 
argument could be made to trivialize representationl distinctions by noting that since 
digital computers are fundamentally propositional devices, any representation used by 
such a system is also propositional.  However, in classifying the representations used by 
an AI system, we must examine the representation at the level of abstraction at which its 
semantics are task-relevant, in other words looking at Marr’s “algorithmic and 
representational” level instead of the “implementation” level (Marr, 1982). 
Pixel-based images are one example of a modal iconic representation.  Such images 
are clearly iconic, in that the patterns of color in a 2D pixel array have a structural 
correspondence with the visual appearance of whatever is shown in the image.  Images 
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are also modal, if we consider their input into thecomputer to be a form of perception; 
whether scanned, imported from a camera, or drawn on a digital canvas, the resulting 
image file remains in the same format in which it was initially “perceived” by the system. 
Most of the familiar data structures in AI systems embody amodal propositional 
representations.  Examples include logical predicates, semantic networks, frames, scripts, 
productions, etc.  The key aspect of these representatio s is that they are manipulated 
according to syntactic rules (Newell & Simon, 1972). Because these representations have 
an arbitrary relationship to what they represent, the actual encoding can bear no influence 
on how they are used; any content-specific directivs must be represented in additional 
propositional expressions.   
In the context of human cognition, it is more difficult to specify and classify the 
internal representations that are in use, because they are largely unobservable and 
certainly less precisely defined than their computation l counterparts.  However, 
considerable progress has been made along this front with the advent of advanced 
neuroscience and particularly neuroimaging techniques.   
Unlike early theories of cognition supposing that, like AI systems under the physical 
symbol system hypothesis, some universal amodal store maintained abstract “deep” 
forms of conceptual knowledge, knowledge representatio  in the brain is now thought to 
be largely (if not entirely) modal (e.g. Barsalou, 1999), in the sense that a particular 
concept is distributed across a network of activation that includes modality-specific, 
perceptual regions related to the representation of that concept.  (While this view seems 
to have growing consensus among the research communities of cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience, the philosophical stance on the nature of mental representation, and 
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especially of “pictorial” or other modal forms of mental representations, remains an area 
of some controversy; see Thomas, 2010, for a summary.)  Knowledge is thought to be 
represented in an attribute- or feature-specific manner and may potentially have category-
specific representational seats as well (Thompson-Schill, 2003).  Again, we can 
distinguish between the representational/algorithmic level, at which representations are 
semantically relevant to the cognitive task at hand, and the implementation level, at 
which neural representations are instantiated within a myriad of neuronal and network 
properties.  At some level of abstraction, knowledge may seem to require amodal 
representation, such as high-level conceptual knowledge, but this form of knowledge has 
been hypothesized to result from the convergence of many modalities of underlying 
knowledge, instead of the absence of modality; what we think of as amodal 
representations may be derived from this convergence of modalities in an online, as-
needed fashion (Binder & Desai, 2011). 
Most of the task domains that I examine, including the Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
test, involve mental representations in short term memory.  I follow the theoretical 
framework laid out in Baddeley’s two-stage model of working memory, in which the 
phonological loop represents a short-term buffer for storing and rehearsing verbal 
phonological information, and the visuospatial sketchpad represents a corresponding 
short-term buffer for visuospatial information (Baddeley, 2003).  Following the work of 
Kosslyn, among others (e.g. Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006), I conceptualize visual 
representations in the visuospatial sketchpad as being a form of mental imagery, with 
these representations exhibiting structural isomorphism with the elements that they 
represent.  Section 3.1.3 discusses mental imagery in more detail, Section 2.3.5 addresses 
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visual and verbal mental representations in long-term semantic memory, and Section 
2.3.6 explores the potential implications of overtly linguistic versus non-linguistic 
propositional representations used for representing foundational concepts. 
1.1.2 Terminology 
Thus, when discussing AI systems, I distinguish betwe n visual and propositional 
representations, and when discussing human cognition, I distinguish between visual and 
verbal representations.  These terms and their associ ted properties, as I use them 
throughout this dissertation, are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Specification of representational terms used throughout this dissertation. 
Context Representation Type Primary example 
AI system 
Propositional Amodal propositional Propositions 
Visual Modal iconic Pixel-based images 
Human  
cognition 
Verbal Amodal propositional 
Verbal/linguistic 
representations 
Visual Modal iconic Mental imagery 
 
In the three following sections, I discuss how the visual/verbal or visual/propositional 
divide has affected theories of cognition and problem solving in the fields of autism, 




Research into autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) has yielded many persistent and 
striking observations of atypical cognitive functioning across a variety of domains, but 
we still do not have a clear understanding of the depth or organization of these cognitive 
differences, their etiological significance, or their ffects on the day-to-day experiences 
of affected individuals. As the prevalence of ASDs continues to rise, more precise 
characterizations of the cognition of these individuals will be crucial to continued efforts 
into basic research as well as the development of new methods for intervention, 
communication, and education.   
A considerable amount of accumulated evidence suggests that certain individuals 
with autism exhibit a bias towards “thinking visually.” This evidence comes from 
introspective accounts (e.g. Grandin, 2006; Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994), anecdotal 
observations by family members, therapists, and teach rs (e.g. Quill, 1997), and 
empirical research into behavior (e.g. Heaton et al. 2008; Joseph et al. 2005; Whitehouse 
et al. 2006) and neurobiological functioning (e.g. Mottron et al., 2006).  I call this the 
“Thinking in Pictures” (TiP) hypothesis about cognition in autism (Grandin, 2006).  This 
hypothesis has two main parts: 
 
Assumption: Typically developing (TD) individuals use both visual and 
verbal mental representations. 
Hypothesis: A subset of individuals on the autism spectrum exhibits a 
disposition towards using visual mental representations and a 
corresponding bias against using verbal mental representations.   
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In cognitive research in autism, this hypothesis seems to have received limited 
focused and sustained consideration, despite the frequency with which accounts of visual 
thinking have emerged within the autism community.  In particular, different types of 
problems are frequently investigated in autism research to identify patterns of cognitive 
strengths and weaknesses, but for a given problem, overall performance is assumed to 
rest on the same cognitive processes in individuals with autism as in TD individuals:  
      
Problem Statement for Autism:   
It is often assumed that individuals with autism solve a given problem 
in the same way as typically developing (TD) individuals, which 
precludes any study of the possibility that individuals with autism 
may have a specialized bias towards using visual stra egies, as is 
suggested by numerous anecdotal accounts. 
 
To address this problem, I present two research questions: 
1) To what extent is published research on cognitive tasks consistent with the TiP 
account, i.e. individuals with autism exhibit a bias towards using visual mental 
representations and away from using verbal ones? 
2) To what extent does the TiP account provide a better xplanation of published 
research on cognitive tasks than do other current theories of cognition in autism? 
I studied both of these questions using the research design of narrative literature review.  
Chapter 2 describes details of the specific predictions that I tested, the methods used to 
conduct the literature reviews, and my results.     
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In particular, for question 1, I reviewed empirical studies that looked at different 
cognitive tasks in autism: the n-back task, serial recall, dual task studies, Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices, semantic processing, false beli f tasks, visual search, spatial recall, 
and visual recall.  Results of this study are mixed.  Certain task domains offer evidence 
that is highly consistent with and well explained by the TiP hypothesis, including:  (1) the 
n-back task, (2) serial recall, (3) dual tasking, (4) Raven’s Progressive Matrices, (5) 
semantic processing, and (6) false belief tasks.  Other task domains, while not 
inconsistent with the TiP hypothesis, are not directly explained by it either, namely:  (7) 
visual search.  Finally, there are task domains whose data seem to contradict the TiP 
hypothesis, which are:  (8) spatial recall, and (9) visual recall.  The main finding of this 
study is that, at least across several task domains, there is a significant amount of 
evidence that is highly consistent with the TiP hypothesis, which empirically 
substantiates the anecdotal evidence for visual thinking that has long been common in the 
autism community.   
For question 2, I reviewed the literature on four different existing theories about 
cognition in autism—Mindblindness, Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central Coherence, 
and Enhanced Perceptual Functioning.  For each of tese theories, I find that no theory 
explicitly posits the differences in representational strategy use in autism that I observed 
during the first study, and TiP does explain many of the findings presented in support of 
each theory. 
The main contributions of this work are listed below: 
1) I have compiled comprehensive literature reviews of several cognitive tasks 
that have been studied in autism research. 
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2) I have provided a concrete definition of the Thinking in Pictures (TiP) 
hypothesis and generated specific empirical predictions arising from it. 
3) I have performed a systematic and empirical evaluation of this hypothesis 
using existing published data. 
4) I have identified key areas in which the predictions of TiP differ from the 
predictions of other theories, which therefore warrant further study to better 
distinguish among these theories. 
5) I have clearly identified certain experimental design and data interpretation 
pitfalls, in particular showing many instances in which published explanations 
are not consistent with data from additional studies. 
There are many important areas for future work, including identifying the individuals 
or subsets of individuals with autism or other ASDs to whom the TiP account does or 
does not apply, investigating more deeply the similarit es and differences in predictions 
made by TiP and other cognitive theories of autism, and understanding the role that TiP 




Psychometrics is one of the three research traditions in the study of mental 
phenomena that had its roots in the late 1800s, together with experimental psychology 
and psychophysics.  These traditions aimed to study mental phenomena in a systematic, 
empirical way, without relying on introspection as  means of inquiry.  Psychophysics 
focused on relationships between physical properties of stimuli and the perceptions they 
would engender in human subjects.  Experimental psychology was mainly concerned 
with the specific behaviors exhibited by subjects in controlled experimental conditions.  
Psychometrics, as the name suggests, aimed to develop scales of measurement to quantify 
individual differences in mental capabilities, particularly intelligence. 
However, in pursuing a mapping from individual differences in intelligence onto 
numerical scales, psychometrics has flattened the notion of individual differences to 
imply only differences of degree rather than differences of degree and of kind.  Thus, the 
numerical measurements obtained from conventional psychometric instruments are not 
often used to represent qualitative differences in trategy and especially differences in 
representation, despite evidence that humans can use different strategies to accomplish 
the same task.   
Interestingly, the importance of strategy variations in intelligent behavior was 
recognized early on by Alfred Binet, who created the first intelligence test in its modern 
form.  For instance, based on extensive observations and experimentation with his two 
young daughters, Binet explicitly pondered the possibility for and role of individual 
differences in strategy when solving the same problems.  He made similar observations in 
his studies of savant-type individuals, finding, for example, that of two calculating 
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prodigies, one seemed to perform his calculations using auditory mental representations, 
while the other seemed to use visual mental imagery (Fancher, 1985).  However, as 
intelligence testing became more widely adopted, Binet’s nuanced position was lost in 
favor a view of intelligence as a unitary, unidimensional construct, especially during the 
promotion of intelligence testing as part of the eug nics movement (e.g. Goddard, 1922).   
This conceptualization of intelligence and psychometric testing implicitly contains 
one of two assumptions about their relationship.  The weaker assumption is that it does 
not matter how an individual solves particular test items; it just matters whether they can 
solve them.  The stronger assumption is that test ims themselves elicit very particular 
strategies, and these strategies taps into some facet of “general intelligence.”  In other 
words, all individuals solve psychometric tests in the same way, and the resulting scores 
measure quantitative variations in a unidimensional cognitive ability. 
With respect to the stronger assumption, psychology is slowly discovering that it is 
not the case that all individuals exhibit the same qualitative forms of cognition, as 
exemplified by the earlier discussion of atypical cognition in autism.  With respect to the 
weaker assumption, one way to conceptualize the existing divide is in terms of 
“correlational and experimental approaches to human cognitive activity” (Keating, 1984, 
p. 17), where the former refers to traditional psychometric approaches and the latter 
refers to information-processing accounts of cognitio .  Understanding the strategies that 
underlie individual performance on psychometric tests will not only give better insight 
into what cognitive abilities particular tests are actually measuring, but will also shed 
light on the nature of individual differences in cognition, beyond just numerical 
variations on a unidimensional scale. 
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Some strides have been made towards trying to incorporate strategy differences into 
psychometric theory.  Keating & Bobbitt admit that many sources of variance can 
contribute to measures of mental ability, including:  1) quantitative differences in 
cognitive processing efficiency, 2) differences in strategy, or 3) differences in 
metacognitive abilities of strategy selection, though they only attempt to experimentally 
address the first of these (Keating & Bobbitt, 1978).  In the context of sentence-picture 
verification tasks, Hunt addresses in some detail the impacts of strategy differences on 
resulting behavioral measures, though he does observe that the question of how the 
existence of strategy differences can be reconciled with the fairly robust statistical 
evidence of a g factor for intelligence is an important open question (Hunt, 1980).  
Finally, Mislevy and Verhelst have attempted to explicitly incorporate strategy 
differences into item response theory, though this eoretical approach has not been 
widely applied (Mislevy & Verhelst, 1990). 
 
Problem Statement for Psychometrics:   
Psychometrics generally assumes that quantitative variations in test 
scores reflect quantitative variations in cognitive ability among 
individuals, often neglecting the possibility that qualitative strategy 
variations, such as between visual and verbal strategies, can also play 
a role in the score achieved by an individual. 
 
To investigate this problem, I focus on one particular psychometric test:  Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices (RPM).  The RPM is a collection of widely-used standardized 
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intelligence tests consisting of analogy problems in which a matrix of geometric figures 
is presented with one entry missing, and the correct missing entry must be selected from a 
set of answer choices.  Correlation studies have found the RPM to be the single best 
measure of intelligence among any psychometric instrument, barring standard multi-
domain measures that contain items in many different formats (Snow, Kyllonen, & 
Marshalek, 1982).  Due to its ease of administration and scoring, as well as the fact that it 
requires little verbal instruction or explicit verbal comprehension, the RPM is widely 
used as a test of intelligence in clinical, educational, occupational, and scientific settings. 
There is considerable evidence from neuroimaging and behavioral studies that 
humans use both visual and verbal strategies for solving RPM problems.  However, the 
most widely cited computational model of information processing on the RPM posits a 
purely propositional strategy, with individual differences modeled as variations within 
this strategy (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990), andmost other accounts of information 
processing on the RPM are likewise propositional. 
To investigate the nature and existence of visual problem solving strategies on the 
RPM, I present three research questions: 
1) To what extent can a purely visual strategy, implemented as a computational 
model, be successful on the RPM tests? 
2) How can this model be used to classify problems on the RPM according to 
their information processing demands? 
3) To what extent can errors made on the RPM serve as behavioral markers to 
indicate the use of a visual versus verbal strategy? 
For question 1, I constructed a computational model, ca led the Affine and Set 
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Tranformation Induction (ASTI) model, which uses affine transformations and set 
operations on purely visual, pixel-based representatio s of RPM problems to generate 
solutions.  I tested this model against the three main tests in the RPM family: the 
Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM), the Colored Progressive Matrices (CPM), and the 
Advanced Progressive Matrices.   
For question 2, I conducted computational experiments to test how systematic 
ablations of the ASTI model, removing various functionalities in different combinations, 
affect performance on individual RPM problems.  Using this approach, I was able to 
define minimally sufficient sets of visual reasoning mechanisms necessary to solve 
particular problems, which provides a problem classification in terms of the information 
processing demands of each problem.   
For question 3, I performed an observational study of the error patterns made by 
typically developing individuals, individuals with autism, and the ASTI model.  I first 
developed a classification of errors on the Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM), one 
version of the RPM tests, using qualitative coding by two independent raters.  Then, I 
analyzed the types of errors made on the SPM among the three groups.   
The main contributions of this work are listed below: 
1) I have provided a proof by construction that a visual strategy is sufficient for 
solving a large proportion of problems on the RPM tests. 
2) I have tested a single computational model against ll three major RPM tests, 
and I have provided a new classification of problem types across this family 
of tests, based on whether and which of a particular set of visual reasoning 
mechanisms is sufficient for solving a particular problem. 
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3) I have developed a new classification of error types found on the SPM. 
4) I have performed the first comparison of errors made on the SPM among TD 
individuals and individuals with autism, and also the first comparison of errors 
made among human groups and a computational model. 
There are many important areas for future work, including identifying what other 
types of visual reasoning might be successful on RPM problems and other psychometric 
instruments, the role that strategy differences play in the predictive functionality of 
psychometric measures, and how such tests might be augmented to include more explicit 




1.4 Artificial Intelligence 
The field of artificial intelligence has long focused on building systems that use 
propositional representations to behave intelligently (for some definition of intelligence).  
This arises partially from the pragmatic reasons outlined earlier, having to do with the 
ease with which propositional strategies can be imple ented on conventional digital 
computers, but also comes from the philosophical stance on intelligence best exemplified 
by the physical symbol system hypothesis.  This hypothesis states that certain properties 
in a system, namely being physically instantiated an  having the ability to process 
symbols in a syntactic fashion, are necessary and sufficient for implementing intelligent 
behavior (Newell & Simon, 1976).   Partly stemming from this philosophical stance and 
partly propagating it has been the tendency in AI to focus on problem domains for which 
propositional representations can be quite successful (e.g. chess, logic) and neglect those 
for which propositional representations do not provide a ready answer (e.g. navigation, 
social reasoning).   
However, this approach neglects much of what we know about visual representations 
and problem solving.  From the perspective of human cognition, while there is 
considerable evidence for the use of mental-imagery-based problem solving strategies, 
few AI systems have attempted to reason using visual representations (see Glasgow & 
Papadias, 1992 for one example).  Many AI systems that work in visual domains first 
convert problem inputs into propositional form and then solve the problem (e.g. 
Chandrasekaran et al., 2011; Davies, Goel, & Nersessian, 2009; Larkin & Simon, 1987).  
From the perspective of building intelligent machines, the AI focus on propositional 
representations ignores evolutionary arguments for the primacy and importance of 
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perceptual representations for very basic forms of intelligent behavior (Brooks, 1991).  In 
fact, the difficulty AI has faced in problem domains like navigation and visual 
recognition suggests that perhaps propositional repres ntations may not be sufficient for 
general intelligence.  One important exception can be found in how, in recent decades, 
the field of computer vision has emerged from its early roots in AI to focus on the 
processing and understanding of visual information, though computer vision does not 
address how visual representations might be used in high-level problem solving. 
 
Problem Statement for Artificial Intelligence:   
AI problem-solving systems built to date have focused almost exclusively on 
using propositional representations, even for the representation of visual 
information, but these accounts do not model the use  of mental imagery 
observed in human problem-solving. 
 
To investigate this problem, I consider the same problem domain described in the 
previous section: the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) test.  As I mentioned, there is 
evidence from behavioral and neuroimaging studies of humans for the use of both visual 
and verbal strategies on the RPM, and yet the vast m jority of computational models of 
the RPM have focused purely on propositional representations of the visual knowledge 
found on the test.   
This work builds upon a long line of related research on analogical reasoning. These 
studies have shown how functional and causal knowledge of physical systems enables 
analogical reminding and transfer in both within-domain analogies (Goel, Bhatta, & 
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Stroulia, 1997; Goel & Chandrasekaran, 1988) and cross-domain analogies (Goel & 
Bhatta, 2004; Griffith, Nersessian, & Goel, 2000).  In this work, functional and causal 
knowledge was represented propositionally. 
Later work showed that visual knowledge and reasoning alone can address some 
classes of analogy problems that had been assumed to require causal knowledge and 
reasoning (Davies & Goel, 2001; Davies, Goel, & Yaner, 2008).  This research also 
showed how visual analogies can account for several aspects of creative problem solving 
in scientific discovery (Davies, Nersessian, & Goel, 2005) and engineering design 
(Davies, Goel, & Nersessian, 2009).  All of these studies, however, used propositional 
representations; while the content of knowledge was visuospatial, the form of 
representation was still propositional. 
In the growing cognitive science literature on analogy, several other lines of research 
have explored visual  analogies (e.g. Casakin & Goldschmidt, 1999; Clement, 2008; 
Croft & Thagard, 2002;  Davies & Goel, 2008;  Evans, 1968; Hofstadter, 1995; Leyton, 
2001; Nersessian, 2008; Ojha & Indurkhya, 2009; Stafford, 2001; Yaner & Goel, 2006).  
Many factors explain this emphasis on visual analogy:  for example, the requirements of 
task and domain, explanations of behavioral data, and consistency with theories of mental 
imagery.  Another important reason is that visual analogies support the construction of 
representations as well as re-representations, as advoc ted, for instance, by Indurkhya 
(1998) and Kokinov (1998).  Indeed, Chalmers, French, and Hofstadter (1992) view 
much of analogy as high-level perception in which representations are constructed rather 
than assumed as given. These various theories of visual analogy, however, differ along 
dimensions of modal/amodal and iconic/propositional representations. 
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To investigate problem solving on the RPM using visual representations from a 
computational perspective, I present two research questions: 
1) To what extent can a purely visual strategy, implemented as a computational 
model, be successful on the RPM tests? 
2) How do changes in the underlying representational commitments of the model 
affect its behavior? 
For question 1, as mentioned in the previous section, I constructed a computational 
model called the “ASTI model” to solve RPM problems using purely visual 
representations.  For question 2, I conducted computational experiments to test how 
changing the representations used by the ASTI model, in particular through varying the 
model’s perceptual interpretation of figure-ground separation and through altering its 
similarity function, affect its performance on the SPM.   
The main contributions of this work are listed below: 
1) I have developed and implemented a model for visual re soning using affine 
and set transformations for high-level problem solving. 
2) I have tested this model against unedited and uninterpreted versions of the 
RPM tests, which is the first instance of a computation l model that can solve 
RPM problems using images scanned directly from the paper test booklets.   
There are many important areas for future work, including identifying what other 
classes of problems the ASTI model might be able to address, exploring the extent to 
which the ASTI model provides a model of the types of visual reasoning humans perform 
on the RPM, and augmenting the ASTI model with additional visual reasoning 
capabilities to further evaluate the problem-solving power provided by a visual strategy. 
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1.5 Dissertation Overview 
Table 2 summarizes the problem statements, research questions, and studies presented 
in this introductory chapter.  The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: 
• Chapter 2 presents the results of the two studies that I performed to evaluate 
the Thinking in Pictures (TiP) hypothesis about cognition in autism. 
• Chapter 3 first summarizes data on strategy use on the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices (RPM) tests from both computational and behavioral studies.  I then 
describe the representations, reasoning, and problem solving architecture of 
the ASTI model, and presents results generated fromtesting the ASTI model 
against the RPM tests and from experiments that vary the representational 
commitments made by the model. 
• Chapter 4 summarizes existing approaches to problem type categorization on 
the RPM tests and then presents results of ablation experiments performed 
using the ASTI model to generate a new classification of RPM problems 
based on their information processing demands. 
• Chapter 5 summarizes existing approaches for analyzi g the errors made by 
individuals on the RPM, describes a new classificaton of error types on the 
Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) test, and then pr sents results of an 
observational study comparing error patterns on the SPM among TD 
individuals, individuals with autism, and the ASTI model. 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 VISUAL PROBLEM SOLVING IN AUTISM 
In this chapter, I explore what I call the Thinking in Pictures (TiP) hypothesis about 
cognition in autism.  This hypothesis is named after th  well-known autobiography of 
Temple Grandin (2006), a woman with autism who believ s that she “thinks in pictures.”  
Grandin often describes how her visual thinking style provides benefits in some areas, 
such as in drafting and visualizing complex machinery for her work in engineering 
design, but also creates difficulties in other areas, such as in forming categories or 
understanding abstract concepts in her day-to-day life. Numerous other individuals on 
the autism spectrum have also posited that they tend to use visual mental representations 
instead of verbal ones (e.g. Hurlburt et al. 1994), though this phenomenon has not been 
documented in a systematic way. 
In particular, I address two research questions: 
1) To what extent is published research on cognitive tasks consistent with the TiP 
account, i.e. individuals with autism exhibit a bias towards using visual mental 
representations and away from using verbal ones? 
2) To what extent does the TiP account provide a better xplanation of published 
research on cognitive tasks than do other current theories of cognition in autism? 
I first describe my predictions and methods, and I then present the results of my research 
on both questions, followed by a discussion of my claims and areas for future work.   
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2.1 Predictions of the TiP Hypothesis 
A simplistic consideration of the TiP hypothesis might lead to predictions that 
individuals with autism will show good performance on visual tasks and poor 
performance on verbal tasks.  In fact, general evidence suggesting a visual/verbal 
disparity among individuals on the autism spectrum can be found in studies of cognitive 
profiles, or patterns of verbal (V) versus nonverbal (NV) intelligence as measured by 
standardized IQ tests.  Some studies have noted a V < N  (lower verbal than nonverbal 
IQ) pattern among individuals on the autism spectrum (Lincoln et al. 1988), though such 
findings have not been universal (Klin et al. 1995; Siegel et al. 1996).  Joseph et al. 
(2002) found that, while children with autism were generally more likely to have a V-NV 
discrepancy in either direction than were TD children, children with autism having a V < 
NV pattern of abilities showed greater social impairment than the other children with 
autism, irrespective of absolute levels of verbal or general ability.  The distinctiveness of 
the V < NV profile, and also its association with variables of diagnostic interest, led the 
authors to conjecture that such a profile might indicate “an etiologically significant 
subtype of autism” reflecting fundamental changes in cognition and neuroanatomy, rather 
than just the selective sparing of certain nonverbal a ilities. 
However, looking purely at existing measures of visual and verbal ability does not 
take into account the possibility of alternate strategies.  In particular, psychology has 
classified cognitive tasks as visual or verbal according to how they are typically solved, 
without accounting for the alternate classification f how they might be solved using 
alternate strategies.  Figure 1 illustrates the potntial overlap between these two types of 
task classifications.  The solid and dashed circles (A and B) represent tasks that can be 
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solved visually or verbally, respectively, and their intersection (A ∩ B) represents tasks 
that can be solved either way.  For example, matching one of two very similar shades of 
red to a target red patch can be solved using visual representations but not using verbal 
ones (at least not easily), and so this task lies inside solid circle A but outside dashed 
circle B.  On the other hand, determining which of the words shoe or now rhymes with 
the word too can be solved using phonological verbal representatio s but not using visual 
ones, and so this task lies inside dashed circle B but outside solid circle A.  Finally, 
deciding which of two red and green colored patches matches a target red patch can be 
solved using either visual or verbal representations (e.g. by matching on visual hue or on 
linguistic label), and so this task lies in the intersection A ∩ B. 
 
Figure 1.  Task classifications according to how they can be solved (solid and dashed 
circles) and how they are typically solved (light and dark grey shadings). 
The light grey and dark grey shaded regions (TA and TB) represent tasks that are 
typically solved visually or verbally, respectively.  The bulk of psychological evidence 
on how most humans solve cognitive tasks has given us TA and TB, by definition.  
However, for a typically verbal task in TB, if that task happens to also be solvable 
visually (i.e. lies within A ∩ B), it is possible that an individual disinclined to use verbal 
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representations can use a visual strategy to successfully solve that task, and vice versa.  
By making these distinctions, the performance of an individual on a given task can be 
evaluated independently of their strategy selection.  Keeping this is mind, the TiP 
hypothesis can be used to make general predictions about the behavior of individuals 
with autism on three different types of tasks, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Behavioral predictions of the TiP hypothesis for strategy use and performance 
of typically developing (TD) individuals and individuals with autism (AUT). 







exclusively in B tasks that can only  be done verbally verbal successful visual impaired 
in TA tasks typically  done visually visual successful visual successful 
in TB  ∩ A 
tasks typically done 
verbally that can be  
done visually 
verbal successful visual successful 
 
The first prediction is, perhaps, the least useful for testing the TiP hypothesis, as 
impaired performance on verbal-only tasks is unlikely to inform us about what mental 
representations an individual who thinks in pictures is using; for instance, such 
individuals may not be engaging any task-relevant representations at all.  Also, data from 
these tasks will not be very useful as a point of distinction between the TiP hypothesis 
and other cognitive-deficit accounts of autism.   
Regarding the second prediction, that individuals with autism use visual strategies to 
solve tasks that are also typically solved visually, a conservative claim might be that the 
visual strategies used by the two groups are the same, and therefore no behavioral 
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differences in either task performance or strategy selection ought to be observed.  
However, there is significant evidence for behavioral differences in autism on typically 
visual tasks, ranging from changes in low-level perception (e.g. Bertone et al. 2005) to 
superior performance on certain visual tasks like the Embedded Figures Task (e.g. Jolliffe 
& Baron-Cohen, 1997).  One possible TiP explanation of these differences is that a bias 
towards using visual representations leads to a general “visual expertise” not shared by 
TD individuals.  However, these findings can also been interpreted as indications of other 
forms of atypical cognitive processing, for example of greater detail-oriented processing 
(Happé & Frith, 2006) or superior low-level perceptual abilities (Mottron et al. 2006).  If 
such processing differences are an integral aspect of autism, one important question for 
TiP will be how such differences might be related to a visual representation bias.  In 
general, data from typically visual tasks are not necessarily the best test of the TiP 
hypothesis, as they alone cannot distinguish between th  TiP account and other cognitive 
theories that posit superior or atypical aspects of cognitive processing in autism. 
The third prediction, regarding tasks typically solved verbally that can also be solved 
visually, is the most useful for directly testing the TiP hypothesis.  In particular, for a 
given task in this category, not only should there be evidence of successful performance 
by individuals with autism, but it should also be possible to measure secondary 
behavioral or neurological characteristics that point to a difference in the underlying 
strategy being used.  This third TiP prediction provides the surest means of distinguishing 
TiP from other cognitive theories of autism, as (insofar as I have seen) no other cognitive 




The first research question I address is this chapter is:  to what extent is published 
research on cognitive tasks consistent with the TiP account, i.e. individuals with autism 
exhibit a bias towards using visual mental representations and away from using verbal 
ones?  The specific predictions of the TiP hypothesis are: 
1) On tasks that can only be done verbally, individuals with autism will show 
impaired performance. 
2) On tasks that are typically done visually, individuals with autism will show intact 
performance. 
3) On tasks that are typically done verbally but can be done visually, individuals 
with autism will show intact performance and will aso exhibit secondary 
behavioral or neurological markers that point to the use of a visual strategy. 
The first prediction is already consistent with general evidence for verbal impairments in 
autism—verbal impairment is, in fact, a definitional criterion of the disorder (DSM-IV-
TR, 2000)—and so I did not address this prediction during the course of this research. 
To test the second two predictions, I conducted a narrative literature review that 
sampled from the space of cognitive tasks found in the autism literature to provide a 
qualitative analysis of published data on each task.  Tasks were selected according to two 
specific criteria.  First, there had to be some evid nce that the task fell into the relevant 
task category, i.e. for prediction #2, the task is typically done visually, and for prediction 
#3, the task is typically done verbally but at least some evidence exists to suggest that the 
task is amenable to successful solution using a visual trategy.  Second, there had to be at 
least two published studies in the autism literature comparing performance on the task 
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between individuals with autism and TD individuals. 
The tasks that were selected according to these criteria are: 
1) Tasks typically done verbally that can be done visually:   
a) The n-back task 
b) Serial recall 
c) Dual task studies 
d) Raven’s progressive matrices 
e) Semantic processing 
f) False belief tasks 
2) Tasks typically done visually:   
a) Visual search 
b) Spatial recall 
c) Visual recall 
To find the studies of each task, potential articles were first located through searching 
online using Google Scholar or following reference trails in articles that I had already 
found.  The time period was inclusive from the beginnings of cognitive research in 
autism until the time of the study in 2010.  Studies considered for this review were 
restricted to those in which the diagnostic group had a diagnosis of “Autistic disorder.”  
Studies in which this diagnosis was predominant, but a few individuals had other 
diagnoses on the autism spectrum, such as Asperger’s Syndrome or Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder-Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS) were included.  Studies of 
participants only with diagnoses of Asperger’s or PDD-NOS were excluded.  Finally, 
studies were not screened on the basis of any otherexclusionary criteria such as sample 
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size or demographic characteristics. 
The second research question addressed in this chapter is: to what extent does the TiP 
account provide a better explanation of published rsearch on cognitive tasks than do 
other current theories of cognition in autism?  In particular, for each existing cognitive 
theory of autism, I made the following two predictions: 
1) The theory cannot explain empirical data showing a visual bias in autism for tasks 
that are typically done verbally but can be done visually. 
2) For the major representative cognitive tasks that are currently cited in support of 
the theory, TiP provides at least as good an explanatio  for established findings. 
To test these predictions, I performed another narrative literature review centered on each 
major cognitive theory in autism: Mindblindness, Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central 
Coherence, and Enhanced Perceptual Functioning.  These t eories are commonly cited as 
the main cognitive theories of autism.  For each theory, I selected a small set of example 
tasks cited in the literature and provided a qualitative analysis of results and 
interpretations on these tasks.  These selected tasks were restricted to those for which 
there was a published literature review in summary articles for each cognitive theory that 
examined the historical body of research on the task.   
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2.3 Review of Cognitive Tasks in Autism 
2.3.1 The n-back task 
In the n-back task (Kirchner, 1958), a subject is presented with a sequence of stimuli 
and asked whether the current stimulus matches that shown n steps ago.  The variable n 
can take the value of one (respond “yes” to any succession of two identical stimuli), two 
(respond “yes” to any stimulus matching that presented two steps back), etc.  Stimuli can 
vary in content and presentation, e.g. letters present d visually or auditorily, pictures, etc. 
For TD individuals, the n-back task is thought to recruit verbal rehearsal 
processes in working memory (i.e. phonological verbal representations), among other 
executive resources (Smith & Jonides, 1999).  Several published studies of the n-back 
task have not shown significant differences in accura y or reaction time for individuals 
with autism relative to TD controls (see Table 4), which has led, in some cases, to the 
conclusion that verbal working memory is intact in autism (Williams et al. 2005). 
However, recent fMRI studies have shown that, while behavioral measures on the 
n-back task may be similar, there can be significant differences in patterns of brain 
activation between individuals with autism and TD controls.  In one study using stimuli 
of visually presented letters, the autism group showed less brain activation than controls 
in left prefrontal and parietal regions associated with verbal processing and greater 
activation in right hemisphere and posterior regions associated with visual processing 
(Koshino et al. 2005).  In another study using stimul  of photographs of faces, a similar 
decrease in left prefrontal activation was found in the autism group (Koshino et al. 2008).  
Both of these studies suggest that individuals with autism may be using a visual strategy 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3.2 Serial recall 
In serial recall tasks, a subject is presented with a sequence of randomly ordered 
stimuli and then asked to reproduce the sequence in order, after a short delay.  These 
tasks generally involve the visual or auditory presentation of letters, numbers, words, or 
pictures, after which the subject has to verbally repeat the sequence or point to items in 
the correct order. 
For TD individuals, serial recall tasks are thought to recruit primarily verbal rehearsal 
processes in working memory (i.e. phonological verbal representations), for instance as 
evidenced by decreased memory spans for long words—the word length effect—or for 
phonologically similar items—the phonological similarity effect (Baddeley, 2003).  
These verbal effects are seen even with visually presented stimuli in TD children above 
seven years of age, suggesting that in later development, TD individuals tend to recode 
visual stimuli into a verbal form (Hitch et al. 1989).  In younger TD children, there is 
evidence for visual (and not verbal) encoding of visual stimuli in the form of decreased 
memory spans for visually similar items—the visual similarity effect (Hitch et al. 1989b). 
Several published studies on serial recall tasks show no significant group differences 
in overall performance between individuals with autism and controls (see Table 5).  As 
with the n-back task, these data are often used to indicate intact verbal working memory 
in autism.  For example, standardized tests such as the WISC and the WRAML use 
number and letter span subtests as components of verbal IQ, and individuals with autism 
have often shown peaks of ability on these particular subtests (Siegel et al. 1996).  
However, additional behavioral data, such as the presence or absence of the word length 
or similarity effects described in the previous paragraph, should be considered to 
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determine what strategy an individual is actually using. 
Two studies have examined the robustness of the word length effect in individuals 
with autism.  Russell et al. (1996) found, for auditorily presented stimuli, no difference in 
word length effect in a verbal response condition between children with autism and TD 
controls as well as a group with moderate learning disabilities, but, oddly, the autism 
group’s word length effect actually increased in a nonverbal (pointing) response 
condition.  In contrast, Whitehouse et al. (2006) used visually presented stimuli with 
verbal responses and found a smaller word length effect in the autism group than in TD 
controls.  Also, the word length effect increased in the autism group in an overt labeling 
condition, suggesting that the autism group may have relied to a lesser extent on verbal 
encoding than controls when not biased to do so by having to produce labels.   
Williams et al. (2008) looked at a similar recall task with visually presented stimuli 
and verbal responses and measured the robustness of the phonological similarity and 
visual similarity effects in children with autism and in a control group with learning 
disabilities.  They found no group differences in recall performance, but when subjects 
were divided by their verbal mental age (VMA), those with VMA over 7 years had better 
overall recall performance and a significant phonolgical similarity effect but no visual 
similarity effect, while subjects with VMA less than 7 years exhibited the opposite 
pattern.  In other words, this study found VMA to better predict strategy use than did 
diagnostic group, and additional analyses found VMA to be a better predictor than 
cognitive profiles as well (Williams & Jarrold, 201).  While the authors of this study did 
not discount the significance of cognitive profile in predicting strategy use, they 
cautioned against treating it as the only variable of relevance, and they also pointed out 
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the importance of looking at variables like VMA and cognitive profile, in addition to 
diagnostic group, in assessing results in experimental studies of autism.  On both of these 
points, we wholeheartedly agree, and the question of how to experimentally identify and 
analyze data from subgroups within the ASD population is central to the continued 
understanding of how individuals with autism utilize various forms of mental 
representations.  
In summary, many studies have reported individuals with autism achieving similar 
levels of performance on serial recall tasks as TD individuals, but at least some of these 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3.3 Dual task studies 
Dual task studies aim to discern task strategy choices by looking at whether executing 
a simultaneous secondary task interferes with performance (Brooks, 1968).  The basic 
assumption of the dual-task paradigm is that, because different cognitive modalities (e.g. 
visual versus verbal) draw upon separate and limited cognitive resources, performing two 
tasks simultaneously using the same modality will degrade performance more than 
performing two tasks that use different modalities (Jonides et al. 1996; Navon & Gopher, 
1979).  Whether a primary task uses a certain modality can be determined by finding out 
whether the simultaneous execution of a secondary task known to involve those resources 
affects performance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  Secondary tasks (a.k.a. suppression 
tasks) can be very simple, so there is little ambiguity about what cognitive resources are 
being used.  Verbal or articulatory suppression (i.e. recruiting phonological verbal 
representations) often consists of repeating a word out loud.  Visuospatial suppression 
can include holding an image in memory or performing a simple tapping or pointing task. 
Dual task studies offer a good test of the TiP hypothesis, because their results can 
clearly indicate, for a particular individual or group, whether visual or verbal cognitive 
resources are necessary for some primary task.  In particular, across a range of primary 
tasks typically done verbally (tasks for which contr ls show impairments under verbal 
but not visual suppression), the TiP hypothesis predicts that individuals with autism will 
show impairments under visual but not verbal suppression.  Only a handful of dual task 
studies have been performed with individuals on the autism spectrum, and although none 
have had exactly this form, all have shown results generally consistent with the TiP 
hypothesis, though not necessarily interpreted as such. 
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García-Villamisar and Della Sala (2002) used a prima y task of serial recall, with 
verbal recall of auditorily presented digits, and a secondary suppression task of 
visuomotor tracking, in which subjects had to manually mark a series of boxes on paper.  
No group differences were found for either task performed singly, but when performed 
together, the autism group showed a significant impairment on both tasks, while the 
control group showed no impairment.  The authors read these results as marking a 
general deficit in simultaneous task performance in autism, but these data could also 
indicate that the group with autism was using a visual strategy for the digit span task, 
which, unlike the verbal strategy used by controls, was open to interference from the 
visual suppression task.  Moreover, as discussed below, other dual task studies in autism 
have not found evidence of a general dual-tasking deficit. 
Whitehouse et al. (2006) conducted a dual-task experiment in which the primary task 
was task-switching in written arithmetic, in which subjects had to alternately add and 
subtract pairs of numbers, and the secondary task w verbal suppression, with subjects 
repeating “Monday” out loud.  No group differences were found in latency or accuracy in 
the single-task condition.  However, the control group showed an increase in latency 
under articulatory suppression, matching previous studies on task switching in TD 
individuals (Baddeley et al. 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003), while the autism group did 
not.  These results go against the idea of a general imp irment in dual task performance 
in autism and also suggest that the autism group used a nonverbal (though not necessarily 
visual) task-switching strategy.  Lidstone et al. (2009) re-analyzed these data divided by 
cognitive profile and found that the lack of a latency increase under articulatory 
suppression was limited to children with autism having a V < NV profile, irrespective of 
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absolute levels of verbal ability.  Controls with a V < NV profile did show impaired dual 
task performance under articulatory suppression, as did children with a V = NV profile in 
both groups.  Wallace et al. (2009) looked at the Tower of London planning task as the 
primary task, with a secondary task of articulatory suppression, and similarly found that 
the control group showed a significant impairment in their primary task performance 
under articulatory suppression, whereas the autism group showed no such impairment.   
Holland and Low (2010) repeated the task switching experiment of Whitehouse et al. 
(2006) but with an added visuospatial suppression task, with subjects tapping out a 
simple pattern on a set of blocks using their non-dminant hand.  As in the study by 
Whitehouse et al. (2006), there were no significant group differences in latency or 
accuracy in the single-task condition.  Dual task results showed that the autism group 
exhibited an increase in task-switching latency under visuospatial suppression but not 
under articulatory suppression, while the control gr up showed a similar latency increase 
under both suppression conditions.  Similar dual-task results were obtained in a second 
experiment that looked at a Tower of Hanoi planning task.  At first glance, these data 
seem to suggest that the autism group used visuospatial but not verbal resources for task-
switching and planning, while controls used both visuospatial and verbal resources for 
both tasks.  However, in the task-switching experimnt, both groups also showed an 
increase in latency under visuospatial suppression for a baseline, non-task-switching 
version of the arithmetic task, suggesting that the visuospatial suppression task may have 
interfered with peripheral, non-task-switching demands of the primary task.  For instance, 
the visuomotor demands of tapping blocks with the non-dominant hand while writing 
arithmetic answers with the dominant hand may have been in contention, in which case 
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the visuospatial suppression task did not really target high-level task-switching resources. 
While none of these dual-task studies taken singly provides a definitive test of the TiP 
hypothesis, together they are highly suggestive of individuals with autism using visual 
strategies for certain tasks that are typically done verbally. 
2.3.4 Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) is a standardized 
intelligence test that consists of problems resembling geometric analogies, and published 
literature on the RPM suggests that TD individuals use a combination of visual and 
verbal strategies on this task.  Recent research on the RPM has found an interesting 
discrepancy between the performance of TD individuals and individuals with autism.  
Whereas the RPM scores of TD individuals are usually strongly matched by their 
Wechsler IQ scores, individuals with autism have demonstrated RPM scores much higher 
than their Wechsler scores (Bölte et al. 2009; Dawson et al. 2007; Mottron, 2004).  
Individuals with Asperger’s syndrome have shown a similar pattern (Hayashi et al. 2008).   
One explanation for the RPM/Wechsler score discrepancies found in autism is that, 
while poor verbal abilities may in fact decrease performance on full-scale IQ tests, intact 
visual abilities might be recruited to successfully solve many RPM problems, which are 
after all visually presented and do not explicitly require any overt verbal abilities.  
Consistent with this explanation, Soulières et al. (2009) found, using fMRI, that 
individuals with autism had lower brain activation i  prefrontal and parietal areas 
associated with language and working memory and higher activation in visual occipital 
areas than TD individuals did while solving the RPM.  On a related but non-RPM set of 
matrix reasoning tasks, Sahyoun et al. (2009) found evi ence through measures of 
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response latency that individuals with autism exhibited a bias towards using visuospatial 
mediation, whereas TD individuals and individuals with Asperger’s seemed able to use 
verbal mediation in solving the problems. 
2.3.5 Semantic processing 
Evidence from neuropsychology has suggested that visual and verbal semantic 
memory are somewhat dissociated, in that brain lesions can selectively impair the use of 
one or the other (Hart & Gordon, 1992).  However, whether this dissociation reflects two 
separate, modality-specific semantic stores or a single store with multiple, modality-
specific access schemes is unclear (Caramazza, 1996; Farah & McClelland, 1991).  
Either way, the TiP hypothesis predicts that indiviuals with autism have privileged or 
primary access to visual semantic information, whereas TD individuals are capable of 
accessing both visual and verbal semantics. 
In one well-designed fMRI study, Kana et al. (2006) studied brain activation in 
individuals with autism and TD individuals while they answered true/false questions 
about high or low imagery sentences.  High imagery s ntences included statements like, 
“The number eight when rotated 90 degrees looks like a pair of eyeglasses,” while low 
imagery sentences included statements like, “Addition, subtraction, and multiplication are 
all math skills.”  One way to conceptualize these two classes of stimuli is as follows:   
(a) High imagery sentences require semantic understanding plus visual reasoning.   
(b) Low imagery sentences require semantic understanding only. 
The control group showed a significant difference between the high and low imagery 
conditions, with the high imagery condition eliciting more activity from temporal and 
parietal regions associated with mental imagery as well as from inferior frontal regions 
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associated with verbal processing.  This pattern fits the model that visual regions are used 
for visual reasoning, while verbal regions are used for lexical and semantic processing.  
(The baseline used for both conditions was a fixation task that involved no linguistic 
processing.)  In contrast, the autism group showed similar activation in both conditions, 
with less activity in inferior frontal language regions than the control group in the high 
imagery condition, and greater activity in occipital and parietal visual regions in the low 
imagery condition.  This pattern suggests that the individuals with autism may have used 
visual regions for both visual reasoning and semantic processing. 
Many other studies have found significant differences in brain activity during 
semantic processing tasks between individuals with au ism and TD controls, although the 
precise patterns of results have varied.  Like the study by Kana et al. (2006), Gaffrey et 
al. (2007) found increased activation in posterior visual regions and decreased activation 
in frontal verbal regions for individuals with ASD during a task of determining whether a 
word belonged to certain semantic categories (tools, c lors, and feelings), with a baseline 
perceptual processing task.  However, Just et al. (2004), in a study of sentence 
comprehension with a fixation baseline, found reduc activity in visual, occipito-parietal 
regions in subjects with autism compared to TD controls, though the autism group did 
also show decreased activity in frontal language regions.  Harris et al. (2006) found 
similar results of reduced frontal language region activation in an ASD group compared 
to TD controls during a word judging task with a perceptual processing baseline, and also 
found that the ASD group showed more similar activation in some language regions 
between the semantic and perceptual tasks than did the control group.  In contrast, Knaus 
et al. (2008) used a response-naming task with a perce tual processing baseline and 
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found that subjects with ASD had greater activation in frontal and temporal language 
areas than did TD controls. 
One important factor in neuroimaging studies of semantic processing is the choice of 
a baseline task.  For TD individuals, lexical-semantic tasks are often paired with 
perceptual processing tasks that use letter or word stimuli, in order to remove any 
perceptual components of the semantic understanding process.  However, if a subject 
uses visual neural machinery to do semantic processing, then it is possible that 
subtracting the brain activation due to a perceptual processing task may remove semantic-
related activation in visual regions as well. 
In addition to these neuroimaging studies, several behavioral studies have also looked 
at semantic processing in individuals with autism.  Kamio and Toichi (2000) used a 
word-completion task in which semantic priming was provided using either picture cues 
or word cues.  TD controls performed similarly under both conditions, but the autism 
group performed much better with picture cues than word cues, suggesting that they were 
better able to retrieve verbal information through pictorial representations than through 
other verbal representations.  Lopez and Leekam (2003) found that children with autism 
were as capable as TD controls of using visual semantic context to facilitate object 
identification; the same pattern was found for verbal semantic information, though ceiling 
effects were a possible confound in the verbal case. 
In summary, while existing data are mixed, current modality-specific models of 
semantic memory (whether modality-specific in indexing alone or in storage as well) 
make semantic processing a good candidate for further testing of the TiP hypothesis. 
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2.3.6 False belief tasks 
False belief tasks represent one experimental paradigm for testing theory of mind 
abilities, which center on the attribution of mentalistic or belief states to external entities.  
Theory of mind, in turn, represents one component of social cognition.  False belief tasks 
comprise one domain that is widely found to be impaired among individuals on the 
autism spectrum (see review in Happé, 1995), and deficits in theory of mind (e.g. 
Mindblindness) and other aspects of social cognitio have been suggested to be a central 
facet of autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005).   
One classic test of false belief understanding is the Sally-Anne task (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983), in which the subject is shown a skit with two dolls, Sally and Anne.  Sally 
places a marble into a basket and, after Anne leaves the room, moves the marble from the 
basket into a box.  The subject is then asked where Anne will look for the marble when 
she returns.  Responding correctly, that Anne will look in the basket, requires an 
understanding of Anne’s false belief that the marble is still in the basket; Anne’s belief is 
false in that it represents something that the subject watching the skit knows is not true. 
Many interpretations of false belief task performance in autism posit that there is 
some fundamentally social deficit that leads to impaired theory of mind abilities (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen, 1995).  One contrasting view is that false belief impairments in autism 
stem from a domain-general bias against using verbal representations, not from a domain-
specific difference in social cognition.  In particular, verbal mental age has been found to 
be strongly correlated with performance on false belief tasks in both individuals with 
autism and in TD controls (Happé, 1995; Yirmiya et al. 1998).  While this pattern seems 
amenable to a straightforward TiP interpretation, it ra ses the question of precisely how 
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verbal mental representations might be related to false belief tasks.   
One possibility is that standard false belief tasks, which require explicit language 
comprehension and responding, overtax the weak language skills of individuals with 
autism.  However, individuals with autism also show impairments on nonverbal 
analogues of false-belief tasks such as eye-tracking studies, making this explanation 
unlikely (Senju et al. 2009; Senju et al. 2010). 
A second possibility is that linguistic verbal mental representations are required for 
developing concepts of false belief, on which both verbal and nonverbal versions of false-
belief tasks rely (e.g. Fernyhough, 2008).  However, two-year-old TD infants exhibit 
visual attentional patterns that seem to draw upon an understanding of false beliefs before 
significant linguistic abilities have developed (Southgate et al. 2007).  While there is 
almost certainly a strong connection between linguistic representations and theory of 
mind abilities, these types of eye-tracking studies ca t doubt on whether the relationship 
is strictly causal and sequential. 
A third possibility, which we espouse, is that verbal representations are, after all, used 
to form false belief concepts, but where “verbal” in this case refers to propositional 
representations, not linguistic representations.  Propositions can be thought of as the 
building blocks of a low-level representational system, where a single proposition takes 
the form of a related set of symbols that carries smantic meaning.  Linguistic 
representations occur at a much higher level of abstr ction than propositions and are 
explicitly tied to a particular language. 
The idea of false belief impairments in autism having a low-level representational 
origin is not new; constructing false belief concepts has been described as requiring, for 
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instance, the representation of complements (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2003; Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2003) or meta-representation (Leslie, 1987).  The gist of these arguments 
is that, in order to represent a false belief, an individual must have some mechanism for 
representing a statement as being held to be true in one context (e.g. as believed by an 
agent in a story), alongside the property of its being false in a different context (e.g. in the 
story itself).  Recent modeling work in cognitive architectures has found that this type of 
information structure can be easily represented using propositions (Bello & Cassimatis, 
2006).   
From this perspective, individual performance on “mental” and “non-mental” 
versions of false belief tasks should be correlated.  While for a time, several visual tasks 
such as the false photograph, false map, and false drawing tasks were thought to be 
appropriate non-mental analogues of false belief tasks (e.g. Leekam & Perner, 1991; 
Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), Perner and Leekam (2008) have 
argued that these tasks do not tap the same representational structure as standard false 
belief tasks.  Instead, they propose that the false sign (or false signal) task is the more 
appropriate non-mental analogue, and in support of their claim, correlated patterns of 
impairments have been observed in autism on the false signal task and standard false 
belief tasks (Bowler et al. 2005).  These results support the view of false belief 
competency being more a function of domain-general representational ability than of 
domain-specific social ability.  
Nevertheless, studies investigating performance across visual reasoning tasks, such as 
the false photograph and map tasks, and theory of mind reasoning tasks, such as standard 
false belief tasks, do reveal some very interesting patterns of results.  Figure 2 gives a 
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summary of results from studies that compared the performance of individuals with 
autism on visual false-item tasks with their performance on standard false belief tasks.  
Each data point represents the performance of a single group, as indexed in the legend, on 
the visual versus false belief tasks.  Numbers within each data point refer to the 
experiment number in Table 6, which contains demographic and experimental design 
information.  Note that this figure is intended as a qualitative illustration of trends in 
published data and not as a strict quantitative analysis. 
These data, along with similar results on other visual tasks such as matching the state 
of a true model or photograph to a room (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1995) and visual 
perspective taking (Reed & Peterson, 1990), suggest that many individuals with autism 
who show impaired performance on false belief tasks can exhibit intact or superior 
performance on these types of visual tasks.  TD individuals, in contrast, seem equally 
predisposed towards having strengths on either one or the other (or both) of these task 
types, which we would expect if they emerge independently in normal development. 
Finally, if false belief impairments in autism are due to deficits in underlying 
propositional representations, then false belief tasks may seem to fall under the first TiP 
prediction, regarding tasks only solvable verbally.  However, there have been some 
recent attempts to help individuals with autism represent false belief concepts visually, 
for instance using thought bubbles or photograph-in-the-head analogies (McGregor et al. 
1998a, 1998b; Swettenham et al. 1996; Wellman et al. 2002).  These studies have 
generally shown positive results in teaching subjects to pass specific false belief tasks but 




Figure 2.  Summary of results from published studies of standard false belief versus 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3.7 Visual search 
One widely reported area of superior performance for individuals on the autism 
spectrum is visual search.  For example, individuals on the spectrum have repeatedly 
demonstrated more accurate and/or more efficient performance on the Embedded Figures 
Task (EFT), in which a small figure must be located within a larger, more complex one 
(see review in Happé & Frith, 2006).  Several recent papers have looked at classic 
target/distracter visual search tasks and have found similar patterns of superior 
performance by individuals on the autism spectrum, often through faster response 
latencies (see Table 7).  Moreover, faster search performance in autism often grows more 
pronounced with more difficult search tasks, e.g. for conjunctive vs. feature search. 
Studies of the EFT using fMRI have shown that individuals with autism tend to 
recruit more occipital visual processing brain regions for this task, whereas TD controls 
recruit more frontal and parietal working memory regions (Manjaly et al. 2007; Ring et 
al. 1999).  However, looking at a target/distracter s arch task, Keehn et al. (2008) found 
increased activation in individuals on the autism spectrum compared to TD controls in 
both frontoparietal and occipital regions.  This study also found that, while patterns of 
activation differed for controls between an easy feature search task and a more difficult 
one, no such differences were found for the autism group.  In addition, significant group 
differences in eye-movement patterns (Keehn et al. 2009) and in sensitivity to task 
parameters (Baldassi et al. 2009) have been found on visual search tasks.  These results 
are often explained by theories that posit processing trengths in autism, and in particular, 
some recent evidence suggests that enhanced low-level p rceptual discrimination may 
contribute to faster search in autism (Joseph et al. 2009). 
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In general, many studies point to the existence of significant and widespread 
differences between individuals on the autism spectrum and TD individuals on visual 
search tasks and in overall patterns of visual attention, and these differences seem to 
developmentally precede many other cognitive processes (Brenner et al. 2007).  Specific 
relationships between the TiP hypothesis and visual e rch and attention remain to be 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3.8 Spatial recall 
Serial spatial recall tasks are a part of many psychometric tests, such as Finger 
Windows in the WRAML.  These tasks involve the presentation of a sequence of spatial 
locations (e.g. holes on a card or blocks on a table), which the subject has to manually 
reproduce.  Another spatial recall task uses self-ordered pointing, in which the subject 
must point to locations not previously selected.  Both paradigms require the subject to 
reproduce a set or sequence of spatial locations.  I dividuals with autism often, but not 
always, show impaired performance on these tasks, and no studies of spatial recall were 
found in which the autism group showed superior performance (see Table 8). 
Given that serial recall for items or objects appears to be unimpaired in autism, there 
appears to be a dissociation between how well indivduals with autism remember visually 
discriminable items vs. visually indiscriminable spatial locations.  Although these results 
seem to contradict the TiP hypothesis, one explanatio  could be that the visual 
representations used by individuals with autism do not, by themselves, represent spatial 
information adequately.  In line with this idea, ontasks that combine visual and spatial 
information (i.e. recalling locations of visually discriminable stimuli), individuals with 
autism have shown intact performance (Ozonoff & Straye , 2001; Williams et al. 2006).   
Another possibility might be that spatial recall tasks actively recruit verbal working 
memory; correlations between spatial span and speech rate have been found in TD 
individuals, without similar correlations between spatial span and tapping or spatial 
movement rate (Chuah & Maybery, 1999; Smyth & Scholey, 1992, 1996).  Studies have 
also found that articulatory suppression can interfer  with spatial span tasks (Jones et al. 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3.9 Visual recall 
One form of visual recall test involves giving the subject an abstract design to draw 
from memory after an initial inspection.  Two examples are the Benton Visual Retention 
Test and the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Task.  The Rey-Osterrieth task includes a 
copy condition to identify perceptual or motor impairments that could confound results. 
Many studies of these tasks have revealed decreased performance in individuals with 
autism (see Table 9).  Given the patterns of intact and even superior performance found 
in other visual domains, these visual recall data are r ther puzzling.  Moreover, both the 
Rey and Benton tests have been found, in TD individuals, to be correlated with the Block 
Design subtest of the Wechsler scales and not correlated with verbal measures 
(Mitrushina et al. 2005; Strauss et al. 2006), and Block Design has been commonly cited 
as an area of particular strength for individuals with autism (Siegel et al. 1996). 
One explanation could be that perceptual and motor components of these drawing 
tasks cause difficulties for individuals with autism, rather than the memory requirements 
per se.  Ropar and Mitchell (2001) examined this posibility by comparing differences in 
copy and recall scores across groups and found no differences between TD controls and 
subjects with autism or Asperger’s.  Alternately, individuals with autism could have 
difficulty on the spatial but not visual aspects of these tasks.  Although the Rey-Osterrieth 
task is often described as a test of visual memory, the task contains both visual and 
spatial components that are somewhat dissociable (Breier et al. 1996). 
As with spatial recall, data on visual recall in autism are mixed at best.  It is unclear 
how these results fit the TiP hypothesis, and further study is needed of the cognitive 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4 Review of Cognitive Theories of Autism 
There are four main cognitive theories of autism often cited in the literature:  
Mindblindness, Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central Coherence, and Enhanced 
Perceptual Functioning.  A review of how research on Mindblindness, related to the TiP 
hypothesis was already presented in Section 2.3.6 on false belief tasks.  This section 
reviews data from the three remaining theories. 
The Executive Dysfunction (ED) theory posits impairments in a set of higher-level 
cognitive skills that underlie independent, goal-oriented behavior, such as planning, set-
shifting, and generativity (Russell, 1997).  However, vidence in support of the ED 
theory is consistent with the TiP hypothesis if thesp cific executive capacities found to 
be impaired in autism are those that cannot be performed using visual mental 
representations.  For example, individuals with autism are often impaired on the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), a test of set-shif ing in which subjects must 
maintain knowledge of a sorting rule and then switch the rule as needed (see review in 
Hill, 2004).  The WCST, however, has been found to rely heavily on language abilities 
and verbal working memory in TD individuals (Baldo et al. 2005).  More generally, 
Russell et al. (1999) propose that individuals with autism may have trouble primarily 
with executive tasks that require the implicit verbal encoding of rules.  However, despite 
these suggestive data, evaluating a potential link between executive functioning in autism 
and the TiP hypothesis will require re-examination of a wide range of tasks used to tap 
executive abilities to discern how they fit into the task decomposition presented earlier 
(i.e. can they be solved visually, verbally, or using either type of mental representation).   
The Weak Central Coherence (WCC) theory suggests that individuals with autism 
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may exhibit a bias towards local over global processing (Happé & Frith, 2006).  Evidence 
for the WCC theory shows patterns of either poor performance in individuals with autism 
on tasks that are said to rely on global processing of stimuli, or intact or superior 
performance on tasks that are said to rely on local processing.  However, at least some of 
the “local” tasks cited by the WCC theory are visual, e.g. embedded figures, block 
design, visual search, etc.  Likewise, certain WCC “global” tasks are verbal, e.g. 
homograph pronunciation.  For these tasks, the TiP hypothesis provides an explanation 
that is consistent with published data, although, as mentioned earlier, the TiP hypothesis 
does not currently provide a concrete explanation of autistic superiorities on certain tasks, 
beyond the speculation that a reliance on visual representations might lead to increased 
visual expertise.  Moreover, the WCC literature hasidentified several non-visual local 
tasks that are also performed well by individuals with autism, such as pitch and melody 
perception (see review in Happé & Frith, 2006).  The TiP hypothesis is, at present, silent 
about representational modalities other than visual or verbal, though these results 
question whether TiP should be extended to a more gen ral perceptual/verbal distinction. 
Along these lines, the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) theory proposes that 
individuals with autism have enhanced low level perceptual processing across a variety of 
modalities, in contrast to cognitive processing that involves higher levels of neural 
integration (Mottron et al. 2006).  For instance, sveral studies have found evidence of 
atypicalities, and often superiorities, in low-level visual perception in autism (e.g. 
Bertone et al. 2005; Vandenbroucke et al. 2008).  In addition to low-level perceptual 
enhancements and atypicalities, Ropar and Mitchell (2002) have proposed that autistic 
perception can be characterized, at least in certain task domains, as being less influenced 
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than in TD individuals by “top-down” cognitive processes that draw upon prior 
conceptual knowledge.  Caron et al. (2006) suggest that a combination of locally oriented 
processing and enhanced perceptual processing leads to superiorities in autism on visual 
tasks, for the subgroup of individuals who share these two traits.   
Unlike the TiP hypothesis, which at present focuses only on visual representations, 
EPF and other perceptual accounts of autism are stat d broadly to encompass a variety of 
perceptual modalities.  However, within consideration of the visual modality, there seems 
to be significant overlap between these accounts, especially in that both TiP and EPF 
propose “a successful, problem-solving use of perceptual [brain] areas” (Mottron et al. 
2006).  Also, inasmuch as working with verbal representations might fall under “high-
level” cognition, additional overlaps between TiP and EPF are likely.   
One major difference between the WCC and EPF theories and the TiP hypothesis is 
that WCC and EPF embody process accounts of cognition, equating various modalities—
visual, auditory, etc.—within each of two distinct types of processing—local vs. global, 
or perceptual vs. high-level.  TiP embodies a content account of cognition, equating 
various processing types—perception, working memory, l ng-term memory, etc.—within 
each of two distinct representational modalities—visual vs. verbal.  Another difference is 
that WCC and EPF explicitly account for autistic superiorities on certain visual tasks, 
whereas TiP does not currently propose a concrete mchanism for superior performance, 
though several possibilities, such as increased visual expertise or the absence of a verbal 
bias, remain to be explored.  It is plausible that these accounts are linked, both 
developmentally and cognitively, and the precise relationship between TiP and these 
theories remains to be determined.   
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2.5 Claims and Future Work 
The first study in this chapter reviews empirical dta from autism in several different 
task domains including an assessment of whether the data are consistent with my 
formulation of the Thinking in Pictures (TiP) hypothesis.  As expected, the results of this 
analysis are mixed.  Certain task domains offer evidence highly consistent with and well 
explained by the TiP hypothesis, including:  (1) the n-back task, (2) serial recall, (3) dual 
tasking, (4) Raven’s Progressive Matrices, (5) semantic processing, and (6) false belief 
tasks.  Other domains, while not inconsistent with the TiP hypothesis, are not directly 
explained by it either, namely:  (7) visual search.  Finally, there are domains whose data 
seem to contradict the TiP hypothesis, which are:  (8) spatial recall, and (9) visual recall. 
The main finding of this study is that, across several domains, there is a significant 
amount of evidence that is highly consistent with the TiP hypothesis, which empirically 
substantiates the anecdotal evidence for visual thinking that has long been common in the 
autism community.  This finding is even more interesting given that most of the studies 
reviewed did not explicitly use a visual/verbal hypothesis in the design or execution of 
their experiments.  Of course, there are many experimental task paradigms that have not 
been addressed or have been only briefly touched upon, for instance block design, free 
recall, cued recall, visual or verbal recognition, executive functioning, etc.   Future work 
investigating the TiP hypothesis should incorporate an increased breadth of tasks. 
The second study presented in this chapter analyzes four different existing theories 
about cognition in autism to evaluate whether these theories can explain empirical 
findings of visual/verbal dichotomies in autism and whether TiP can provide explanations 
of data commonly cited in support of these theories.  For each of the four theories—
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Mindblindness, Executive Dysfunction, Weak Central Coherence, and Enhanced 
Perceptual Functioning— I find that no theory explicitly posits the differences in 
representational strategy use in autism that I observed during the first study, and TiP does 
explain many of the findings presented in support of each theory. 
If certain individuals with autism do have a bias towards using visual mental 
representations, then several important questions remain to be answered about the TiP 
hypothesis.  First, most of the studies that were rviewed in this chapter drew from only 
high-functioning participants with autism, i.e. IQ of a certain level.  This was necessitated 
primarily by task demands.  However, TiP may provide an account of cognition in lower-
functioning individuals with autism as well, for instance in nonverbal individuals.  How 
might TiP predictions be tested in this population without resorting to measures of 
performance on intellectually demanding cognitive tasks?   
In addition, I have not explored the extent to which TiP might characterize cognition 
in other disorders on the autism spectrum, such as Asperger’s Syndrome or PDD-NOS, or 
how it might be distributed among subsets within the diagnosis of autism itself.  How 
might particular individuals or subgroups be identified for whom TiP applies?   
Also, TiP may provide, on an individual or group basis, only partial accounts of 
cognitive bias, e.g. an individual might show a visual propensity for certain tasks or 
domains but a verbal propensity for others.  What assessments could be designed to 
assess the breadth or selectivity of domains across which TiP does or does not apply?  A 
related question is how TiP might play into savant-like abilities in autism.  
One important feature of my characterization of the TiP hypothesis is that I specify 
both a bias towards visual representations as well as a simultaneous bias against verbal 
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representations.  Whether both of these biases are actually present, or if one of them 
causally or developmentally precedes the other, bears further investigation.  It could be, 
for instance, that a bias against or difficulty with verbal representations occurs first in the 
developmental progression, and this causes the brain to compensate by recruiting visual 
brain areas in atypical ways; on the other hand, the main mechanism in development 
could be some predisposition towards using visual representations, which then leads to 
underutilization of verbal capabilities.  In addition, for TD individuals, I do not examine 
whether, for tasks that can be solved either visually or verbally, there is any typical bias 
in one direction or another.  Certainly, in many studies of individual differences in the 
TD population (e.g. MacLeod, Hunt, & Mathews, 1978), verbal thinkers seem to 
predominate, and so the TiP hypothesis could describe, in some sense, the absence of a 
typical verbal bias (e.g. Sahyoun et al., 2009).  Furthermore, the TiP hypothesis presented 
in this chapter makes no claims as to whether a visual thinker in the ASD population and 
a visual thinker in the TD population exhibit similar forms of cognition or behavior, or 
indeed if they share any developmental trajectory at all.  Given the continuity of the 
autism spectrum into ranges of typical behavior, however, it seems likely that visual 
thinkers in both populations may share aspects of neural development and recruitment. 
Other important avenues for further inquiry include (1) the distinction, if any, 
between visual and spatial processing under the TiP account, as well as relationships with 
other types of perceptual processing, (2) the differences in predictions between TiP and 
the other cognitive theories of autism, and how they can be interpreted or reconciled, and 
(3) what role TiP might play in neurobiological and developmental accounts of autism. 
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3 VISUAL PROBLEM SOLVING ON THE RPM 
As mentioned earlier, the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) family of tests 
consists of geometric-analogy-like problems in which a matrix of figures is presented 
with one missing entry, and the correct missing entry must be selected from among a set 
of answer choices.  Figure 3 shows examples of two-by-two (2x2) and three-by-three 
(3x3) matrix problems, respectively, that are similar to actual RPM problems.3  
                
Figure 3.  2x2 (left) and 3x3 (right) example problem similar to those from the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices family of tests. 
There are currently four different published version  of the RPM (Raven, Raven, & 
Court, 2003):  
1) The original Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM). 
2) The Colored Progressive Matrices (CPM), a simpler test han the SPM for use 
with children, the elderly, or other individuals falling into lower IQ brackets.  
                                                
3 To protect the confidentiality of the RPM, we present example problems that are similar, but not identical, 
to actual test problems. 
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3) The Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM), developed as a more difficult test 
to reduce the ceiling effects sometimes found with the SPM. 
4) The Standard Progressive Matrices Plus (SPM+), a test that shares some items 
with the SPM but also contains more difficult items. 
I use the term RPM to refer to the general family of tests, and SPM, CPM, APM, and 
SPM+ to refer to specific tests.  The SPM+ is rarely used, compared to the prevalence of 
the SPM, CPM, and APM, and so I focus on the first three tests. 
In this chapter, I address two primary research questions:  
1) To what extent can a purely visual strategy, implemented as a computational 
model, be successful on the RPM tests? 
2) How do changes in the underlying representational commitments of the model 
affect its behavior? 
First, I motivate my investigation of visual problem solving on the RPM by reviewing 
evidence from the literature showing that humans do eem to use both visual and verbal 
strategies on the test, and that computational accounts to this date have not provided a 
model of problem solving on the RPM using visual representations.  Then, I describe the 
ASTI model, which is a computational model that I have built which uses affine 
transformations and set operations, together with pixel-based representations of RPM 
problems, to generate solutions for the test.  I present results from running the ASTI 
model against the CPM, the SPM, and the APM, and I also give results from the SPM for 
experiments in which the representational commitmens of the ASTI model were varied.  
This chapter concludes with a discussion of my claims and areas for future work. 
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3.1 Visual Versus Verbal Strategy Use on the RPM 
The RPM tests were originally designed by John Raven in the 1930s to measure only 
eductive ability, or the ability to extract and understand information from a complex 
situation, which is sometimes referred to as “fluid intelligence” (Raven et al., 2003). 
They were intended to be used together with the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scales, which 
measure reproductive ability, or the ability to recall previously learned information, 
sometimes called “crystallized intelligence.” Together, these two tests would provide a 
measure of Spearman’s general intelligence factor g, which Spearman had supposed 
could be decomposed into eductive and reproductive components (Spearman, 1923). 
However, over time, it was found that the RPM alone exhibited a very high level of 
correlation with other intelligence tests, leading the RPM to become widely considered 
one of the best single psychometric measures of g (Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984). 
Using the RPM as a measure of general intelligence, though it consists only of 
problems in a single, visual format, stands in contrast to using broader IQ tests like the 
Wechsler scales, which are comprised of subtests that span several different verbal and 
nonverbal domains. In fact, Raven originally develop d the RPM as an easy-to-
administer, easy-to-score alternative to traditional multi-domain intelligence tests, which 
can take many hours to administer and yield complex, multi-dimensional subscores that 
must be combined to create a final IQ score (Raven et al., 2003). 
The question of how people solve RPM problems was not addressed by John Raven 
during his original development of the test; the test was defined, and has later been 
refined, based on normative data and item analyses (Raven et al., 2003).  Not until the 
emergence of computational and cognitive views of mental processes in the 1970s did 
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researchers begin to take an in-depth look at problem solving on the RPM. 
Hunt (1974) argued for a stronger consideration of strategy usage on psychometric 
tests as a window into the nature of individual differences in intelligence.  He proposed 
the existence of two qualitatively different RPM problem-solving strategies which varied 
primarily in how problem inputs were represented—using modal iconic representations 
versus amodal propositional representations—and he described each of these strategies in 
terms of how they could be implemented in a computer program.  
Despite the lack of a concrete implementation of his algorithms, Hunt made a 
significant contribution to the understanding of information processing on the RPM with 
his contention that qualitatively different strategies could exist and even potentially be 
equally successful.  He emphasized the importance of taking possible variations in 
strategy into account when considering individual differences in overall performance:  
not only might individual performance differences stem from such strategy variations, but 
also equal levels of performance in two individuals could be masking variations in the 
underlying strategy.  Such considerations, Hunt urged, should play a meaningful role in 
the interpretation of RPM results, rather than just treating an individual’s score as an 
atomic measure of general intellectual ability.  Interestingly, Spearman himself, though 
he generally approved of the RPM as a tool for measuring g, supposed that there might be 
two different ways to tackle RPM problems, which he termed “analytic” and “synthetic,” 
and he also believed that only the analytic approach loaded heavily on g (cited in Hunt, 
1974). 
Despite Hunt’s work on the existence and plausibility of multiple RPM strategies, 
computational studies of problem solving on the RPM have tended to embody only a 
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single strategy (within any given information processing account), and these strategies 
have all relied on propositional forms of problem solving.  As a result, the prevailing 
notion of how people solve RPM problems has been that they use verbal strategies.   
However, Hunt’s notion of dual strategies on the RPM has since been borne out 
across various psychological studies of human RPM performance.  In particular, there is 
considerable evidence from both within-individual and between-individual studies that 
humans recruit both visual and verbal strategies on the RPM.  The evidence from 
between-individual studies comes from research intoautism and has already been 
summarized in Section 2.3.4  The remainder of this section is organized as follows: 
1) Evidence from human studies of within-individual strategy differences across 
various RPM problems or test-taking conditions. 
2) Computational accounts of problem solving on the RPM. 
3) Operations of mental imagery in human cognition, including evidence for the 
kinds of affine and set transformations used by the ASTI model 
3.1.1 Within-individual strategy differences on the RPM 
Within-individual strategy differences have been studied as a function of problem 
type on the RPM tests, primarily through factor analyses of the SPM (Lynn, Allik, & 
Irwing, 2004; van der Ven & Ellis, 2000) and of the APM (Dillon, Pohlmann, & Lohman, 
1981; Mackintosh & Bennett, 2005; Vigneau & Bors, 2008). These studies have 
identified multiple factors underlying RPM tests, indicating variations in the recruitment 
of particular cognitive mechanisms for different problems, and have often divided test 
problems into two primary categories: those solved using visuospatial or gestalt 
reasoning and those solved using verbal or analytic reasoning (though it should be 
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pointed out that, while the factor loadings themselves are statistically determined, labels 
for the various factors appear to be based on the authors’ own inspections of problem 
groupings by factor).  Following the Gestalt/Analytic strategy divide proposed by Hunt 
(1974), Kirby and Lawson (1983) studied the performance effects of training students to 
use a particular strategy; part of this study involved developing a new series of test items 
on which the type of strategy being used led to a different selection of a “correct” answer 
choice, thus demonstrating the existence of strategy-linked answer types (in addition to 
strategy-linked problem types). 
From neuroscience, one fMRI study of RPM performance (Prabhakaran, Smith, 
Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997) found that patterns of brain activity differed 
significantly based on whether participants were solving “figural” versus “analytic” 
problems, using problem classifications derived from a computational study of the RPM 
(Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990). Figural problems induced brain activity primarily in 
spatial and object working memory regions, while analytic problems induced additional 
brain activity in verbal working memory and executive processing regions. Studies of 
patients with focal brain lesions have also found linkages between brain regions 
associated with specific types of visual or verbal processing and successful performance 
on figural versus analytic problems (Berker & Smith, 1988; Villardita, 1985).   
Zaidel, Zaidel, & Sperry (1981) looked at the performance of two commissuorotomy 
and two hemispherectomy patients on the CPM and the SPM, to see if there were 
hemisphere effects on RPM performance.  Overall, they found that RPM problems were 
equally solvable with either hemisphere, though the left hemisphere showed a slight 
dominance overall and on the more difficult problems within each set.  They speculate on 
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whether this dual hemispheric competence relates to Spearman’s notion of two different 
RPM strategies, one analytic and one synthetic, which may correspond to left and right 
hemisphere solving, respectively. 
DeShon, Chan, & Weissbein (1995) had participants complete the APM while 
simultaneously performing a “verbal overshadowing” protocol, in which they had to 
verbally describe their reasoning. The authors hypothesized that requiring overt verbal 
descriptions would bias participants towards using verbal instead of visual strategies and 
thereby impair performance on problems that would normally have been solved visually, 
which was borne out in the resulting data. These findings call into question the 
methodology of using verbal reporting protocols as a window into RPM problem solving, 
as the act of verbal reporting itself may cause shifts in an individual’s strategy; this 
“verbal overshadowing” phenomenon has been observed in other problem domains as 
well (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). 
Jacobs and Vandeventer (1968) supposed that CPM problems require participants to 
both imagine what each answer choice looks like in the empty space in the matrix as well 
as perform induction to determine if an answer choie (thus imagined) is the correct one.  
They found that an experimental manipulation in which the cognitive loading of the first 
skill is removed, by having physical answer choices that could be moved by a participant 
into the matrix, made the task significantly easier for young children.  This analysis 
assumes, to some extent, that participants are using an at least partially imagery-based 
strategy.  It could be, however, that the overall strategy could change with the altered 
task; e.g., having a complete (but possibly incorrect) matrix would seem to suggest a 
Gestalt reasoning approach, whereas having to select an answer choice could admit 
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Gestalt approaches (with the imagination component) as well as rule-based, predictive 
approaches. 
Babcock (1994) looked at how different hypothesized components of problem-
solving on the RPM might be measurable by looking at correlations with other tests that 
load on these specific components.  In particular, the author hypothesized that RPM 
problem solving requires rule identification, rule application, and rule coordination.  (She 
hypothesized a fourth component, figure decomposition, but found in a pilot study that 
most variance on figure decomposition tasks was accounted for by processing speed, so 
omitted this fourth component from further analysis.)  She then chose two tasks from 
psychology that exemplified each of these components:  Shipley abstraction and letter 
sets for rule identification, geometric transformation and pattern transformation for rule 
application, and the calendar test and following direct ons for rule coordination.   
Then, she analyzed results from these tests and other measures of processing speed 
and working memory, and also from the APM, from adults of varying ages to see which 
of these tests could account for the age-related variance on the APM.  She found that 
working memory and processing speed accounted for much of the age-related variance on 
the APM, and neither rule identification nor coordination contributed substantial 
additional variance, but rule application did contribute, and the combination of rule 
application, working memory, and processing speed was sufficient to reduce the age-
related variance on the APM to non-significance.  This is particularly interesting given 
that the rule application task involved affine visual transformations very like operations 
performed by the ASTI model, which is described later in this chapter, in that it involved 
transforming given geometric patterns by a given geom tric rule to choose the correct 
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answer.  Rule identification used two verbal tests that involve rule abstraction, and rule 
coordination involves following complex sets of rules, again that were given in verbal 
representational form.  This could be considered evi ence of participants on the APM 
using figural reasoning similar to that performed by the ASTI model, or it could just be 
that the rule application task was too similar to the APM, in comparison with the other 
verbal tasks, and this similarity presented a confou d in the study results. 
3.1.2 Computational models of the RPM 
As described earlier, Hunt (1974) proposed two qualitatively different RPM strategies 
that varied primarily in how problem inputs were repr sented. Hunt’s “Analytic” 
algorithm used amodal propositional representations and operations such as constancy 
and addition/subtraction. This algorithm proceeded by first abstracting features from each 
matrix entry and then iteratively applying operators to the entries within a row or column, 
or to an entire row or column, to generate partial answer predictions. If the predicted 
answer was found among the answer choices and was unique, then the algorithm halted. 
If either of these conditions were not met, then the algorithm iterated further to either 
predict a different answer or refine the current par ial answer.  
Hunt’s “Gestalt” algorithm, akin to mental imagery, used modal iconic 
representations and perceptual operations like continuation and superposition. The 
algorithm successively applied various visual operations to entries from the matrix in 
order to obtain an answer that matched one given in the answer choices, using an answer-
iteration procedure similar to that used in the Analytic algorithm.  
While neither algorithm was actually implemented, Hunt performed a theoretical 
analysis of how each algorithm would fare on Set I from the APM, and he predicted that 
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the Gestalt algorithm would successfully solve 6 of the 12 problems on Set I, whereas the 
Analytic algorithm would solve all 12 problems.    
All of the RPM models that have since been developed resemble Hunt’s Analytic 
algorithm in that they rely on a conversion of problem inputs into amodal propositional 
representations. None of these models have adopted the approach suggested by Hunt in 
his Gestalt algorithm. 
Model #1: Carpenter, Just, and Shell (1990) implemented a production system that 
took as input hand-coded propositional descriptions f problems from the APM. The 
system chose from a predefined set of rules over mat ix elements in order to predict an 
answer for each problem. The predicted answer was compared to the answer choices in 
order to choose the best match. The predefined rules were generated by the authors from 
an a priori inspection of the APM and were validated in experim ntal studies by 
observing what “rules” participants used while taking the test, as evidenced by verbal 
reporting protocols. Differences between low- and high- scoring participants were 
modeled by developing two different versions of the production system; the more 
advanced system contained an increased vocabulary of ules and a goal monitor for 
setting and adjusting the high-level problem-solving process being used. Both systems 
were tested against 34 of the 48 problems from the APM. The basic system solved 23 of 
these 34 problems, while the more advanced system solved 32 of the 34 problems.  This 
model also made predictions about the numbers of eye ixations that subjects might make 
on different types of problems. While the experimental results presented were consistent 
with the model, there is no direct relationship between the eye gaze data and the use of a 
purely propositional strategy; the data could be equally well fit by a model using iconic 
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representations. 
Model #2: Bringsjord and Schimanski (2003) used a theorem-prover to solve selected 
RPM problems stated in first-order logic, though no specific results were reported.  
Model #3: Lovett, Forbus, and Usher (2010) combined automated sketch 
understanding with the structure-mapping technique for analogy to solve problems from 
the SPM. Input images from the test were first redrawn by hand in Powerpoint, and the 
resulting vector graphics objects were fed into the system. The system translated these 
inputs into amodal propositional descriptions using a procedure for automated sketch 
understanding. Then, a series of strategies based on the structure-mapping technique for 
analogy were applied to detect certain patterns of structural relationships between various 
elements in the matrix.  Strategies focused either on differences between images in a row 
or column (Differences and Advanced Differences strategies) or on elements that are 
shared among images in a row/column (Literal or Advanced Literal strategies).  The 
Advanced Differences strategy is different from theregular Differences strategy because 
objects are only mapped to other objects of the same shape, thus allowing for object 
additions or deletions but not object transformations.  The Advanced Literal strategy is 
different from the regular Literal strategy because objects shared across matrix entries are 
removed, and spatial relations are also removed, causing objects to be matched 
independently to other objects (or segments of an object, in the case of a single object 
matrix entry.)  These derived structural relationship  were also used to refine object 
segmentation and groupings by revisiting the original vector-graphics-based 
representations and extracting modified propositional descriptions that allowed for 
improved structural matches. Finally, each answer choice was inserted into the matrix, 
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and the answer providing the closest matching structu al relationship within the matrix 
was selected. This system was tested against 48 of the 60 problems on the SPM and 
solved 44 of these 48 problems.  
Model #4: The system of Cirillo and Ström (2010), like that of Lovett et al. (2010), 
took as inputs hand-drawn vector graphics representatio s of test problems and used an 
automated procedure to create hierarchical propositional representations of the problem 
information. Then, like the work of Carpenter et al. (1990), the system drew from a set of 
pre-defined patterns, derived by the authors from an a priori  inspection of the SPM, to 
find the best-fit pattern for a given problem. The resulting pattern was used to predict an 
answer, though no explicit procedure was given for matching the predicted answer to one 
of the given answer choices. This system was tested against 36 of the 60 problems from 
the SPM and solved 28 of these 36 problems.  
Model #5: Rasmussen and Eliasmith (2011) used a spiking neuro  model to induce 
rules for solving RPM problems. Input images from the est were first hand-coded into 
vectors of propositional attribute-value pairs, and then the spiking neuron model was 
used to derive several individual transformations among these vectors and abstract over 
them to induce a general rule transformation for that particular problem. While the 
authors attested that this system could correctly so ve RPM problems, they did not 
present any results regarding which specific tests or problems were addressed.  
However, as they pointed out, their approach differed adically from earlier RPM 
models in that it explicitly accounted for the process of rule induction for a given 
problem, rather than relying on a predefined set of rules.  They argued that rule induction 
is a fundamental component of problem solving on the RPM, as that is by definition the 
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main characteristic of an eductive task; if the RPM were intended to measure an 
individual’s pre-existing memory for a set of rules, then it would have to be classified as 
a test of reproductive ability instead of eductive ability.  Furthermore, their model of rule 
induction naturally facilitates inter-problem learning and transfer, which undoubtedly 
plays a role in human problem solving on the RPM (Bors & Vigneau, 2001; Verguts & 
De Boeck, 2002) and for which none of the previous models readily account. 
3.1.3 Operations of mental imagery 
Hunt (1974) presented his intuition of the kinds of visual operations needed to solve 
RPM problems as resembling those of visual perception, specifically of continuation and 
superposition.  More generally, these are consistent with a viewpoint of mental imagery 
as a form of analog mental model, in which the referents of imagery are modeled after 
rigid bodies in the world, and thus the operations of imagery are grounded in the 
affordances of manipulating (or observing manipulations of) such objects (Schwartz & 
Black, 1996).  Mathematically, the manipulations of a 3D rigid body projected into a 2D 
plane correspond to affine transformations, and the combination of projections of 
multiple such bodies can be represented using operations on mathematical sets, in this 
case sets of points or elements in the 2D plane.  In this section, I examine evidence 
relating to two classes of mental imagery operations: affine transformations and set 
operations. 
The most well-known early experiments looking at functional properties of mental 
imagery are the mental rotation experiments of the early 1970s (e.g. Shepard & Metzler, 
1971).  Many variations on these experiments have be n performed, with a recent 
plethora of studies that include neuroimaging measures (Zacks, 2008), but the basic 
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findings have been that the reaction time taken by participants to mentally rotate an 
object is proportional to the angular degree through which the object must be rotated.  
This finding is replicated in situations when two stimuli are both visible for comparison 
(e.g. Shepard & Metzler, 1971) as well as when a single visible stimulus is compared to 
another representation from memory (Cooper & Shepard, 1973).  More recently, certain 
individuals with autism have been found to be faster and more accurate on mental 
rotation tasks than typically developing individuals; the reaction times in the autism 
group in this study preserved the conventional pattern of increase with respect to angle of 
rotation (Soulières, Zeffiro, Girard, & Mottron, 2011). 
Set operations in mental imagery can include manipulations such as union, 
intersection, and complement (see Section 3.2.4 for a detailed computation-based list).  
These manipulations correspond generally to the combination of elements of mental 
images in various ways, including: subtraction, in which participants were asked to 
subtract a visually presented shape from a remembered image in order to derive and 
identify a new mental image (Brandimonte, Hitch, & Bishop, 1992a), and combination, 
in which participants were asked to perform a similar dentification after combining a 
new image element with a remembered image (Brandimonte et al, 1992c; Finke, Pinker, 
& Farah, 1989).  Additional studies have found evidnce, in some cases, of verbal coding 
interfering with this type of image transformation (Brandimonte, Hitch, & Bishop, 
1992ab) and in other cases, of an interaction between seemingly pictorial depictive 
representations and non-pictorial descriptive representations (Hitch, Brandimonte, & 
Walker, 1995; Walker et al., 1997).  In the paper discussed above looking at mental 
rotation in autism, another experiment was conducted to examine this type of image 
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combination (Soulières et al., 2011).  Participants first inspected and memorized an array 
of visually presented letters and numbers, and then were briefly shown a circular segment 
with a portion of one character inside it.  Then, upon looking at the segmented circle 
alone, the task was to determine which segment would contain a greater visual proportion 
of the original character.  This experiment can be thought of as requiring an operation 
akin to intersection, in visualizing which portion f the character falls into each segment 
of the circle, as if the two were overlaid, and also a comparison of visual similarity in 
terms of which character portion embodies a greater visual area. 
Drawing upon this literature, the main types of transformations employed by the 
ASTI model, described in the following section, are affine transformations and set 
operations.  The model’s conceptualization of visual similarity, which might be 
considered a third class of visual mental transformations, relies on set-based notions of 
union and intersection (Tversky, 1977) and follows template-based theories of similarity 
in which image elements are compared according to the amount of visual overlap 
between them (Palmer, 1978). 
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3.2 Description of the ASTI Model 
As described in Section 3.1.2, existing computational models have focused 
exclusively on propositional accounts of problem-solving on the RPM. This section 
describes a computational model for solving RPM problems, called the Affine and Set 
Tranformation Induction (ASTI) model, that, like Hunt’s proposed Gestalt algorithm 
(1974), simulates modal reasoning by using iconic visual representations.  In particular, 
this model uses pixel-based representations of problem inputs and reasons over these 
representations using affine transformations and set op rations. 
The ASTI model is one of a pair of visual RPM models under development by our 
research team.  The other model, called the “fractal model,” represents an effort led by 
fellow Ph.D. candidate Keith McGreggor (McGreggor et al., 2010).  While this 
dissertation does not address the fractal model in depth, its development marks an 
important contribution to the general argument about visual RPM strategies that I present, 
in that the existence of two different visual computational models may yield additional 
insights as to the generalizability of each of our independent sets of results and analyses. 
3.2.1 Inputs and outputs 
The ASTI model uses representations consisting of two-dimensional arrays of 
grayscale pixels, with each pixel associated with a single intensity value. These pixel-
based representations are iconic in that they preserv  a spatial correspondence with the 
patterns of light and dark areas on the actual test problem inputs. They are modal in that 
they remain in the same pixel-based format that was generated when test problems were 
scanned using a digital scanner. 
Specifically, the inputs to the ASTI model for a given problem are sets of images that 
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represent individual matrix entries and answer choices as presented in the test booklet. 
For the 2x2 problem in Figure 3, the inputs to the ASTI model are the images shown in 
Figure 4, where mij  refers to the entry at row i and column j of the matrix, and a1 through 
an represent the n answer choices given at the bottom of the problem. 
The output of the ASTI model is a single number betwe n 1 and n, denoting its 
chosen answer. 
 
Figure 4.  Imagistic representation of the RPM problem shown in Figure 3, fed as input 
into the ASTI model. 
3.2.2 High-level approach 
At a high level, the basic approach used by the ASTI model is to: 
1) Inspect the matrix portion of an RPM problem to determine what relationship 
is present among the existing matrix entries. 
2) Using this relationship, generate a predicted answer in the form of an image 
for what entry might occur in the empty spot in thematrix. 
3) Compare the predicted answer to each given answer choice and select the 
choice that is most similar to the prediction. 
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The relationship that the ASTI model attempts to determine in Step 1 is an image 
transformation that best accounts for the variation among entries in any collinear set of 
entries in the matrix. In Step 2, the model applies thi  same transformation to whichever 
incomplete collinear set of entries is parallel to the first, in order to generate its predicted 
answer. In these two steps, the ASTI model is making two implicit assumptions about the 
structure of RPM problems: (1) entries in a single collinear set within the matrix are 
related according to some image transformation, and (2) parallel collinear image sets are 
analogous in that they share the same image transformati n. 
Schematic illustrations of which entries the ASTI model uses in Step 1 to induce row 
or column transformations are given in Figure 5 andFigure 6 for 2x2 and 3x3 matrices, 
respectively. A more detailed description of the image sets examined by the ASTI model 
is provided later in this section.  These illustrations show which parallel incomplete rows 
or columns are used together with the induced transformation to generate the predicted 
answer in Step 2. 
 
Figure 5.  Schematic illustration of transformations considered by the ASTI model for a 
2x2 RPM matrix. 
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For example, looking at a 2x2 matrix as shown in Figure 5, the model might induce a 
row transformation relating entries A and B and then apply this transformation to element 
C to predict an answer. Alternately, the model could try to induce a column 
transformation in the same manner, first relating etri s A and C and then applying the 
induced transformation to entry B.
For 3x3 matrices, the set of possible transformations s much larger, as there are eight 
matrix entries to consider instead of just three. Byond considering unary transformations 
as in the 2x2 case, i.e. transformations converting a single given image into a single 
transformed image, 3x3 matrices present the possibility of binary transformations, i.e. 
transformations converting two given images into a single transformed image. For a 3x3 
matrix, looking at row transformations, the model might induce a unary row 
transformation between adjacent entries A and B or adjacent entries B and C, and then 
apply this transformation to entry H to predict an answer, as shown in the top “row” 
matrix in Figure 6. Or, the model might induce a binary row transformation relating all 
three entries A, B, and C, and then apply this transformation to entries G and H, as 
shown in the bottom “row” matrix in Figure 6. As with 2x2 matrices, all of these 
transformations for 3x3 matrices can be induced either across rows or along columns.  
Therefore, for a given RPM problem, the ASTI model proceeds by first inducing all 
possible transformations for the matrix, using collinear sets of image entries. The 
transformation induction process is described in more detail below. Each induced 
transformation carries with it a measure of “fitness” that varies between 0.0 and 1.0 to 
indicate how well that particular transformation fits ts associated row or column, where 
0.0 indicates a poor fit and 1.0 indicates a perfect it. The ASTI model selects that 
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transformation and associated image set that has the highest measure of fitness, which 
completes Step 1.  
 
Figure 6.  Schematic illustration of transformations considered by the ASTI model for a 
3x3 RPM matrix. 
In Step 2, the model applies this transformation to the appropriate incomplete parallel 
image set to predict an answer. Finally, in Step 3, the predicted answer is compared in 
turn to each given answer choice according to a similarity measure, which is also 
described below. The choice yielding the highest similarity value is chosen as the 
model’s final answer. 
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3.2.3 Best-fit image transformations 
This section describes the induction process for unary transformations (e.g. 
converting image A to image B), with the detailed algorithm given in Figure 7; induction 
of binary transformations (e.g. converting images A and B to image C) is a 
straightforward extension of this process. 
To begin, suppose we have two images A and B. We wish to induce a transformation 
that represents the change from A to B. This process is akin to image registration, in 
which two images are aligned according to some criteria that ultimately enable a “best-
fit” correspondence to be found. In image registration, a correspondence between two 
images is found by matching features between the images, and any remaining differences 
are modeled as a combination of various types of gemetric deformations and/or color 
transformations (Zitová & Flusser, 2003). While image registration is typically performed 
on real-world images, this approach has been adapte for the ASTI model’s 
transformation induction process, as it seems well able to capture differences between 
black-and-white line drawings of the type found in RPM problems. 
In particular, the ASTI model defines a composite transformation between two 
images as a combination of two geometric transforms and one color-based transform: 
1) A base affine transform t (e.g. rotation, reflection, etc.) 
2) A translation (x, y)  
3) A pixel-wise composition operation ⊕ (e.g. addition, subtraction) together 
with a composition operand X, which consists of another image 
The ASTI model contains a finite set of base transforms which, for simplicity, are 
restricted to rectilinear rotations and reflections. Affine transformations such as shearing 
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and scaling are not included, nor are other types of ge metric image deformations. 
 
Figure 7.  Main algorithm for the ASTI model, including transformation induction. 
To induce a composite transformation between two images, the ASTI model first uses 
a template-matching scheme to search across all possible base transforms and translations 
to find the combination of these two geometric transforms that results in the best 
correspondence between image A and image B. Then, given these particular geometric 
Initialization 
 
1 Read matrix entries into list of images M 
2 Read answer choices into list of images A  
3 For any two images a and b, define a similarity metric S(a, b)  
z ∈ [0, 1] 
4 Define set of base transforms T 
5 Define set of analogies I0  I1, where I0 contains image sequences 
representing complete row, column, or diagonal lines in the 
matrix, and for each i0 ∈ I0, I1 has the corresponding images i1 




1 For each image sequence i0 ∈ I0, induce the best-fit composite 
transform tC: 
2 For each base transform t ∈ T: 
3 Apply t to the first image(s) in i0 to produce image it 
4 Search all possible translation offsets (x, y) between i0 
and it to find the best match, as calculated by S(i0(x,y), it) 
5 Select the best-fit base transform tB as per S, as 
calculated above 
6 tC is then a composition of tB and the translation offset (x, y) 
7 Obtain a final transform tF by selecting that tC which produces the 
best average fit, across each subset of parallel i0 ∈ I0 
 
Candidate Prediction and Answer Selection 
 
1 Choose image sequence i0 that results in the best-fit tF, according 
to S as calculated in the previous step 
2 Apply tF to corresponding partial image sequence i1 ∈ I1 to produce 
candidate answer image iC 
3 For each answer choice iA ∈ A, compute similarity S(iC, iA) 
4 Select the best-fit answer choice iA as per S, as calculated above 
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transforms, any remaining image discrepancies are accounted for by defining pixel 
differences between the two images as comprising the operand of an image composition 
operation, namely pixel-wise addition or subtraction. Which type of operation is selected 
depends on whether there are a greater number of pixels being added to or subtracted 
from image A to arrive at image B. 
The combination of these three transforms—base transform, translation, and image 
composition—is defined to be the best-fit composite transformation between image A 
and image B. The degree of “fit” (i.e. the strength of the discovered correspondence) is 
defined as the similarity value found during the template-matching process 
3.2.4 Base transforms 
The base unary transforms (i.e. transforming image A into image B) used by the 
ASTI model during the induction of composite transformations are drawn from the set of 
image operations that fall under the category of affine transformations (hence the name of 
the model), and in particular are restricted to orth normal transformations only (i.e. 
rotation and reflection, combined with translation). In addition to the fact that affine 
transformations are a well-defined and thoroughly-studied type of image operation, there 
is evidence that human visual processing can apply affine transformations like scanning 
(i.e. translation), zooming (i.e. scaling), and rotation to mental images, or operations that 
are computationally isomorphic (Kosslyn et al. 2006; Shepard & Metzler, 1971).  
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Figure 8.  Eight base unary affine transforms used for 2x2 and 3x3 matrices. 
 
Figure 9.  Five base binary set transforms used by the ASTI model for 3x3 matrices. 
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The ASTI model presently uses the eight base unary tr nsforms shown in Figure 8, 
which comprise all possible rectilinear rotations and reflections. In addition, for 3x3 
matrices, as mentioned earlier, the larger number of matrix entries introduces the 
possibility of using binary image transforms instead of unary ones (i.e. transforming 
images A and B into image C). The base binary image transforms used by the ASTI 
model are drawn from set composition operations to capture notions of image union, 
intersection, subtraction, etc., and are implemented at the pixel level as maximums, 
minimums, and differences of grayscale intensity values. Figure 9 illustrates the five base 
binary transforms used by the model. 
To see why these five particular binary transforms were chosen, consider the full set 
of all binary transforms on two single black and white pixels (i.e. functions that map from 
two binary values onto one binary value).  All possible values for these transforms are 
shown in Table 10. 
Table 10.  Definitions of pixel-wise operations forvarious pixel color representations. 
 
The two leftmost columns show the values of the twoinput pixels, labeled A and B; 
there are four possible combinations of input values that can occur, which are listed by 
row.  The columns to the right show the sixteen different possible patterns of outputs that 
can occur for each pattern of inputs.  All values are shown as if 0 is the value of a white 
A B C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
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pixel and 1 is the value of a black pixel.  This table gives all possible combinations of 
inputs and outputs for a binary transform function on binary-valued pixels. 
First consider the eight right-most columns that are shaded in brown.  For all of these 
output functions, two white pixels (values of 0 and 0 for A and B) map to an output value 
of black (value of 1 for C).  Since black is considered by the model to indicate figural 
pixels and white to indicate ground pixels, these functions would map the combination of 
two ground pixels onto a figural pixel, essentially “making up” pixel content where none 
previously existed.  Operationally, this would turn all white regions shared between two 
images into black, and so the ASTI model omits these functions. 
Next, look at the first green column output function.  This function takes all possible 
inputs and maps them to white pixels (values of 0).  Operationally, this function would 
turn all pairs of images into pure white images, and so the ASTI model omits this 
function as well. 
Next, turn your attention to the output columns shaded in purple.  Note that the first 
purple column is identical to the input values for A, and the second purple column is 
identical to the input values for B.  Both of these output functions essentially ignore one 
of the inputs and instead map everything to the values of the other input.  Operationally, 
given two images A and B, these functions would either map directly back to image A or 
back to image B, and so the ASTI model omits these functions. 
The five remaining white output columns that are left correspond precisely to the five 
binary transforms that are implemented in the ASTI model.  The first white column can 
be read as the intersection operation, mapping to black only when both input pixels are 
black.  The second white column is subtraction, specifically A minus B.  The third white 
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column is also subtraction, specifically B minus A. The fourth white column is the XOR 
function, mapping to black only when one or the other (but not both) inputs are black.  
Finally, the fifth white column is the union function, mapping to black when either or 
both of the inputs are black. 
3.2.5 Visual similarity 
The same similarity measure is used by the ASTI model in Step 1, for template 
matching during the transformation induction process, and also in Step 3, to select the 
final answer choice based on the predicted answer image. This measure is adapted from 
Tversky’s (1977) ratio model of similarity: 
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In this equation, f represents some function over features in each of t e specified sets A
and B. The constants α and β are used as weights for the non-intersecting portions of A 
and B. If α and β are both set to 1.0, this equation becomes: 
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For calculating the similarity measure, each feature is defined to be a single pixel, and 
intersection, union, and subtraction operations are defined as the maximums, minimums, 
and differences, respectively, of the pixels’ grayscale intensity values. The functions f are 
defined as summations of feature comparison values ov r the entire image. 
The formulation of Tversky’s ratio model used by the model makes one important 
assumption about pixels, which is that they can be treated as independent features within 
the pixel sets represented by images A and B. While this notion of pixel independence is 
a strong simplification, it matches the assumptions made by basic template theories of 
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visual similarity that define similarity based purely on evaluations of the extent of 
overlapping figural units (Palmer, 1978), which in our case are individual pixels.  
3.2.6 Consideration of image sets within matrix 
Earlier, I stated that the ASTI model makes two assumptions about how entries in a 
problem matrix are related: 
1) Collinear entries are related according to some image transformation. 
2) Parallel pairs of collinear sets of entries are analogous in that they share the 
same (or a similar) image transformation. 
These assumptions raise the question of how to select collinear entries and parallel 
pairs of collinear entries from a given problem matrix.  In particular, we want the model 
to examine collinear sets of entries to discover an image transformation, and then find a 
parallel collinear set of entries which contains the empty space, in order to apply the 
previously discovered transformation to infer an answer.   
In the 2x2 case, the situation is fairly simple.  There are four entries, and thus we 
could consider collinear pairs of images or collinear triplets of images.  Collinear pairs 
are possible in a 2x2 matrix, but collinear triplets are not, because the set of three 
elements ABC is not collinear in a 2x2 grid.  So we restrict consideration to pairs only. 
Combinatorially speaking, there are six ways to choose pairs of elements from this 
set:  AB, AC, BC, A?, B?, and C?.  Each of these image pairs represents a collinear s t 
of elements in the matrix, because any two points o a grid are collinear.  We need not 
consider the reverse pairs—e.g. BA, CA, and CB—because the base unary affine 
transforms, as a collective set of operations, are commutative over pairs of images: 
 Identity(A)=B   ⟹   Identity(B)=A 
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 Rotate90(A)=B   ⟹   Rotate270(B)=A 
 Rotate180(A)=B   ⟹   Rotate180(B)=A 
 IdentityFlip(A)=B   ⟹   IdentityFlip(B)=A 
 Rotate90Flip(A)=B ⟹   Rotate270Flip(B)=A 
 Rotate180Flip(A)=B   ⟹   Rotate180Flip(B)= 
Given the three complete pairs of collinear images AB, AC, and BC, the next step is 
to find corresponding parallel collinear pairs which contain the empty space ? in the 2x2 
matrix grid.  For AB and AC, the collinear pairs are obvious:  C? and B?, respectively, 
where ? represents the empty space.  However, it is not immediately clear what the 
parallel pair is for BC.  To find this, we simply repeat the matrix entries as if they were 
part of a regular, infinite grid, as shown in Figure 10.  BC is only parallel to CB, which 
does not help in solving the matrix problem.  (Likewise for A? and ?A.)  Therefore, the 
analogies considered by the ASTI model for 2x2 matrices are:  A : B  ::  C : ?  and  A : 
C  ::  B : ?.  These correspond to rows and columns, respectively.  BC and A?, which the 
model does not use, correspond to diagonals. 
 
Figure 10.  Collinear pairs of entries, and parallel sets of collinear pairs, in a 2x2 matrix. 
For 3x3 matrices, the situation is more complex, though we can follow the same 
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procedure to identify the analogies that the ASTI model will inspect.  There are eight 
nonempty entries in a 3x3 matrix.  However, only pairs of entries or triplets of entries can 
be collinear; any larger groupings will consist of n n-collinear entries.  To find the image 
pairs, we first note that combinatorially there are36 ways to choose two entries from a 
set of nine.  Further, as noted above, any two entries in a regular grid will be collinear, 
but we need not consider the reverse pairs, as the affine unary transforms are 
commutative.  Figure 11 shows how these collinear pairs can be organized according to 
rows, columns, or diagonals.  As 28 of these 36 pairs contain complete (i.e. non-empty) 
entries, there are 28 analogies that can be inspected by the model, given in Table 11. 
 
Figure 11.  Collinear pairs of entries, and parallel sets of collinear pairs, in a 3x3 matrix. 
Moving on to the case of image triplets within a 3x3 problem matrix, there are 84 
ways to choose three entries from a set of nine.  However, few of these will represent 
collinear triplets of entries in a 3x3 problem grid.  In particular, we can count the 
collinear triplets by beginning again with the 36 possible collinear pairs.  Of these pairs, 
one can form sets of three pairs which represent three collinear elements, e.g. AB, AC, 
and BC, which represent the triplet ABC.  No other triplets in which any of these pairs 
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participate will be collinear.  Among the 36 possible collinear pairs, there are 36/3 = 12 
such sets of three pairs representing a collinear triplet.   
Note that for a given collinear triplet, e.g. ABC, there are actually six permutations 
that might be considered:  ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, and CBA.  The five affine 
binary transforms are commutative with respect to the first two elements: 
 Union(A, B)=C   ⟹   Union(B, A)=C 
 Intersection(A, B)=C   ⟹   Intersection(B, A)=C 
 Subtraction(A, B)=C   ⟹   Back-subtraction(B, A)=C 
 XOR(A, B)=C   ⟹   XOR(B, A)=C 
Thus, the triplet ABC is computationally equivalent to BAC, and likewise for ACB / 
CAB and BCA / CBA.  However, examining the base binary transforms for triplet ABC 
will not be equivalent to examining the same transforms for triplets ACB or BCA; in 
particular, while the transposition of the first two images in a triplet do not matter, which 
entry takes the third place does matter.  Furthermore, consider a triplet containing the 
empty entry in the matrix, call it XY?.  As long as the empty entry is in the third place, 
then solving for it using a base binary transform is well-defined, as one just applies the 
binary transform to the first two known entries.  However, if the empty entry is one of the 
first two places, e.g. X?Y, then solving for it will become ill-defined, as any number of 
different images may suffice to make the relationship true.  Thus, the ASTI model 
restricts consideration of binary transforms over image triplets to only those triplets in 
which (or which are analogous to triplets in which) t e empty entry takes the third place. 
Graphically, these triplets are shown in Figure 12. There are a total of eight analogies 
that can be formed with these triplets, as shown in Table 11. 
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Figure 12.  Collinear triplets and parallel sets of c llinear triplets, in a 3x3 matrix. 
Table 11.  Listing of analogies in 3x3 matrix. 
 Rows Columns Diagonals 
Pairs 
A : B  ::  H : ? 
B : C  ::  H : ? 
D : E  ::  H : ? 
E : F  ::  H : ? 
G : H  ::  H : ? 
A : C  ::  G : ? 
D : F  ::  G : ? 
A : D  ::  F : ? 
D : G  ::  F : ? 
B : E  ::  F : ? 
E : H  ::  F : ? 
C : F  ::  F : ? 
A : G  ::  C : ? 
B : H  ::  C : ? 
F : G  ::  E : ? 
G : B  ::  E : ? 
H : C  ::  E : ? 
C : D  ::  E : ? 
A : E  ::  E : ? 
F : B  ::  A : ? 
H : D  ::  A : ? 
F : H  ::  D : ? 
H : A  ::  D : ? 
G : C  ::  D : ? 
C : E  ::  D : ? 
B : D  ::  D : ? 
F : A  ::  B : ? 
G : E  ::  B : ? 
Triplets A : B : C  ::  G : H : ? D : E : F  ::  G : H : ? 
A : D : G  ::  C : F : ? 
B : E : H  ::  C : F : ? 
F : G : B  ::  A : E : ? 
H : C : D  ::  A : E : ? 
F : H : A  ::  B : D : ? 
G : C : E  ::  B : D : ? 
 
3.2.7 Generality of transform 
There is much redundancy contained in 3x3 matrices; in particular, the same 
transform is repeated across each row or column of a matrix.  One way for the ASTI 
model to take advantage of this redundancy is to look at best-fit image transformations 
across all row/column subsets, instead of just looking at the single best-fit image set.  The 
basic affine configuration determines the best-fit image transformation for a matrix by 
searching among all possible base transforms and among all sets of entries listed in 
Figure 11 and Figure 12, and selecting the single set that yields the highest fitness value.  
For 3x3 problems, an alternate “aggregate” strategy was implemented that selects the 
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best-fit image transformation by searching among the possible base transforms with 
fitness values averaged for sets of entries across all complete rows or columns. After the 
best-fit base transform has been chosen based on this aggregate fitness value, the single 
best-fit row or column is used together with the corresponding partial row/column, as in 
the standard model, to generate an answer prediction. 
3.2.8 A detailed example of solving a 2x2 matrix problem 
This section contains a detailed example of the operation of the ASTI model using the 
2x2 sample RPM problem shown in Figure 3.  The original problem image is first broken 
into the constituent matrix entry and answer images, as shown in Figure 4. Then, as 
shown in Figure 5, there are two possible combinatio s of entries that are used to induce 
transformations: the entries across the first row and the entries down the first column. 
The base transforms used in the induction process are the eight rotations/reflections 
shown in Figure 8. 
For the top row and for the first column, the best-fit composite transformation T i is 
calculated by the model according to the algorithm shown in Figure 7. The resulting 
similarity values from these calculations are given in Table 12. Once these similarity 
values have been calculated, the transformation yielding the highest similarity is chosen 
as the defining transformation for the matrix.  
In this case, it is the rotate180-flip transform as applied to the images in the first row 
of the matrix, which yields a similarity value of 0.697. Then, for this particular 
transformation, the image composition operand is determined to be subtraction, as there 
are more pixels in A but not in B than vice versa, i.e. Σ(A-B) > Σ(B-A). In other words, 
the second image B roughly equals the first image A transformed and minus some pixels.  
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identity   0.334 226.7 218.5 
rotate90 
  
0.292 250.2 247.8 
rotate180   0.536 120.4 122.4 
rotate270 
  
0.262 269.6 267.0 
identity-flip   0.318 235.9 229.4 
rotate90-flip 
  
0.253 274.2 270.7 
rotate180-flip   0.697 59.5 58.7 
rotate270-flip 
  





identity   0.438 173.7 158.4 
rotate90 
  
0.255 275.0 263.0 
rotate180   0.323 236.6 213.3 
rotate270 
  
0.311 242.2 228.7 
identity-flip   0.608 104.6 86.3 
rotate90-flip 
  
0.261 272.1 256.8 
rotate180-
flip   0.289 254.9 234.1 
rotate270-
flip   
0.256 274.7 261.8 
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The predicted answer image is generated by taking the first image from the second 
row, applying the rotate180-flip transform, and subtracting the same pixels that represent 
the difference between the images in the top row. In this particular case, the first row 
images are fairly closely matched, and so the pixels that are subtracted are few in number 
but not zero, due to slight imperfections in the input images. Finally, the predicted answer 
image is compared to each of the answer choices, as shown in Table 13. The most similar 
answer choice is selected as the ASTI model’s final a swer, which is answer number 2, 
with a similarity value of 0.503. 
Table 13.  Answer similarity calculations for the example problem shown in Figure 3. 









3.2.9 Image processing to obtain inputs 
To obtain inputs for the model in the form shown in Figure 4, I followed a 
standardized procedure, described in this section.  First, each test booklet was cut at the 
spine, so that each problem was on a separate (but double-sided) sheet of paper.  Each 
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page was then scanned to create digital images of each problem.  All scans were 
performed at 200 dpi on a grayscale setting (even th  colored problems on the CPM).  
Each original scanned image was 1704 by 2197 pixels n size.   
Then, each scanned image was cropped to remove the problem label at the top of each 
page.  Also, any large dust specks that arose from the scanning process were manually 
removed, but only from the outer margins of each problem page (i.e. no pixels were 
altered within any of the actual problem content, either within the problem matrix box or 
within any answer choice box).  These were the only manual corrections performed on 
the scanned images.  The resulting images were then passed into an automated image 
processing system to carve up each problem into its con tituent subimages.   
One might assume that carving up each problem would be a simple matter of 
extracting subimages of particular sizes and positions across all problems; however, the 
RPM test booklets contain significant variation in s zing and positioning across problems, 
enough so that a simple one-size-fits-all solution was not sufficient to subdivide each 
problem.  Therefore, automated methods were developed to extract the subimages, 
primarily by searching through the image to find the edges of the matrix and of each 
answer choice.  Edges were determined using pixel int nsity thresholds.  For all of the 
image processing described here, the threshold for determining edges was set to 0.4 
(where 0.0 is white and 1.0 is black).  Thresholds for the CPM were set somewhat lower, 
ranging from 0.1 to 0.3, as some of the problems were v ry light when scanned. 
First, each problem image was corrected for rotation l misalignment.  The image 
processing system searched from the top of each image to locate the upper edge of the 
box enclosing the problem matrix and performed a simple linear regression to determine 
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the slope of this line.  Then, the entire image wasrotated to make this line horizontal. 
Second, the position and dimensions of the matrix box were determined by searching 
for each of its four edges.  For 2x2 matrices, the entire box was then divided into four 
quadrants, and the first three of these quadrants became the three matrix entry inputs into 
the ASTI model.  For 3x3 matrices, once the edges of the matrix box were found, the 
position of the empty box within the matrix (in the lower-right-hand corner) was 
determined, again by searching to find its edges.  The position of this empty box was 
used to define the size of each of the rows and columns in the 3x3 matrix.  In particular, 
the bottom row and right-most column were defined to be aligned with the edges of the 
empty box.  The top row and left-most column were defined to be the same sizes as the 
bottom row and right-most column, respectively.   
One additional correction was performed by the image processing system to account 
for mis-aligned matrix entries in the original problems for 3x3 matrices.  The height of 
the first two rows and the widths of the first two c lumns were automatically adjusted to 
avoid chopping off part of a figure in a matrix entry.  In particular, if the divide between 
the first and second rows crossed any non-white pixls, its position was incrementally 
moved up or down (up to a maximum displacement) until it no longer crossed any non-
white pixels.  The divide between the first and second columns was automatically 
adjusted in the same fashion.  Note that the resulting subimages for 3x3 matrix entries 
within a single problem were not necessarily the same size.  Figure 13 illustrates results 
of the automated image processing system for 2x2 and 3x3 matrix problems. 




               





3.3 Results from the ASTI Model 
In this section, I present results from running the ASTI model against the SPM, the 
CPM and the APM.  When RPM results are typically analyzed, the total score from each 
test summarizes the overall level of performance.  However, the raw numerical score may 
have little meaning to those unfamiliar with the test, and so the total score is typically 
compared to national age-group norms to determine a p rcentile ranking.  As the ASTI 
model does not have an “age” with which to look up its percentile rank, it is instead 
assumed that the model is performing at the 50th percentile, and then an “average age” 
can be inferred at which human test-takers would show an equivalent level of 
performance.  These comparisons with human norms are presented not to suggest that the 
problem solving processes used by humans of a certain age strictly resemble those of the 
ASTI model but merely to give readers unfamiliar with the RPM tests some indication of 
what level of ability is indicated by a particular score.   
Because the ASTI model is not a process model of solving RPM problems, variables 
that have to do with the sequence or ordering of prcessing of inputs or of reasoning are 
not valid.  Thus, measures like reaction time or attention (e.g. eye-tracking) are not valid 
for this model. 
The Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) consists of 60 problems divided into five 
sets of 12 problems each, labeled Sets A through E.  The first 24 problems (Sets A-B) 
consist of 2x2 matrices.  The Colored Progressive Matrices (CPM) consists of 36 
problems divided into three sets of 12 problems each, l beled Sets A, AB, and B.  Sets A 
and B are identical to Sets A and B from the SPM, except that problems are presented in 
color. Set AB is intended to be of intermediate difficulty between Sets A and B. All 36 of 
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the problems on the CPM contain 2x2 matrices.  The Advanced Progressive Matrices 
(APM) consists of 48 problems divided into two sets of 12 problems and 36 problems, 
respectively, labeled Sets I and II.  All 48 problems on the APM consist of 3x3 matrices.  
The ASTI model was tested on all problems from all three tests. 
Note that the ASTI model was developed primarily after my own inspection and 
completion of the SPM test.  This test was used to provide insights into what kinds of 
problem solving capabilities the model might need to solve these types of matrix 
problems.  However, I did not take the CPM or the APM prior to testing the model 
against these tests, and I had only minimal exposure to their problems. 
3.3.1 Results and discussion for the SPM 
The ASTI model correctly solves 50 of the 60 problems on the SPM. For typically 
developing children in the U.S., this total score corresponds to the 50th percentile for 17-
year-olds, as shown in Figure 14 (Raven et al., 2003).  A breakdown of this score across 
sets is given in Figure 15, along with the expected score composition across sets for 
participants achieving the same total score. 
The ASTI model performs extremely well on the SPM, achieving a score near the 
upper end of the test’s discriminable range.  The scores across sets also resemble the 
expected score composition for human test-takers, deviating by no more than  +/- 2 on 
any given set, indicating that the problems in Sets A and B which are easy for humans 
also seem to be easy for the ASTI model, while the model has trouble with more difficult 
problems found in Sets D and E. 
Figure 14.  Score achieved by the 
typically developing children in the USA (Raven et al., 2003).
Figure 15.  ASTI score broken down by Sets A through E
score composition for same given total score
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ASTI model on the SPM, along with 
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Table 14 gives a comparison of the performance of the ASTI model with other 
computational models that have been tested against the SPM.  The ASTI model achieves 
the highest overall score, but both propositional models perform better on the later sets 
than does the ASTI model.  One reason for this might be that the ASTI model currently 
lacks the ability to perform segmentation of a single matrix entry into multiple entries 
that follow different transformation rules. For example, a problem might have three inner 
shapes that are permuted across rows and columns and three outer shapes that remain 
constant across rows, as illustrated in Figure 16. The ASTI model cannot currently 
account for these types of transformations, though there is no a priori reason why such 
transformations could not be implemented using iconic representations. Segmentation 
could be done by iteratively seeking transformations to successively explain differences 
between subsets of pixels in each matrix entry, until no pixels remain to be explained. 
Table 14.  Results from various computational models on the SPM, by set.  Each set 
contains a total of twelve problems. 
Model Set A Set B Set C Set D Set E 
Cirillo & Ström (2010) n/a n/a 8 10 10 
Lovett et al. (2010) n/a 44 total for sets B through E 
ASTI model 11 12 10 8 9 
 
Segmentation of this type is likely necessary for any computational model to solve all 
of the problems on Set D.  Both of the propositional models listed in Table 14 receive, as 
inputs, matrix entries already segmented into discrete shapes, as vector graphics, although 
the Lovett et al. (2010) system did have the ability to re-group and re-segment discrete 
116 
shapes and edges within its vector graphics representations. The Carpenter et al. (1990) 
model (to be discussed later in Section 3.3.3) receiv d hand-coded inputs already 
segmented into propositional features. A question fr future work is how automated 
image processing techniques might be applied to perform image segmentation of RPM 
problems, and what background knowledge is needed regarding the identities of shapes 
and other visual entities in order to perform such segmentation. 
 
Figure 16.  Example problem showing multiple elements i  individual matrix entries. 
One interesting aspect of the SPM results in Table 14 is that (as far as we can tell 
from published findings) only models using visual representations have ever attempted 
Set A of the SPM, which, according to human normative data, is purportedly the easiest 
set on the test  The problems on Set A of the SPM (see Figure 17 for examples), are 
qualitatively different from the problems on Sets B through E in that they resemble 
pattern-completion problems more than geometric analogy problems. It may be that part 
of the reason that no propositional models have been t sted against Set A is because these 
types of problems are very difficult to represent using propositions, especially within 
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propositional schemes that focus on representing discrete shapes and attributes.  
 
Figure 17. Two examples of the “pattern-completion” type of matrix problems found in 
Set A of the SPM and of the CPM, as well as in a few early problems on the APM. 
Some of these types of problems could potentially be represented propositionally as 
textures, but this approach would be difficult for problems such as that shown on the right 
of Figure 17, in which no quadrant of the matrix contains a uniform texture. Furthermore, 
extracting propositional descriptions of texture directly from an image is in itself a 
difficult computational task. These problems might also be represented propositionally 
using a richer vocabulary that includes lower-level el ments such as edges and lines (for 
example, as obtained by the edge segmentation process in the Lovett et al. 2010 model), 
but this approach greatly increases the computationl complexity of the problem; instead 
of problems containing two or three or even ten elem nts per matrix entry, a single 
problem as shown in Figure 17 might have dozens or even hundreds of elements.  
Such problems are very easy to represent using modal iconic representations of the 
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type used by the ASTI model;  the representation simply consists of the scanned images 
from the test. In fact, using pixel-based representations, none of the problems on the SPM 
are particularly more difficult to represent than any others, and this type of representation 
seems highly effective, as the ASTI model achieves a very high score on Set A. 
Human factor-analytic studies of the SPM have typically classified these pattern 
completion problems as loading on a “gestalt” cognitive factor, in contrast to visuospatial 
or verbal factors. These data seem to suggest that pattern completion problems may be 
solved by humans using qualitatively different strategies than those used on the geometric 
analogy type of RPM problem. The ASTI model currently solves the problems in Set A 
using the same mechanisms used on later problems. In particular, the ASTI model looks 
at discrete transformations within the problem matrix, i.e. going from one image to 
another, which is akin to using a rule-based, albeit visual, approach (where the rules are 
conceptualized as image operations of affine and set transformations). A gestalt approach 
might differ by looking at the entire problem matrix as a whole, using principles of visual 
coherence such as symmetry and continuity. 
3.3.2 Results and discussion for the CPM 
The ASTI model correctly solves 35 of the 36 problems on the CPM. For typically 
developing children in the U.S., this total score corresponds to the 95th percentile for all 
children under 12 years of age, as shown in Figure 18 (Raven et al., 2003).  A breakdown 
of this score across sets is given in Figure 19, along with the expected score composition 
across sets for participants achieving the same total score.  Note that Sets A and B on the 
CPM are identical to Sets A and B on the SPM, except with colored diagrams instead of 
purely black and white ones. 
Figure 18.  Score achieved by the 
typically developing children in the USA (Raven et al., 2003).
Figure 19.  ASTI score broken down by Sets A through B on the CPM, with expected set 
score composition for same given total score (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003).
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The ASTI model performs extremely well on the CPM, achieving a score that is 
essentially at the ceiling of what the CPM can measure.  The scores across sets exactly 
match the expected score composition for human test-takers.  The single problem missed 
on the CPM was B9.  This problem was actually solved correctly on the SPM, and the 
ASTI model correctly solves problem A12 on the CPM which was missed on the SPM.  
These two discrepancies are explained by the different pixel thresholds used in testing the 
ASTI model against the SPM and the CPM, which is discussed further in Section 3.4.1.  
No other computational model has ever been tested against the problems on the CPM.   
3.3.3 Results and discussion for the APM 
The ASTI model correctly solves 18 of the 48 problems on the APM.  For typically 
developing adults in the U.S., this total score corresponds to around the 15th percentile 
for most adults, as shown in Figure 20 (Raven et al., 2003).  Note that norms for the APM 
are given for adults instead of for children, and these data show a decline in scores with 
increasing age.  A breakdown of this score across sets i  given in Figure 21.  The APM 
does not give data on the expected score composition across sets for all participants 
achieving the same total score, but for adults around 60 years of age, Figure 21 also 
shows their expected score composition alongside the affine results. 
Figure 20.  Score achieved by the 
typically de
Figure 21.  ASTI score broken down by Sets I and II on the APM, with expected set score 
composition for same given total score (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003).
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ASTI model on the APM, along with norms for 






Carpenter et al. (1990) report results of running two versions of their production 
system model (FairRaven and BetterRaven) against a ubset of APM problems.  A 
comparison of their results with the results of the ASTI model is shown in Table 15. 
Table 15.  Results from various computational models on the APM given as total correct 
out of total number attempted, by set. 
Model Set I  12 problems 
Set II 
36 problems 
Carpenter et al. (1990):  FairRaven 7 out of 7 16 out of 27 
Carpenter et al. (1990):  BetterRaven 7 out of 7 25 out of 27 
ASTI model 5 out of 12 13 out of 36 
 
Both of the propositional models do much better than the ASTI model on the APM.  
As mentioned with regard to SPM results, part of the reason for this discrepancy may 
have to do with image segmentation.  Both Carpenter models received as input hand-
coded propositional feature vectors that already contained segmented descriptions of the 
problem content.  It may be that adding a mechanism to perform visual segmentation to 
the ASTI model would be sufficient to boost its performance on the APM. 
As seen in this table, both of the Carpenter et al (1990) models were tested on only 7 
of the 12 problems in Set I, and 27 of the 36 problems in Set II.  The reasons for this 
omission were described as stemming from the limitations of a digitized display system 
that was used for behavioral experiments conducted prior to the computational analysis, 
though there is no explicit mention of why these problems were omitted from the 
computational analysis as well.  It may be that the same problem features that caused 
problems with the digital display also caused problems for the authors’ hand-coding of 
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propositional problem representations, though there is not enough information in the 
paper to know this for sure.  The problems omitted w re problems 1, 3, 4, 5, and 11 from 
Set I, and problems 2, 11, 15, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, and 30 from Set II. 
The first four problems in the APM resemble the pattern-completion problems in Set 
A of the SPM, as discussed in Section 3.3.1; of these four, three are omitted by the 
Carpenter et al. (1990) models.  The fourth problem (problem 2 in Set I) contains discrete 
elements not unlike those in the geometric analogy type of problem, except with 
continuous lines added around the elements.  Informal inspection might suggest that this 
particular problem can be solved even if its continuous, pattern-like content is ignored.  
So, as with the SPM, the results from Carpenter et al. (2010) suggest that propositional 
models have yet to attempt pattern-completion problems.  Of the four pattern-completion 
problems on the APM, three are answered correctly by the ASTI model.    
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3.4 Altering Representations within the ASTI Model 
In this section, I discuss the results of two experim nts conducted with the ASTI 
model to investigate the effects of altering the low- evel representational commitments 
made by the model, namely its representation of pixels and of visual similarity. 
3.4.1 Representation of pixels 
One tunable parameter in the ASTI model lies in how pixels are represented.  In 
particular, pixels in the ASTI model are represented as binary black-and-white values, 
where only two values are possible: 0 (white) and 1 (black).  While this approach reduces 
noise in the inputs, some fine-grained detail can be lost due to the radical shifting of raw 
pixel color values to extremes of black and white.  Note that though an image in the test 
booklet may appear to be purely black and white, th test when scanned contains many 
grey-valued pixels, for instance on fine lines or at the edges of shapes. 
Pixels in the ASTI model contain a threshold, expressed as a percentage value 
ranging from 0% (pure white) to 100% (pure black), above which pixels received as input 
from the original scanned images will be converted to black, and below which pixels will 
be converted to white.  Changing this parameter essentially alters how the model 
performs figure-ground discrimination on the inputs that it receives.  High values of the 
threshold are more resistant to grey-valued noisy pxels in the images, but lower values 
can capture more fine levels of detail. 
The threshold for the initial run of the ASTI model against all three RPM tests 
described in the previous section was manually set to a threshold of 10%, based on visual 
inspection of sample test problem images.  (For the CPM, to account for the variations in 
grey values among problems that were colored in different shades, the threshold was 
adaptively set by the ASTI model
effects of varying this figure
the SPM using ten different 
3.4.2 Results of pixel-representation experiment
Figure 22 shows a graph of the total scores achieved by the 
for the ten different assignments of the pixel thres old, ranging from 5% up to 50%.  As 
this figure shows, the scores overall are very similar, with the lowest being 46 and the 
highest being 50.  Thus, the 
underlying pixel representation.  The lower thresholds seem to yield slightly higher 
scores, which may indicate that the loss of 
increases affects the performance of the 
noise as the pixel threshold decreases.
Figure 22.  Total scores achieved by the 
of the figure
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Figure 23 shows the scores for the same 
the SPM.  The problems on Set A, which are densely packed with visual information, 
seem to suffer with low pixel threshold values, likely as a result of added noise that 
obscures the patterns and textures found in these problems.  In contrast, the later 
problems, especially in Set
thresholds, likely because these problems consist of fine lindrawings for which higher 
thresholds may lose impor
Figure 23.  Scores achieved by the 
assignments of the figure
The highest performance achieved by any combination of thresholds is 52 total 
problems correct.  One important area for future work will be in developin
methods for a visual model like the 
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s B, C and E, seem to show improved performance at lower 
tant visual details. 
ASTI model for each set on the SPM for various 
-ground separation pixel threshold value.
ASTI model to tune its own pixel representation 





thresholds.  This would essentially serve as a mechanism by which the model can identify 
salient features on its own and tune thresholds accordingly. 
3.4.3 Representation of similarity 
Calculating similarity is a central facet of the ASTI model and would be of any model 
using modal iconic representations. In order to investigate the effect of using different 
formulations of visual similarity, I implemented a sum-squared-differences (SSD) 
measure of similarity, in addition to the Tversky similarity measure originally used by the 
ASTI model, defined as: 
	
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Note that the model takes the reciprocal of one plus the sum of squared differences 
between pixel intensities in order to convert the usual SSD measure of difference into one 
of similarity that varies between one (for identical images) to zero (for images with 
infinite differences in pixels), as shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.  Graph showing range of values for sum-squared-difference similarity 
measure, where x-axis indicates magnitude of raw SSD calculation. 
The absolute magnitude of the difference between th union and intersection of pixels 
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approximates the result of the SSD measure (as the individual pixel values vary between 
zero and one).  Thus, for the same magnitudes of SSD, we can approximate the Tversky 
similarity measure equivalents by setting SSD equal to the union of pixels minus the 
intersection, and then “solving” for the Tversky measure of union divided by intersection, 
as given in Equation (4): 
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Thus, for various values of the intersection between two images, the Tversky 
similarity measure will scale with the raw magnitudes of SSD very much like the SSD 
similarity measure defined above, as shown in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25.  Graph showing how Tversky similarity measure changes for various values of 
intersection (curves) and magnitudes of SSD (x-axis). 
To study the effect of altering the 
the model using the SSD measure of similarity 
3.4.4 Results of similarity
Figure 26 shows a graph of the total scores achieved by the 
for the Tversky and SSD similarity metrics
does not perform very well, correctly answering only 32 problems as compared to 50 
problems for the Tversky configuration.  
sensitive to changes in the underlying 
scores for both similarity metrics for each set on he SPM.  
Figure 26.  Total scores achieved by the 
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on the SPM using a pixel threshold of 0.1.
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Thus, the ASTI model seems to be fairly 
similarity representation.  Figure 
 
ASTI model on the SPM for the Tversky and 
SSD similarity metrics. 
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 on the SPM 
27 shows the 
 
Figure 27.  Scores achieved by the 
Why does changing the similarity measure affect the performance of the 
model?  A closer look at each similarity measure suggests one possibility. Consider the 
image pairs shown in Figure 
different between the images within each pair is the same
of common pixel content that is shared is different
pixels in pair CD.  The Tversky measure, given in Eq
more pixel content, and so images 
In contrast, the SSD similarity measure, given in Eq. (3), effectively ignores any pixel 
content that is shared; similarity is cal
different. Thus, the SSD measure yields identical similarity values for image pairs 
and CD, because within each image pair, there are two mismatched pixels. The opposite 
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and SSD similarity metrics. 
28. For pairs AB and CD, the number of pixels that are 
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ulated only as a function of pixels that are 
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pattern can also occur: for image pairs EF and GH, the Tversky measure yields identical 
similarity values, but the SSD measure prefers pairEF, because EF has only two 
mismatched pixels, whereas GH has three mismatched pixels. 
In summary, the Tversky measure considers both shared image content as well as 
content that differs between two images.  This appers to be an important component of 
similarity for solving visual analogy problems like those found on the RPM. 
 
Figure 28.  Illustration of differences between Tversky (1977) and SSD similarity 
measures, as applied to pixel-based images. 
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3.5 A Note on Inputs 
In this section, I discuss the rationale for choosing to work with raw, scanned images 
from the test, instead of using artificially generat d, “clean” input images.  The ASTI 
model takes as inputs scanned images from the actual RPM test booklets. Some 
preprocessing is done on these images; they are manually rotated to correct for rotational 
misalignments during the scanning process, and then t y are automatically sliced into 
constituent images for each matrix entry and answer choice. Even after these 
preprocessing steps, however, the images fed as inputs into the ASTI model are still very 
noisy; they contain numerous pixel-level artifacts and misalignments from the scanning 
process, and in addition, the figures in the RPM test booklets are not (at a fine level of 
detail) as precise as they might appear to the human eye. For example, part of a matrix 
element that appears to be symmetric about its horizontal axis can be measured and found 
to be off by a half a millimeter, which sounds tiny until one considers that that entire 
segment of the figure is only seven millimeters wide. Entries that are clearly meant to 
appear identical across multiple matrix entries are not exact duplicates of one another; 
this becomes especially apparent in figures that incorporate textures such as stripes. 
For these reasons, the similarity values calculated by the ASTI model are often much 
lower than one might expect. In the example problem discussed in Section 3.2.8, even 
though the predicted answer looks very like one of the given answer choices, the 
calculated similarity between the two images is only 0.503.4  
One might ask, why not just create “clean” computerized input images to eliminate 
the imprecision found in scans of the SPM test booklet? There are three reasons for 
                                                
4 This example problem was hand-drawn using rulers, stencils, and ink, in order to emulate the level of 
imprecision found in the actual RPM test booklets. 
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choosing to work with the original scanned images. The first reason is simple: given that 
humans use paper copies of the test, one might say hat the model should try to tackle 
inputs that are as close as possible to the originals. Humans do not receive the benefit of 
having “cleaned up” versions of RPM problems, and so neither should a computer model. 
A second reason has to do with model robustness when faced with low-level 
representational irregularities. Part of the power of amodal propositional representations 
comes from their ability to abstract away from the raw pixel level, and, for example, call 
two squares “identical” despite slight mismatches in size or alignment. However, 
methods using modal iconic representations can also achieve similar levels of robustness 
using calculations of visual similarity at the pixel l vel, whether or not the inputs have 
been “cleaned up.” The field of image processing regularly deals with noisy, imperfect 
images, and the ASTI model strives to maintain some f that realism and take the actual 
RPM test problems as they come. 
The third and most important reason for choosing not to redraw RPM problems is that 
there is a strong methodological argument against it (whether they are redrawn as vector 
graphics or even just as more precise raster images). As an example, consider redrawing 
the shapes shown in Figure 29. At first glance, these images might appear to be identical, 
and it would be tempting to create the first circle with stripes and copy it in order to 
create the second. However, closer inspection will reveal that, although the high-level 
texture might be described in the same way, at a low level, the images are drastically 
different—the calculated similarity between these two images is a mere 0.253! While the 
outer circular outlines are alike, the inner “textured” portion of each circle is almost 
exactly a negative image of the other. 
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Figure 29.  Illustration of “same” texture with wildly different pixel-level properties. 
As another example, specific to redrawing problems as more precise raster images, 
consider the problem shown in Figure 30, which was drawn using vector graphics in 
PowerPoint and then exported as a raster image. Looking just at the top row of matrix 
entries, and using the set of eight affine base transformations shown in Figure 8, it 
becomes apparent that the top-row image transition could equally well be described as a 
“rotate180flip” transformation (i.e. a reflection about the vertical axis) or as a “rotate270” 
transformation (i.e. a one-quarter counter-clockwise rotation). It follows that the model 
ought to compute that either of these transformations is equally well-suited, and choose 
one according to whatever tie-breaker is in place. 
 
Figure 30.  2x2 example problem to illustrate impacts of “clean” input images. 
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However, the actual output of the model depends, in fact, on how the problem was 
originally created using vector graphics, even after th  images have been rasterized. In 
particular, when recreating this problem using vector graphics in Powerpoint, the 
original, top-left image in the matrix was used to construct two different versions of the 
top-right image. For the first version (the “rotated version”), the top-left vector graphic 
was rotated 90 degrees to the left. For the second version (the “reflected version”), the 
top-left vector graphic was reflected about its vertical axis. Then, all of these vector 
images were rasterized to create input images to feed into the ASTI model. 
Results from calculating similarity values over allbase affine transformations for 
these two versions of the top-row images are shown in Table 16. For the rotated version, 
the rotate transformation is found to yield the highest image similarity. In contrast, for the 
reflected version, the rotate180-flip (i.e. reflection) transformation is found to yield the 
highest similarity. While the slight differences present in the final rasterized images 
would likely not influence the behavior of a human taking the test, these differences 
represent enough of a bias that they can completely change the output of a model that 
uses pixel-based representations.  
As these examples show, when redrawing RPM problems, the specific choices by 
which “clean” images are created can have a non-trivial impact on the visual information 
contained in the problem and thus can significantly alter the output of a computer model. 
Redrawing could also introduce bias if the drafter has foreknowledge of the computer 
model to be tested against the problems, as they may consciously or unconsciously 
redraw problems with the problem-solving algorithm in mind. Lovett et al. (2010) notes 
that for their experiments, one of the SPM test problems was redrawn using a grey line 
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instead of the original dotted line “for simplicity.” While humans solving this problem 
would likely not be much affected by such a change, it does raise questions of when such 
simplifications are appropriate and when they might, in fact, be materially changing the 
substance of a problem for a computational system. For all of these reasons, the ASTI 
model deliberately uses images scanned directly from the printed RPM test booklets. 
Table 16.  Similarity calculations for example problem shown in Figure 30.  Underlined 
values indicate highest values of similarity for each calculation. 
base transform original images s original images s 











rotate90 0.347 0.325 
rotate180 0.449 0.431 
rotate270 0.884 0.818 
identity-flip 0.341 0.340 
rotate90-flip 0.458 0.433 
rotate180-flip 0.881 0.825 




3.6 Claims and Future Work 
In this chapter, I show that, for many RPM problems, it is not necessary to extract 
amodal symbols in order to arrive at the correct answer, and iconic visual representations 
often constitute a sufficient form of representation t  solve these problems. The ASTI 
model is intended to serve as a complementary account t  existing propositional models, 
which together may provide an integrated, dual-process account of human problem 
solving on the RPM.  I conclude this chapter with a few remarks about this work. 
First, my aim is not to show that the ASTI model is “better” or “worse” than previous 
computational models, but rather to explore to what extent a particular set of iconic 
representations and mechanisms can succeed on a body of RPM problems, just as 
previous computational models have explored to what extent particular propositional 
accounts can be successful. I discuss results from the ASTI model in comparison with 
other models in order to evaluate how the representatio al commitments made by such 
models affect their performance on various subsets of RPM problems. 
Second, the ASTI model demonstrates only one possible instantiation of the use of 
modal iconic representations for RPM problem solving. The spectrum of possible iconic 
representations ranges from the type of low-level, pixel-based representation used by the 
ASTI model to more complex representations explicitly containing edges, lines, shapes, 
topological information, etc. One question for further exploration is how models that use 
other types of iconic representations might perform n the RPM.  
Third, while the ASTI model does not seek to provide an account of or model all of 
the microstructures and processes of human visual cortical processing, the operations it 
uses (affine transformations and set operations) are mathematically grounded for general 
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forms of imagery or visualization and are based upon evidence from studies of mental 
imagery.  Both affine transformations and set operations can be formally defined as 
general types of transformations over any two-dimensional plane figures, whether pixels, 
edges, shapes, or otherwise.  These types of operations, or operations that are 
computationally isomorphic, have been found to play a role in mental imagery tasks 
ranging from mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 197 ) and scanning (Kosslyn, Ball, & 
Reiser, 1978) to image addition and subtraction (Brandimonte, Hitch, & Bishop, 1992ab). 
Fourth, while the ASTI model was designed to use forms of inference similar to those 
evidenced by studies of mental imagery in humans, not all elements of the model are 
intended to be interpretations of human cognitive processing on the RPM.  The primary 
intent of the model is to evaluate whether the content of the proposed knowledge 
representation is sufficient for solving RPM problems, using forms of inference that are 
cognitively plausible, even though certain aspects of the overall process may not be.  
Thus, the ASTI model represents a content model rather than a process model of how 
humans might solve RPM problems using iconic visual representations. 
Future work on the ASTI model will include implementing additional forms of visual 
reasoning, such as scaling, image segmentation, and gestalt perception.  In addition, 
much work remains in comparing the processing performed by the model with the mental 
imagery operations that humans apply when visually so ving RPM problems.  Part of this 
research will include investigating how the basic mechanisms used by the ASTI model, 
namely affine transformations, set operations, and similarity-based matching, might be 
implemented in a neural computational architecture, sing detailed knowledge of the 
processing and neuronal structures contained in human visual processing brain areas. 
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4 CLASSIFICATION OF RPM PROBLEMS 
One reason for forming problem type classifications for a standardized test such as 
the RPM is so that such classifications can be usedin further computational, behavioral, 
and/or neuroimaging studies to better determine what cognitive processes people use or 
need to use to solve the test.  This is an argument from cognitive science, in that problem 
classifications can be used to better understand human cognition. 
Another reason has to do with understanding the psychometric properties of such a 
test, because if problems can be classified as being of different types, then finer-grained 
observations about an individual’s cognition can be made by looking at their performance 
not just on the test as a whole but on individual problem classes.  This is an argument 
from practicality, in situations involving the use of psychometric tests, as knowledge of 
problem classes can better inform interpretations of an individual’s test results. 
Developing such a classification scheme can also help to relate performance results 
across psychometric tests.  There is currently a notio  of very coarse problem 
classification in psychometrics along the dimension f verbal and non-verbal (e.g. the 
Wechsler scales divide subtests into whether they contribute to “verbal IQ” or 
“performance IQ”).  However, it may be that two different tests actually contain 
problems of the same type, or a single test might contain problems of multiple types.  
Classifying problems apart from just how they appear in a standardized test could affect 
how psychometric tests are studied.  This is an argument from psychometrics, to improve 
the way in which tests are created, evaluated, and understood. 
The specific research question that I address in this chapter is: 
1) How can the ASTI model be used to classify problems on the RPM according 
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to their information processing demands? 
I begin by summarizing existing approaches to problem classifications of the RPM 
tests.  I then describe a method for using systematic ablations of the ASTI model to 
obtain problem classifications according to the information processing demands of 
particular problems.  Then, using experimental data obtained from the ASTI model, I 
present a new classification of problems for the CPM and the SPM.  The APM is not 
addressed in this section as the ASTI model does not do well enough on it to provide 
classifications for many of the APM problems.  I con lude the chapter with a discussion 




4.1 Existing Approaches 
Since John Raven’s creation of the Progressive Matrices family of tests, most RPM 
analyses and refinements have been performed based on normative data from large 
samples of TD individuals (Raven et al., 2003).  While there have been many efforts to 
identify problem types on RPM tests, most of these fforts have either used qualitative, 
introspective methods or have been based purely on human performance data, without a 
deep consideration of the information processing demands of individual problems. 
Jacobs and Vandeventer (1972) collected 1335 matrix-type figural reasoning items 
from 22 standardized tests, and educed (using an informal inspection of the items) a set of 
12 relations that they believed covered the majority of test items.  These twelve relations 
are:  identity, shape, shading, size, movement in a plane, flip-over, reversal, added 
element, addition, unique addition, number series, and elements of a set.  Some inter-rater 
verification was performed to show that these relations could be used to describe a 
sample of the matrix problems, though not always uniquely.  Then, they assessed how 
well Sets B through E of the SPM covered pairs of these relations (presumably to account 
for variation in rows and columns), and found that only 20 of 66 possible relation pairs 
are covered.  It is noteworthy that they found all 48 problems readily describable in terms 
of pairs (or trios) of these 12 relations. 
Mulholland, Pellegrino, and Glaser (1980) constructed a set of geometric analogy 
problems in which an analogy is presented and the participant must answer whether the 
analogy is true or false.  Each problem varied systematically according to the number of 
elements and number and types of transformations (ad the ways in which the analogy 
was altered to create incorrect analogies).  They constructed a processing model in which 
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elements and transformations are processed serially and independently, and with additive 
reaction times.  The reaction time and error data that they collected supported their model 
to some extent, though they found significant interactions when the number of elements 
and transformations both increased, among other trends.  They surmise that certain levels 
of problem complexity introduce significant working memory demands that cause 
increases in latency and error rates.  While their data did support their model in the sense 
that number of elements and transformations do systematically affect reaction time, there 
may be other factors at play as well.  One difference between their task and RPM is that, 
since their task was only to evaluate a single complete analogy, the prediction form of 
high-level strategy wasn’t really warranted by the ask; it was more of a compare-and-test 
task.  Also, they stated that their model assumed that information was stored 
propositionally in mental representations, but it is not clear that any part of their model 
really relies on this assumption. 
Horner and Nailling (1980) adapted a listing of problem types from Corman & 
Budoff (1973) and present a listing of the problem type for each problem in the CPM.  In 
a study of left-, right-, and non-brain-damaged patients, they found that each group 
showed a similar pattern of accuracy across the four problem types, though absolute 
levels of accuracy differed somewhat. 
Dillon, Pohlmann, & Lohman (1981) performed a factor analysis of Set II of the 
APM in which they accounted for problems being of dif erent difficulty levels.  Not 
accounting for problem difficulty could lead to conf unds, because problems tapping into 
the same cognitive ability may be of different difficulties, and problems of the same 
difficulty may tap into different cognitive abilities, but difficulty levels may mask these 
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other differences in a regular factor analysis.  The authors also observed, in a brief review 
of previous factor-analytic studies of the RPM, that studies in which the RPM is 
examined along with other tests generally yield results that the RPM loads mainly on a 
single g factor, whereas studies in which the RPM is examined alone often yield results 
that the RPM has multiple factors.  With regard to the APM, their analysis seemed to 
support a two-factor solution, in which they labeled their factors as Pattern 
Addition/Subtraction (Factor I) and Pattern Progression (Factor II).  Many of the 
problems showed loadings on both factors, but the authors suggest subsets of problems 
that could serve as “pure” measures of each factor: 
1) Factor I, Pattern Addition/Subtraction:  7, 9, 10, 1 16, 21, 28, and 35 
2) Factor II, Pattern Completion:  2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 26, 3 . 
However, they do not address apparent differences in difficulty levels between the 
two sets of problems that they suggest. 
Stone and Day (1981) describe a study very similar to the reaction time study of 
Mulholland et al. (1980).  They studied participants a  three different ages (fifth grade, 
eighth grade, and college), and they used artificial m trix problems in which the number 
of elements and transformations was systematically v ried.  Their matrix problems were 
3x3 problems, with the ninth element filled in eithr correctly or incorrectly, and the 
participant’s task was to indicate whether the matrix was correct or incorrect.  However, 
they instructed the participants to only look at the rows of the matrix, as column 
transformations were not implemented in the artificial matrix problems.  So, like 
Mulholland et al. (1980), the task different from the regular RPM in that no processes of 
answer prediction or selection are required, and the analogies are all unidimensional.  In 
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Mulholland et al. (1980), the analogies were strictly of the form A : B :: C : D, whereas in 
this paper, they were strictly of the form A : B : C :: D : E : F :: G : H : I.  They found 
results broadly consistent with Mulholland et al. (1980), in that both increased elements 
and increased transformations increased reaction time in an additive fashion, but when 
both were increased simultaneously, the increases in reaction time were more than 
additive.  In addition, the authors found that reaction time decreased with age, as did the 
non-additive increases with elements and transformations (i.e. the younger participants 
showed greater absolute increases in RT for the combination of more elements and 
transformations than did the older participants, though the increases were proportionally 
about the same).  Little analysis was done of true versus false RTs; it appears in this study 
that the RTs were fairly similar across the two conditions in certain 
groups/manipulations, which goes against Mulholland et al. (1980)’s contention that false 
items involve self-terminating processing and should thus take less time overall. 
Kirby and Lawson (1983) adopted the approach from Hunt (1974) in classifying RPM 
problems as either analytic or gestalt, in terms of what strategy might be more effective.  
They gave children one of four types of training in a strategy:  strong or weak, gestalt or 
analytic.  The weak training consisted of giving the participants a series of problems from 
the CPM and SPM that the authors evaluated to draw upon that particular strategy.  The 
strong training consisted of giving the participants a series of problems that the authors 
evaluated to be strategy-neutral, and then they verbally described either a gestalt (i.e. 
pattern completion) or analytic (i.e. rule-based) strategy. 
1) Weak gestalt:  A1, A1, B2, A7, A8, A11, AB4, AB6, B4, and B5. 
2) Weak analytic:  A1, A2, B2, B3, B6, B7, B8, B9, B10, B11. 
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3) Strong:  A1, A2, B2, AB7, AB9, AB12, B7, B8, C1, C4. 
They developed a new set of “ambiguous” problems for a post-test in which at least 
one of the answers would follow from a gestalt strategy, and at least one of the answers 
would follow from an analytic strategy.  They then scored how many analytic vs. gestalt 
answers each participant chose.  They also administered Set I from the APM, of which 
they considered problems 1-6 as gestalt and 7-12 as an lytic, following Hunt (1974).  
With the ambiguous figures, they found that strong a alytic training did decrease the 
number of gestalt responses and increase the number of analytic responses, though the 
gestalt responses seemed preferred by respondents overall, and increased with age.  For 
the APM, they found that gestalt problems were equally solvable in all groups (which we 
would expect, since Hunt classified these as gestalt or analytic), but analytic problems 
were solved with more accuracy by both weak and strong analytic training groups.  They 
conclude with supposition that perhaps the RPM is a me sure of strategy monitoring and 
selection, given that early items tend to bias the test-taker towards a gestalt strategy, 
while later items require an analytic approach.  Itwould follow, then, that good 
psychometric tests are precisely those which are strategy ambiguous. 
Smilansky (1984) classified RPM problems according to difficulty by assigning them 
each a score from 1 to 6, based on the number of elements within a matrix as well as their 
relationships, which he classified as representing e ther design patterns of linear, random, 
or complex relationships or arithmetic patterns of addition, subtraction, or complex 
relationships.  He found good inter-rater reliability on scoring problems from the SPM as 
well as decent correlations for invented problems between the difficulty rating and 
reaction time of a group of students solving the problems. 
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Bethell-Fox, Lohman, and Snow (1984) performed a study similar to that of 
Mulholland et al. (1980) in that they gave participants geometric analogy problems with 
varying parameters and then measured their accuracy, reaction time, and eye-movements.  
The problems varied in number of elements, number of transformations, type of 
transformations (figural versus spatial), number of alternatives, and difficulty of 
distracters.  They also included “ambiguous” items for which the expected answer choice 
was not present, but a similar one was, which was supposed to be the correct answer.  
One new finding they presented was that number of response alternatives (two versus 
four) greatly increased the difficulty/latency of problems, especially in cases with more 
elements.  Also, spatial transformations (e.g. rotati n, reflection) increased 
difficulty/latency more than figural transformations, which they supposed was because 
spatial transformations involved imagery operations that were not needed for figural 
transformations.  They propose a componential model f performing these analogies with 
steps like encoding, inference, mapping, etc., and were able to fit the model to their data.   
Their other significant finding was a distinction between strategies of constructive 
matching, where the answer choice is predicted and then compared to response 
alternatives, and response elimination, in which the response choices are inspected and 
eliminated in turn.  They found, especially using the eye-movement data, that all subjects 
appeared to use constructive matching on easier problems, but that lower ability subjects 
switched to response elimination for more difficult problems.  Higher ability subjects 
stuck with constructive matching, but just spent more time in constructing their answer 
and comparing it to the response choices.  Evidence came from whether subjects looked 
back at the analogy before or after looking at the answer choices, and also at how many 
147 
answer choices subjects considered before providing their answer.  They also discuss 
another experimental manipulation in which they presented subjects with the first part of 
the analogy only, without answer choices, before prsenting the full problem.  In this 
manipulation, eye-tracking data suggested that constructive matching was preferred. 
Green and Kluever (1991) presented a factor analysis of the CPM that found evidence 
of three factors, with most CPM items loading on a single factor, but certain items 
loading on multiple factors or only weakly on any of the factors: 
1) Visual closure and pattern completion, visual orientation, discrimination 
2) Visual analogies, particularly foreground/background discrimination, 
line/density discrimination 
3) Perceptual matching 
Green and Kluever (1992) tried to identify a system for predicting RPM item 
difficulty:  They looked at parameters of the matrix (orientation, symmetry, progression, 
dimensions, curvature, number, density, color) as well as parameters of the answer 
choices (number of options, progression, rotation, reflection, directions, number of 
elements, reversal), and coded problems from the CPM and SPM using this scheme.  
They were mainly interested in modeling item difficulty, so they used these parameters as 
variables in a model that they based on the CPM and tested against problems from the 
SPM.  The four parameters that seemed to contribute most were number of distinct 
options (trivially, as two very easy problems have r peated answer choices), 
reflection/rotation of options, number of dimensions/features (i.e. transformations) in the 
matrix, and number of directions of options. 
DeShon, Chan, & Weissbein (1995) observed that while the APM is presented 
148 
visually, it can be solved either using a visuospatial strategy that operates on visual 
representations of the problem or using a verbal-anytic strategy that operates on 
propositional representations of the problem.  They surmised that certain problems on the 
APM may be more amenable to one or the other of these types of strategies, following 
Hunt (1974).  Further, they hypothesized that concurrent verbalization would disrupt 
visuospatial problem solving, and thus impair performance only on those problems that 
were visuospatial to begin with.  They developed a set of visuospatial rules and a set of 
verbal-analytic rules, following Hunt (1974) and Carpenter et al. (1990), as well as 
drawing on introspection, in the form of concurrent a d retrospective reports of problem-
solving on the APM from pilot studies.  Using these rules, they classified all of the 
problems on the APM as “most likely” to be either 1) visual, 2) analytic, 3) either, or 4) 
both, using three independent coders for all 36 problems (in Set II, I assume).  They then 
administered the APM to three groups of participants, with one group solving the test as 
usual, one group solving the test on the computer, and the third group solving the test on 
the computer with concurrent verbalization.  Overall, the group with concurrent 
verbalization showed significantly lower accuracy than the other two groups, indicating 
that overt verbalization actually impairs performance on the APM.  Furthermore, 7 of the 
12 visual problems showed a significant decrement with verbalization, and the other 5 
problems also showed some decrement, whereas none of th 9 verbal problems showed 
any decrement with verbalization.  Response times showed a similar pattern, with the 
non-verbalization group having equivalent response tim s for visual and verbal items, but 
the verbalization group having (a) greater response tim s overall than the other group, 
and (b) greater response times for visual than for verbal items.   Interestingly, as the 
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authors observe, verbalization has been showed to increase performance on other tasks 
like the Tower of Hanoi, which Carpenter et al. (1990) compared to the APM in terms of 
requiring similar cognitive loadings on working memory.  However, this study shows that 
even at a coarse level of analysis, verbalization does impair performance on the APM but 
improves it on the Tower of Hanoi, which might suggest that the two tasks tap into very 
different cognitive processes.  They conclude by observing that actual strategy choice 
depends not only on the problem characteristics but also on the abilities of the problem 
solver. 
Van der Ven and Ellis (2000) performed a Rasch analysis of the SPM by set.  They 
found that sets B and E loaded on two factors each, nd to some extent set C.  They 
looked at the most frequent incorrect answer choice to hypothesize what the factors are, 
and they concluded that Set B requires Gestalt continuation for the early problems and 
analogical reasoning for the latter problems.  Set C requires analogical reasoning and lack 
of resistance to perceptual distracters.  Set E requir s analogical reasoning and coping (or 
constructing an answer choice from the two adjacent entries in the matrix). 
Matzen et al. (2010) constructed a set of artificial SPM-like items by using a fixed 
bank of shapes, features, transformations, and directions.  They used six shapes (oval, 
rectangle, diamond, triangle, trapezoid, T), with each shape varying according to size, fill 
pattern, orientation, and numerosity.    Transformations were of two types:  object 
transformation (changes in shape, shading, orientatio , size, and number) and logical 
transformations (AND, OR, and XOR).  Directions were ither rows, columns, diagonal 
(both ways), or outward from the top left corner of the matrix.  Incorrect answer choices 
were created by systematically varying elements of the correct answer and of other 
150 
matrix entries or answer choices.  The authors hypothesized that three-relation problems 
would be more difficult than two-relation problems, and two-relation problems would be 
more difficult than one-relation problems.  They also hypothesized that within three-
relation problems, problems in which more relations were either diagonal or outward 
would be more difficult.  Both of these difficulty hypotheses were borne out in 
participant data.  In addition, outward transformations were more difficult than the other 
directions, though this result primarily applied to problems with shading changes as the 
salient transformation.  The artificial object transformation problems seemed of equal 
difficulty to similar SPM problems, but the artificial logical problems were more difficult 
than similar SPM problems, probably because several of the SPM logical problems are 
very easy.  They establish that direction of relation s a significant contributor to item 





4.2 Problem Classification Using Model Ablation 
One advantage of classifying problems using a computational model is that results are 
strictly quantitative; human coding or introspection necessarily includes qualitative 
influences.  However, previous approaches to using a computational model to classify 
RPM problems—namely, the taxonomy developed by Carpenter et al. (1990) based on 
what rules their model used to solve particular problems—have shown sufficiency of 
particular reasoning mechanisms, but not necessity.  In particular, just because a model 
can successfully solve a problem using a set of mechanisms does not directly inform us 
about which of those mechanisms were actually necessary.   
In this section, I present a new approach for classification of RPM problems that 
relies on systematic ablations of the ASTI model to discover which, out of the set of 
mechanisms implemented in the model, are necessary for solving particular problems.  I 
define the rules for this classification as follows: 
1) To deem a particular set of mechanisms as sufficient for solving a particular problem, 
the model must be able to successfully answer the problem using these mechanisms. 
2) To deem a particular set of mechanisms as necessary for solving a particular problem, 
removing any one mechanism must cause the model to fai solve the problem. 
The ASTI model has many orthogonal collections of mechanisms that can be ablated.  I 
consider the types of base transformation used by the model as well as the image sets that 





Table 17.  Configurations of ASTI model used for ablation experiments for 2x2 matrices. 
Type Image sets Base transforms 













4.2.1 Problem classification for the CPM 
Table 18 shows results on the CPM from ablated configurations of the ASTI model, 
grouped by type of base transform and whether rows or columns were considered.  Only 
one problem on the CPM, problem B9, was not solved by any configuration of the ASTI 
model that was tested and is thus unclassifiable und r the current scheme. 
Most of the problems on the CPM appear to be agnostic wi h respect to the use of 
rows or columns.  Most of the problems on the CPM also ppear to be solvable using 
either basic matching (i.e. the identity transform) or exclusively using one or the other of 
rotate/flip transforms or add/subtract transforms.   
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Table 18.  Classification of problems from the CPM. 
Set # Identity Rotate/ flip 
Add/ 
subtract Rows Columns 
A 
1  - -   
2  - -   
3  - -   
4  - -   
5  - -   
6  - -   
7  - -   
8 - -    
9  - -   
10  - -   
11 - -    
12  - -   
AB 
1  - -   
2  - -   
3  - -   
4 -  -   
5 -  -   
6 -  -   
7 -  -   
8 -  - -  
9  - -   
10 -  -   
11 -  -   
12 - -   - 
B 
1  - -   
2  - -   
3  - -   
4 -  -   
5 -  -   
6 -  - -  
7 -  -  - 
8 - -    
9 - - - - - 
10 - -  -  
11 - -    
12 - -    
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4.2.2 Problem classification for the SPM 
Table 19 shows results for 2x2 SPM problems using a pixel threshold of 0.1.  Notice 
that all 24 problems are solved correctly by some combination of transform and image 
set, though, as illustrated by the results presented in Section 3.3.1, the best single 
configuration only solves 23 of the 24 problems, due to interactions between various 
components within a single configuration.   
Table 19.  Classification of 2x2 problems from the SPM. 
Set # Identity Rotate/ flip 
Add/ 
subtract Rows Columns 
A 
1  - -   
2  - -   
3  - -   
4  - -   
5  - -   
6  - -   
7  - -   
8  - -   
9  - -   
10  - -   
11 - -   - 
12  - -   
B 
1  - -   
2  - -   
3  - -   
4 -  -   
5 -  -   
6 -  - -  
7 -  -  - 
8 - -    
9 -    - 
10 - -  -  
11 - -   - 
12 - -    
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There are small differences in these results compared to corresponding CPM 
problems, most likely due to slight differences in the pixel thresholds used for each of 
these tests.  Like the CPM, most 2x2 SPM problems are not affected by the use of rows 
or columns, and most 2x2 SPM problems also appear to be solvable using either basic 
matching (i.e. the identity transform) or exclusively using one or the other of rotate/flip 
transforms or add/subtract transforms.   
Table 20 shows results for 3x3 SPM problems also using a pixel threshold of 0.1.  30 
of the 36 problems are solved by some configuration of the model at this threshold; 
problems C2, C9, D6, D9, D12, and E7.  There are many more successful combinations 
of image sets and transforms with 3x3 problems thanere are with 2x2 problems.  Far 
fewer of the 3x3 problems are solvable using identity-based matching.  Addition and 
subtraction seem to be predominant in Set C, and composition seems to be predominant 
in Set E, but Set D uses a mixture of all of these typ s of base transforms.  In addition, 
Set C seems to be solvable using either rows or columns, while Set E seems to favor row-
based transformations.  Set D is clearly dominated by iagonal transformations. 
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Table 20.  Classification of 3x3 problems from the SPM. 
Set # ID RF AS COMP Rows Cols Diags 
C 
1  - - -  - - 
2 - - - - - - - 
3  - - -   - 
4 - -  -   - 
5 - -  -   - 
6 - -  -   - 
7 -  -     
8 -   -    
9 - - - - - - - 
10 - -  -   - 
11 -   -    
12 - -  -   - 
D 
1  - - -  - - 
2  - - - - -  
3  - - - - -  
4 - -  -  - - 
5 - -     - 
6 - - - - - - - 
7 - - -  - -  
8 - -  - - -  
9 - - - - - - - 
10  - - - - -  
11 - - -  - -  
12 - - - - - - - 
E 
1 - -     - 
2 - -     - 
3  - - -  - - 
4 - -     - 
5  - - - -  - 
6 - - -   - - 
7 - - - - - - - 
8  - - -  - - 
9 - -      
10 - - -   - - 
11 - - -    - 
12  - - - - -  
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4.3 Claims and Future Work 
In this section, I conducted computational experiments to test how systematic 
ablations of the ASTI model, removing various functionalities in different combinations, 
affect performance on individual RPM problems.  Using this approach, I was able to 
define problem classifications based on the visual re soning mechanisms necessary to 
solve particular problems, which provides a problem classification scheme based on the 
information processing demands of each problem.   
My findings, apart from the problem classifications themselves, indicate that there do 
seem to be distinct problem types present on both the CPM and the SPM, which can be 
identified through computational modeling as I have shown.  In addition, this work 
demonstrates that previous approaches that define large classes of RPM problems as 
“visual” or “verbal” are somewhat misleading, in tha  the majority of RPM problems can 
be solved using particular visual mechanisms.   
There are many important areas for future work, including providing a model-based 
classification of problems on the APM, if future versions of the ASTI model are able to 
successfully address more problems.  Additions to the ASTI model, such as image 
segmentation or gestalt reasoning, provide additional dimensions along which RPM 
problems might be classified.  Furthermore, there is significant potential for using these 
problem classifications to provide more detailed studies of human behavior on the RPM.  
For example, one could imagine studying the neural activation of individuals with autism 
as they solve problems in the various classes identified in this section, to better 
understand the neural substrates that underlie various types of visual operations.  
  
158 
5 ERROR PATTERNS ON THE RPM 
This chapter investigates one potential behavioral m rker for the RPM that may or 
may not provide an indicator of whether a test-taker is using a visual or verbal problem-
solving strategy.  As I have shown in Chapter 3, visual strategies can be as successful as 
verbal strategies on many RPM problems, and so overall l vels of accuracy cannot serve 
as this type of behavioral marker.  However, beyond just the total score, an individual’s 
responses on the test can actually furnish additional information based on the errors that 
they make.  In particular, for two individuals who appen to achieve the same total score, 
their particular choice of distracters for problems answered incorrectly may differ, for 
instance if their preferred problem-solving strategies lead them down different paths of 
reasoning. 
1) To what extent can errors made on the RPM serve as behavioral markers to 
indicate the use of a visual versus verbal strategy? 
To answer this question, I have conducted an observational study of error patterns on 
the SPM using data drawn from three different populations:  typically developing (TD) 
individuals, who likely use a combination of visual and verbal strategies, individuals with 
autism, who, as I have discussed in Chapter 2, may use predominantly visual strategies, 
and the ASTI model, which uses exclusively visual strategies.   
I begin by describing existing approaches in the RPM literature for analyzing patterns 
and types of errors.  Then, I present a new classification of conceptual error types 
represented by the distracters on the SPM.  I then pr sent a detailed method for the 
observation study of error patterns, followed by results.  I conclude with a summary of 
my claims and areas for future work.   
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5.1 Existing Approaches for Examining RPM Errors 
In this section, I examine existing approaches from the RPM literature for examining 
the number or types of errors that individuals make on the test. 
Miller and Raven (1939) looked at the performance of tw  groups of children:  one 
group of girls of unspecified school age, and another group of younger children between 
5 ½ and 7 ½ years of age.  Using variations of matrix problems, they established that 
there are at least two influences on which wrong answers participants choose, in terms of 
there being non-random effects on the distribution of answers that are chosen.  One 
influence is the absolute position of the answer choice with respect to the matrix.  When 
alternatives are all listed horizontally to the right of the matrix, the position effect is very 
marked, and participants tend to choose the left-most choices that are closer to the matrix.  
When alternatives are listed in rows underneath the matrix, position effects are less 
marked though still present, and participants tend to choose answers from the top row and 
those towards the middle-right of any particular row (i.e. closer to the empty space in the 
matrix).  The other influence on answer choices is the conceptual type of error 
represented by the entry given in each respective answer choice, and in particular, for 
difficult problems, participants tend to make errors f repetition.  These two influences 
are not independent, however; they do interact in complex ways.  If a correct answer 
happens to be in the preferred position, it will be chosen more often than otherwise.  
Likewise, if an obviously implausible answer is put into this preferred position, 
participants will go on to examine more alternative choices, whereas if a “familiar” but 
still incorrect answer is in the preferred position, e.g. a repetition error, participants tend 
to stick with that answer.   
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Halstead (1943) compared results on the SPM from a clinical group of individuals 
diagnosed with neuroses with those of healthy controls.  In order to examine group 
differences at a finer level of detail than overall score, Halstead created subgroups 
individually matched on raw scores.  The groups didnot differ on measures of 
“unevenness,” i.e. score consistency across sets when compared to norms, or “reversals,” 
i.e. scoring higher on a later set than on an earlier one.  He also examined test variables as 
a function of age, time (for taking the test), attitude, etc.  Finally, Halstead looked at the 
most frequent errors made by a very large number of control participants (n = 2790).  He 
broadly classifies these errors according to conceptual type and observed that low ability 
participants tended to make “perceptual” errors like repetition, whereas high ability 
participants tended to make “inadequate reasoning” errors.  He also observed that:  
“Mathematically minded subjects seem to do as well as any on the test, and indeed some 
items in Set E can only be solved logically.  High scores have, however, been obtained by 
artistic people who have an eye for form (Gestalt), symmetry, etc.” (p. 211). 
Eysenck (1945) looked at the performance of elderly adults with senile dementia, 
compared to typical adults, on sets A and B of the CPM.  She looked at errors in terms of 
the most frequent distracters chosen and found that in both groups, both the absolute 
position of distracters as well as distracters thatrepeat entries from the matrix influence 
the incorrect answer choices made by participants.  In particular, distracters in positions 
1, 2, and 6 were more frequently chosen than those in the other positions, but the only 
group difference was for position 2, which was chosen more frequently by the senile 
group.  For both groups, matching the entry above the empty space accounted for a 
significant proportion of errors, and matching the entry to the left of the empty space 
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accounted for a smaller, but still significant, proortion of errors. 
Bromley (1953) wrote an interesting paper in which he studied performance on the 
SPM by a group of older individuals with various psychiatric disorders, whom he 
described as evincing “primitive” forms of thinking.  The individuals were instructed to 
explain their reasoning as they took the test, and Bromley provided qualitative analyses 
of their responses.  His main observation was that ere seemed to be two ways to 
approach the SPM:  one the intended way, with abstrct, elational, analogical thinking, 
and another involving more global, holistic, concrete thinking (including mental 
imagery).  He observed that the primitive thinking shown by the test participants fell 
more into the latter category and could explain many of the errors made on the test.  With 
respect to errors, Bromley observed that the participants seemed susceptible to effects of 
both the absolute position of answer choices as well as other features of incorrect answer 
choices (e.g. repetition of a part of the matrix, etc.).  He characterized the answer choice 
error types as: “part of the matrix, simple or distorted figure like the correct one, 
relatively unrelated figure, global figure, similar to part of the matrix reversed or 
distorted” (p. 384).  The highest proportion of errors was for “part of the matrix” answer 
choices, followed rather distantly by “simple or distorted figure like the correct one” and 
“global figure.”  Bromley also listed the types of thinking that he supposed gave rise to 
errors on the test, and he emphasized that types of thinking differed significantly on an 
individual differences level.  He also surmised that many of these forms of “primitive” 
thinking might have developed in an individual (and thus used on a test like the SPM) as 
a compensatory mechanism, to make up for difficulties with other forms of thinking (e.g. 
abstract, analogical, etc.). 
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1) Global responses are those that involve global/Gestalt solutions. 
2) Concrete responses are those that fail to adequately abstract from the directly 
perceived features of the problem. 
3) Mechanization of response involves the inability to switch set from initially 
successful strategies.  Bromley points out that the test itself encourages this 
sort of mechanization, which echoes the strategy findings of Kirby and 
Lawson (1983), that early problems on the test influence the strategy chosen 
by participants for later problems.  This seems very akin to perseveration. 
4) Inability to explain refers to failures in verbalizing a strategy (for successful 
problems) or the difficulties with a particular problem (for unsuccessful 
problems). 
5) Sensori-motor responses refer to the tendency of partici nts to point and 
trace their answer on the matrix and on the answer choices.  Bromley 
observed that on occasion, participants would trace the correct answer but be 
unable to choose that answer choice. 
6) Physiognomic responses. 
7) Subjective responses occurred when participants seemed to think there was 
ambiguity in the answer choices, and the correct answer was a matter of 
personal preference. 
8) Fluid responses were those in which participants seemed to use arbitrary 
selection criteria, including just picking the “odd man out” among the answer 
choices. 
9) Avoidance of reality referred to participants who picked answer choices and 
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described how they should be different, or to participants who tried to evade 
the problem by trying to match the frame shapes instead of the entry content. 
Forbes (1964), as part of an item analysis to revise the problems found on the APM, 
analyzed the types of errors made by participants as a function of their ability level (i.e. 
total APM score).  He classified errors as being of four types:  incomplete correlate, 
wrong principle, incomplete individuation, and repetition.  His analysis looked at each 
third of the test with respect to a single ability evel: low for the first third, average for the 
second third, and high for the third third.  He noted hat the incomplete correlate was the 
most frequent error type overall, but represented a sm ller proportion of errors for the 
low ability group, for whom wrong principle was the most frequent error.  Individuation 
and repetition errors were the least frequent in any group.  He also looked at overall 
selection of answer choices as a function of position, and found that positions 6 and 7 
tended to gain fewer responses than the others, and positions 1 and 4 were the most 
frequently chosen.  He surmised that perhaps 1 is favored by typical scanning patterns, 
and 4 is closest to the empty space in the matrix. 
Weatherick (1966) looked at the errors made by healt y dult subjects on the SPM to 
directly compare to Bromley’s (1953) results with senile psychiatric patients.  The 
subjects were overall high scoring, and he found “very close agreement between our 
sample of n = 236 and Bromley’s sample of n = 35.”  As a result, Weatherick contends 
that the specific errors identified by Bromley do nt indicate “primitive thought 
processes.”  Weatherick does observe that in instances where his control results do differ 
from Bromley’s results, the senile patients tended to prefer (instead of the most frequent 
control error) a repetition error, of an answer that repeats a part of the matrix adjacent to 
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the empty space. 
Vejleskov (1968) looked at performance on the SPM among Danish children.  He 
gave results on error frequencies for only a few problems, and observed that for these 
problems (all from Set B), girls tended to fail by choosing the distracter that was the same 
as the correct response except rotated or flipped. 
Jacobs and Vandeventer (1970) looked at error patterns on the CPM.  In particular, 
for a given 2x2 CPM problem, they classified the answer choices based on whether the 
answer choice followed a horizontal rule only, a vertical rule only, both (which would be 
the correct answer), or neither.  They assumed that an incorrect answer choice was 
“superior” if it followed at least the horizontal or vertical rule (as opposed to answer 
choices that followed neither).  They found that 18 of the 36 problems on the CPM 
contained both “superior” answer choices, and they restricted their analysis to these 18 
problems.  Then, for each participant, they calculated a proportion Ps that was the 
number of superior answer choices chosen divided by the total number of wrong answers.  
(Participants who answered fewer than five problems incorrectly were excluded.)  
Looking at data from American children in the first and third grades, Eskimo adults and 
young adults (from Canada), and Temne adults and young adults (from Sierra Leone), Ps 
appeared to be more strongly correlated with total number of correct answers in lower-
ability groups of participants (i.e. those with lower average scores).  In addition, Ps 
appeared to be higher in the more able groups (i.e. Ps for Eskimos was higher than Ps for 
Temne).  One difficulty in this study is that Ps data from more able participants because 
less valid, because fewer errors have been made to con ribute to the Ps score.  In addition, 
Ps was defined solely based on answer choices that followed row or column rules in the 
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matrix; it is a very strong assumption to say that t ese answer choices were “superior” to 
the other answer choices.  A stronger methodology would require coding classes of 
distracters for all the answer choices, and then looking at types of errors of the various 
classes.  It could be that the classes of distracters ould still be ranked according to their 
“correctness” level, but that would depend on how the distracter classes were defined. 
Carter (1970) supposed that solving SPM problems involved processes of induction 
as well as evaluating similarity (i.e. similarity of the induced answer to the given answer 
choices).  He gave subjects five tests:  regular problems from the SPM (induction + 
similarity), problems from the SPM in which the answer choices were omitted 
completely and the answer had to be described (pure induction), tests to rank the 
similarity of answer choices and matrix entries, according to shared features in a 
propositional encoding (pure similarity), and problems from other, non-visual tests of 
induction (pure induction).  The similarity rankings of answer choices and matrix items 
by subjects might have given interesting insight into how they might be viewing the 
different distracters, but the study only scored them as correct or incorrect in their 
rankings.  Further, the problems that they ranked wre not the same as the ones in the 
first two tests, so it was not possible to see how their perceived rankings might have 
affected their actual performance on the problem.  In fact, while the author designed the 
two ranking tasks to be different from inductive reasoning, it does seem as though 
evaluating similarities on a feature-by-feature basis would share a lot in common with 
solving a matrix task, even one without the answer choices, inasmuch as both tasks 
involve evaluating differences between entries in a systematic way. 
Guttman (1974) looked at familial correlations in SPM scores among children and 
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their parents.  Guttman observed that for each item, wo or three of the incorrect answer 
choices seemed to be chosen with greater frequency.  However, she did not observe any 
inter-family differences in these frequency distribut ons. 
Thissen (1976) characterized incorrect response choices on the SPM according to 
frequency:  the first most-chosen, second most-chosen, and then all other incorrect 
answer choices.  He used this information to calculte a latent trait model for each test 
item that gave probability of choosing a particular answer choice as a function of ability 
(the latent, unobserved trait).  He did find that for different problems, the answer choices 
behaved differently for different levels of ability, but the analysis was purely done along 
this unidimensional notion of ability; no explanations were offered for why certain 
answer choices might be more or less chosen than others.   
Horner and Nailling (1980) adapted a listing of error types from Raven (1965) and 
present a listing of the error type for each answer choice in the CPM.  In a study of left-, 
right-, and non-brain-damaged patients, they found that each group showed nearly 
identical patterns of error types across the four error types.  In particular, only one type of 
error, “repetition of a pattern,” seemed to be made with significant frequency, other than 
the correct answer. 
Kirby and Lawson (1983) developed a series of ambiguous items in which different 
answer choices were deemed correct depending on the strategy one were employing.  
This is one example of different strategies leading to different answer choices, though in 
this case both answers were deemed correct. 
Vodegel Matzen, van der Molen, and Dudink (1994) looked at types of errors made 
on the SPM by typically developing children.  They adopted error categories from the 
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APM to categorize SPM errors as: incomplete correlate, wrong principle, repetition, or 
additional elements, and they only analyzed sets C hrough E.  Inter-rater reliability for 
coding the error types was only around 72%.  They found that the incomplete correlate 
was most frequent overall, followed by wrong principle, repetition, and additional 
elements.  When they divided the subjects by ability level, they found that low ability 
subjects made relatively more errors of the incomplete correlate and repetition types.  The 
authors then devised an “experimental progressive matrices” test, in which all errors were 
of the “incomplete correlate” type, but they varied according to how many rules were 
omitted to generate that answer choice.  The problems varied according to rule type and 
number, following Carpenter et al. (1990).  The EPM was similar in difficulty to the 
SPM, and they found that most error choices (for any ability level) were made due to the 
omission of a single rule.  Furthermore, the rules increased in difficulty (as measured by 
number of errors) in this order, for all ability levels:  constant in a row, quantitative 
pairwise progression, distribution of three values, addition/subtraction, distribution of two 
values.  This is the same rule ordering that was chosen by Carpenter et al. (1990) for 
inducing rules. 
Van der Ven and Ellis (2000) looked at the most frequent incorrect answer choice for 
the SPM in sets B, C, and E, in order to determine what factors these problems might 
load upon.  They identified different types of errors, including:  “lack of completeness of 
analogical reasoning,” “freedom from perceptual distracters,” and “coping.”  They also 
present data from sets C and E giving the frequencies of each answer choice for each 
problem, using their sample of several hundred Dutch schoolchildren. 
Babcock (2002) classified each answer choice from the APM as being one of four 
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different error types:  incomplete correlate, wrong principle, confluence of ideas, or 
repetition.  She studies the error responses made by adults of varying age and ability, 
according to whether their frequency of making a particular type of error was above or 
below chance levels.  She found that adults of varying ages tended to make similar types 
of errors, but adults of high ability made different errors than those of low ability.  In 
particular, high ability adults tended to make more incomplete correlate errors, and few 
errors of other types.  Lower ability adults tended to make each type of error at chance 
levels.  Also, she studied errors as a function of rule type, based on Carpenter et al. 
(1990), and found some differences between subjects of varying abilities. 
Gunn & Jarrold (2004) looked at types of errors made by TD children, children with 
moderate learning disabilities (MLD), and children with Down syndrome (DS) on the 
CPM.  They classified error choices as being of onef four types, following the CPM 
manual: difference, repetition of a figure, inadequate individuation, and incomplete 
correlates.  They found that, even after controlling for total number of errors, the DS 
group made different types of errors than the other wo groups.  In particular, the DS 
group produced fewer repetition of a figure errors and more inadequate individuation 
errors and difference errors (which is choosing an u related answer choice).  
Furthermore, the pattern of errors produced by the DS group is similar to that shown by 
younger TD children, even in cases where the DS group shows better performance than 
younger TD children.  The authors surmise that individuals with DS may have either 
difficulty in combining features to produce the target pattern, difficulty in visual 
discrimination, or less rigor in choosing their final response, in the case of incomplete or 
partial solutions. 
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Matzen et al. (2010) performed an analysis of errors on the SPM and on artificial 
SPM-like items.  On the artificial items, errors were classified systematically according to 
how each distracter was related to content in the problem matrix.  In particular, error 
types were classified as (for a single relation in the problem): match to diagonal, match to 
top left, match to adjacent, flanker, and unclassified.  They were able to categorize some, 
but not all, SPM errors using the same scheme (i.e. the one-relation SPM problems but 
not the two-relation problems).  For certain problems, they found that the error type 
seemed to have a relationship to the direction of the relation in the problem; for instance, 
problems that were diagonal in one direction tended to have more “match to adjacent” 
errors, whereas problems that were diagonal in the o r direction tended to have more 
“flanker” errors.  Though the authors do not draw this connection, it seems as though 
participants might have been distracted by Gestalt properties of the overall matrix in 
making such errors. 
Fajgelj, Bala, and Katic (2010) as part of a factor analysis of the CPM, looked at 
types of errors made by their sample of Serbian children.  They found that for younger 
children, more CPM problems had certain distracters hat were chosen by significant 
portions of subjects (i.e. more than 20%).  They observed that the most common 
distracters involved choosing the answer identical to the entry to the left of the empty 
space or above the empty space in the matrix.  Theyalso note, interestingly, that number 
2 was chosen more frequently than other answer choices, and especially so for younger 
children, possibly because this choice is spatially closest to the empty spot in the matrix. 
Facon and Nuchadee (2010) looked at relative item difficulties among items on the 
CPM between TD children, children with Down syndrome, and children with unspecified 
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intellectual disability.  They matched each group, participant-by-participant, on CPM raw 
score, to account for potential differences in overall ability level.  They found no 
evidence of differential item functioning (i.e. particular items being more or less difficult 
for different individuals) among the groups.  They did emphasize the importance of such 
analyses for various clinical groups because there is little evidence that psychometric 
tests involve the same cognitive processes for cognitively disparate groups of individuals. 
Van Herwegen, Farran, and Annaz (2011) looked at error types on the CPM between 
TD children and individuals with Williams syndrome (WS).  They classified errors on the 
CPM following the CPM manual into four categories: difference, inadequate 
individuation, repetition, and incomplete correlation.  They looked at proportion of each 
error type out of total error for each participant.  Participants were matched on CPM raw 
score, and the WS group had a much higher mean chronological age than did the TD 
group.  Their results were very similar to those in Gunn and Jarrold (2004), in the 
proportions of each type of error made, on average, though they found no group 
differences in this study between the WS and TD indiv duals.  They also studied 
developmental effects on error type, and again found similar results to Gunn and Jarrold 
(2004), in that the difference and inadequate individuation errors decreased and repetition 
errors increased; however, incomplete correlation errors did not increase with age.  They 
also did an item analysis, following Facon and Nuchadee (2010), to look at whether items 
differed in difficulty between the two groups.  Only 3 of the 36 items differed.  They 
close with speculating that one might expect to see diff rent patterns autism, since autism 
has perceptual atypicalities more so than WS and the RPM is a perceptual task. 
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5.2 Classification of Error Types on the SPM 
The published manuals for both the CPM and the APM include small taxonomies of 
what types of conceptual errors are represented by the choice of a particular distracter 
from among the given answer choices.  The CPM manual gives four broad categories of 
error types along with specific criteria that can be used to classify a particular distracter 
into one of these four categories, shown here in Table 21.  The manual also gives a 
classification for each answer choice for all 36 problems on the CPM.  The APM manual 
similarly lists four broad categories of error types, which are somewhat different in name 
from the four categories given for the CPM, and instead of specific classification criteria, 
gives broad descriptions of each type of error, shown here in Table 22.  Then, for each of 
the 36 problems in Set II of the APM, the manual lists the top two most frequently chosen 
distracters along with their error type classifications.  However, the manuals do not give 
details as to how these taxonomies were developed or how distracters were classified.   
Table 21.  Error type taxonomy and classification criteria from the CPM manual (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 2003, p. 5). 
Error type  Criteria 
Difference a The piece has no figure of any kind on it b The figure shown is quite irrelevant 
Inadequate individuation 
c The figure is contaminated by irrelevancies or distortions 
d It combines figures irrelevantly 
e It is the whole or half the pattern to be completed 
Repetition of the pattern 
f Above and to the left of the space to be filled 
g Immediately above the space to be filled 
h Immediately to the left of the space to be filled 
Incomplete correlate i The figure is wrongly orientated [sic] j It is incomplete, but correct as far as it goes 
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Table 22.  Error type taxonomy and descriptions from the APM manual (Raven, Raven, 
& Court, 2003, p. 10). 
Error type Description 
Incomplete solutions 
(Incomplete correlate) 
These are errors arising from failure to grasp all the 
variables determining the nature of the correct option 
required to complete the problem pattern.  Instead an 
option is chosen which is only partly correct. 
Arbitrary lines of reasoning 
(Wrong principle) 
The option chosen suggests that the person being tested 
is using a principle of reasoning qualitatively different 
from that demanded by the item. 
Over-determined choices 
(Confluence of ideas) 
These are errors involving failure to discriminate 
irrelevant qualities in the chosen option, and to select one 
which combines as many as possible of the individual 
characters shown in the matrix to be completed. 
Repetitions 
These involve selection of a [sic] option identical to one of 
the three options immediately adjacent to the space to be 
filled in the matrix. 
 
The SPM manual does not contain a similar discussion of error types (Raven, Raven, 
& Court, 1998).  Vodegel Matzen and colleagues (1994) attempted to use the APM 
classifications shown in Table 22 to categorize distracters for sets C through E of the 
SPM, but inter-rater reliability between two coders was found to be only around 70%, 
and the authors observed that classification of SPM distracters seemed “problematic,” as 
no explicit methodology for constructing distracters is apparent, either in the test itself or 
in the research literature on the SPM (Vodegel Matzen et al., 1994, p. 1).   
For coding error types on the SPM, I first reconciled the two sets of error type 
categories given in the CPM and APM manuals which, alt ough having different labels, 
seem to represent conceptually the same notions of err r types.  For each of these four 
error types, I give a preferred label, which best captures the intended conceptual 
underpinning of that error type, along with the other labels used to indicate the same type.   
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Incomplete correlate (IC) errors, or “incomplete solution” errors, are those in which 
the distracter is almost, but not quite, correct.  For example, some IC distracters represent 
a rotation or reflection of the correct answer.  Other IC distracters differ from the correct 
answer in a single feature dimension, e.g. they might have four elements instead of three, 
or straight elements instead of curvy ones, or have the correct shape but the wrong 
texture.  Alternately, an IC distracter might be only missing an element from the correct 
answer.  Oftentimes, an IC distracter might be correct in terms of a single row or column 
in the matrix, e.g. looking just at the right-most column or just at the bottom-most row, 
but when both rows and columns are taken into account, it no longer fits the matrix 
pattern.  These kinds of errors are made when a test-taker more or less “gets” the 
problem, in terms of identifying and understanding the relevant matrix relationships, but 
then fails to fully account for all of the problem details when selecting an answer. 
Repetition (R) errors are those in which the distracter is a copy f one of the matrix 
entries adjacent to the blank space.  Choosing an R distracter may represent a sort of 
cognitive bias or fixation on the matrix, in which an answer is selected using perceptual 
matching between the answer choices and the matrix entries closest to the blank space.  
These entries may be privileged because of their proximity to the blank space, just as the 
answer choices in positions closest to the blank space tend to be chosen more frequently.  
Alternately, assuming a top-left to bottom-right visual scanning pattern, adjacent entries 
may be the last viewed before the test-taker moves n to look at the answer choices.   
Difference (D) errors, or “over-determined choices” or “confluenc of ideas” errors, 
are those in which the distracter is somehow qualitatively different in appearance from 
the other distracters.  D distracters include those that are completely blank, as well as 
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those that have extraneous shapes that are not found anywhere in the problem matrix.  In 
addition, a D distracter is often the most complex-s eming answer choice, either 
combining all of the matrix entries together into a single agglomeration of matrix 
elements or taking some feature from the matrix and increasing its value until it surpasses 
all the other entries and answer choices.  A D distracter might be chosen because it 
visually “pops” from among the other answer choices.  Additionally, difference errors 
may be more common when a test-taker is adopting an answers-first strategy, i.e. 
response elimination, instead of a matrix-first strategy, i.e. constructive matching. 
Wrong principle (WP)  errors, or “arbitrary lines of reasoning” or “inadequate 
individuation” errors, are those in which the distrac er is a copy or composition of 
elements from various matrix entries.  A WP distracter might be chosen if the test-taker 
does not educe the correct relationship from the matrix entries and instead combines the 
entries according to some other rule or relationship to produce an answer choice. 
Then, I developed criteria that mark a particular distracter as belonging to a particular 
error type.  The difficulty in classification expressed by Vodegel Matzen and colleagues 
(1994) was perhaps partially due to the vague and qualitative error type descriptions 
taken from the APM manual.  The approach in the CPM manual, with specific criteria for 
each error type, is much easier to adopt into a coding scheme, but its criteria do not cover 
all of the distracters present in the SPM.  Thus, I surmised that developing a clear set of 
criteria would be important to establish a reliable coding of distracters on the SPM. 
However, there is an additional difficulty in coding the SPM distracters, which is that 
often, it seems that the same distracter falls under multiple categories; it might be a 
repetition of an item in the matrix as well as an incomplete correlate of the correct 
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answer.  In particular, while trying to come up with a set of criteria satisfactory for 
coding the distracters on the SPM, I made the following key observation.  The four error 
types listed above actually represent two orthogonal classifications of distracters: 
I. Repetition, difference, and wrong principle errors all have to do with how a 
particular answer choice is related to information n the matrix and in the 
other answer choices, without any regard to the content of the correct answer 
choice.  In particular, these errors assume that the est participant is attending 
to irrelevant or erroneous aspects of the problem, and that they are not able to 
discover even a partial solution to the problem.  In particular, it may be 
possible for individuals who favor a particular error type to pick the correct 
answer by chance, even though they were simply doing it to repeat an entry or 
to choose the most different-looking answer choice. 
II.  Incomplete correlate errors, on the other hand, have to do with precisely how 
a particular distracter is related to the correct answer choice.  These errors 
assume that the test participant correctly guesses some part of the solution, but 
does not quite attain the correct answer. 
Therefore, I defined criteria for these four error types in two overlapping parts, which 
are shown in Table 23.  Type I errors do not consider the correct answer; all distracters 
for each problem are coded according to criteria for repetition, difference, and wrong 
principle errors.  Type II errors, in contrast, do c nsider the correct answer, but do not 
consider the matrix.  Answer choices (with the exception of the correct answer) are coded 
according to how they are related to the correct answer, if at all; many distracters may not 
fit any criteria under the Type II error designation. 
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Table 23.  Classification criteria for the SPM for Type I and Type II errors. 
Error type Code Criteria 
I: Repetition 
R-Left Repetition of matrix entry to left of blank space 
R-Top Repetition of matrix entry above blank space 
R-Diag Repetition of matrix entry to top-left of blank space 
I: Difference 
D-Blank Filled completely white or black 
D-Union Union of matrix entries or aspects of them, so that union has more components than any single matrix entry 
D-Plus Maximizes some feature value or makes it more complex 
D-Diff Differs qualitatively from matrix and other answers, or contains information not found anywhere in matrix 
I: Wrong principle 
WP-Copy Copy of matrix entry not adjacent to blank space 
WP-Flip Rotation/reflection of matrix entry 
WP-Matrix Other transformations or combinations of matrix entries or aspects of them, including negative images 
II: Incomplete 
correlate 
IC-Neg Negative (color-inversion) of correct answer 
IC-Fill Change only in fill, texture, or style 
IC-Flip Rotation/reflection of correct answer 
IC-Layout Change only in spatial layout of elements 
IC-Scale Change only in size or scale, in either or both dimensions (allowing for feature-wise scaling) 
IC-Num Change only in number of discrete elements (allowing for slight changes in layout) 
IC-Inc Incomplete, with missing element or portion 
   
5.2.1 Coding method 
The method I used for coding distracters on the SPM was as follows.  First, from 
inspection of the SPM, I developed lists of criteria for Type I and Type II errors similar to 
those given in Table 23.  Then, I wrote a small coding protocol to use for performing the 
distracter classification, which is given in its entirety in Appendix A.  This protocol 
contained qualitative descriptions of each overall error type, an example problem 
illustrating the various types of criteria for both Type I and Type II errors, and finally, an 
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instruction sheet with ordered codes and criteria to use for the classification, which 
proceeded in two parts, first for Type I errors and second for Type II errors.  Type I error 
classification used a copy of the test booklet in which no answers had been marked.  
Type II error classification used another copy of the est booklet in which the correct 
answers had been marked, and additionally, the matrix po tions of each problem had been 
cut off, so only the answer choices were used for the coding. 
I used this protocol to perform a coding of all distracters on the SPM for both Type I 
and Type II errors.  Then, an independent rater was given the same protocol.  After a 
brief verbal discussion of the goals of the coding and the contents of the protocol, the 
second rater also coded all distracters for both Type I and Type II errors. 
The initial agreement between the two raters was 82% for Type I errors and 82% for 
Type II errors.  (The agreement in these percentages is purely coincidental; the two parts 
of the coding protocol had different numbers of items to code, different numbers of 
codes, and different counts of agreement between raters.)  Kappa coefficients were 
calculated to test for independence between raters.  The kappa values were 0.79 for Type 
I errors and 0.67 for Type II errors. 
Then, I met with the second rater to discuss the items on which we disagreed.  There 
were several systematic disagreements that were easily re olved by making the coding 
criteria more specific.  For example, the D-Union criterion was modified to specify that 
this type of distracter had to have more elements in it than any entry in the matrix, which 
was not originally part of the criterion.  All of these changes are incorporated into the 
final criteria listed in Table 23.   
After the negotiation and criteria-revision phase, agreement between raters was re-
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calculated.  Post-negotiation agreement between the two raters was 95% for Type I errors 
and 98% for Type II errors.  Any remaining disagreem nts were resolved based on 
consideration of the conceptual type of error intended to be captured. 
Once the distracters had been assigned codes, the only step left in determining what 
error type a particular distracter choice represents was to resolve the priority ordering 
between Type I and Type II errors.  For example, if a distracter is chosen that represents 
both a D-Diff error as well as an IC-Flip error, whic  code is assigned to determine the 
overall error type?  Instead of trying to create a global ordering for all combinations of 
Type I and Type II error codes, I first observed which codes had been assigned in cases 
where both Type I and Type II errors were identified for the same distracter, and I 
resolved these conflicts only using a few simple rus, which are applied in order: 
1) Type I repetition errors take precedence over any Type II error. 
2) Any Type II error takes precedence over Type I WP-Matrix errors. 
3) Type II IC-Flip errors take precedence over any Type I error. 
4) Type I WP-Copy or WP-Flip errors take precedence ovr any Type II error. 
5) Type I D-Plus or D-Diff errors take precedence over any Type II error. 
5.2.2 Results 
Figure 31 shows the overall proportions of each error type identified in the set of 
answer choices of the SPM.  The proportions of each error type were found to be non-
uniform, χ2(4, N = 432) = 30.66, p < 0.001.  However, if the incomplete correlate errors 
are considered to represent a variation on choosing the correct answer, as shown in 
Figure 32, then the error types are distributed uniformly, χ2(3, N = 432) = 2.57, p = 0.46.  
This is interesting and suggests perhaps that Raven himself used some scheme in 
constructing distracters, and if so, the coding scheme that I have developed seems to 
match Raven’s approach to a considerable extent.
error types across Sets A through E on the SPM.
across sets, χ2(16, N = 432) = 70.88, 
Figure 31.  Proportion of error types
Figure 32.  Proportion of error types found across all answer choices on the SPM after 
combining correct answers with incomplete correlates.
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  Figure 33 shows the distribution of 
  The distributions differ significantly 
p < 0.001. 





Figure 33.  Prop
Figure 34 and Figure 
through 6 for Sets A and B and across answer choices 1 though 8 for Sets C, D, and E
While the error frequencies were too small to perform a regular chi
independence, data were analyzed using a simulated p
functionality for this in the statistical software package R.  The
significantly different across
= 6.71, p = 0.99, or 3x3 matrices, 
themselves are evenly distributed across answer choices, which was likely deliberately 
controlled by test creators, given that the effects of position had 
non-trivial effect on guessed answer choices.
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ortion of error types found across each set on the SPM.
35 show the distribution of error types across an wer choices 1 
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 answer choice positions for either 2x2 matrices
χ2(N = 288) = 16.46, p = 0.96.  The correct answers 
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Figure 34.  Proportion of error types found across each 
Figure 35.  Proportion of error types foun
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nswer position for 2x2 matrices








As can be seen from the literature, there are many different ways to examine errors 
made on the RPM, amidst general agreement that looking at errors in any of these ways 
can add valuable information about an individual’s performance on the test.  I focus on 
examining error choices by type, i.e., for problems that are not answered correctly, which 
conceptual types of distracters tend to be chosen? 
This analysis is applied to existing human behaviorl data, kindly made available by 
Dr. Isabelle Soulières at the University of Montreal.  These data come from four groups:  
children and adults, either typically developing or with autism.  These data are compared 
with each other as well as against computational dat generated by the ASTI model.   
5.3.1 Predictions 
In this section, for each type of error discussed above, I make predictions about 1) 
whether the ASTI model is likely to make this type of error, and 2) whether human test-
takers using either visual or verbal strategies are likely to make this type of error, i.e. 
does the probability of making this type of error differ based on strategy? 
Incomplete correlate (IC):  The ASTI model would likely make certain types of IC 
errors but not others.  IC-Neg, IC-Fill, IC-Flip, IC-Layout, and IC-Scale errors all 
represent changes in the visual properties of the corre t answer choice.  Because the 
ASTI model represents visual properties explicitly (in the predicted answer image itself), 
it would be unlikely for the model to correctly reason about the problem far enough to get 
close to the correct answer but then make one of these types of errors.  IC-Num and IC-
Inc errors, on the other hand, have more to do withintrinsic content of the answer image, 
and it is possible that incorrect reasoning by the model might lead to making one of these 
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two types of errors.  If human test-takers use similar visual representations to the ASTI 
model, i.e. if these representations explicitly portray the visual properties of a shape in 
terms of its color, texture, orientation, layout, and size, then we would expect to see the 
same pattern:  IC errors would only be made of the IC-Num and IC-Inc types.  For human 
test-takers using verbal representations, on the otr hand, number is likely one of the 
aspects of an answer choice that will be explicitly represented, and so we would not 
expect them to make IC-Num errors.  However, it is plausible that they might make 
errors of the other types, i.e. IC-Neg, IC-Fill, IC-Flip, IC-Layout, IC-Scale, and IC-Inc. 
Repetition (R):  The ASTI model could very well make repetition errors, as it uses 
the matrix entries adjacent to the blank space to generate its predicted answer image.  
Thus, if the model reasons incorrectly about the matrix, it could easily select an answer 
choice due to the answer’s similarity to an adjacent matrix entry.  In humans, if repetition 
errors are made due to a cognitive fixation on the adjacent matrix entries, I would expect 
to see little difference in repetition errors between individuals who are solving the 
problem visually versus verbally.  On the other hand, it may be that individuals who use 
visual representations are more likely to make repetition errors, if the visual priming/bias 
that occurs during inspection of the matrix is stronger for these individuals. 
Difference (D):  The ASTI model will likely not make difference erros, because the 
model reasons by trying to maximize similarity among matrix images, and difference 
errors represent answer choices that are very dissimilar from matrix entries.  These 
answers would not likely be chosen by test-takers who are using a constructive matching 
strategy, because answer choices represent “differenc ” errors for the very reason that 
they would be unusual or complicated to construct using elements from the matrix.  For 
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this reason, I expect to see little change in difference errors between individuals solving 
the problem visually or verbally.  On the other hand, as with repetition errors, it may be 
that individuals who use visual representations are more sensitive to attending to visually 
different stimuli, in which case their rate of difference errors might be greater. 
Wrong principle (WP):  The ASTI model could easily make wrong principle errors, 
as these errors might correspond to the ASTI model sel cting an incorrect transform or 
image set from which to generate its predicted answer.  For human test-takers, WP errors 
are likely to have equal frequencies of occurrence regardless of whether the test-taker is 
using visual or verbal representations.  Differences in WP errors are probably greater 
among individuals of different ability levels, irrespective of what strategy they are using. 
5.3.2 Overview of data 
In this section, I give an overview of the quantity and type of human behavioral data 
that is available, along with summary statistics decribing the demographics and the 
overall SPM performance levels shown by participants as well as the comparable SPM 
performance levels shown by the ASTI model. 
The human behavioral data that was available for study consisted of data on SPM 
performance by children and adults who were either ypically developing (TD) or who 
had been diagnosed with autism.  Portions of these data were previously analyzed and 
published in other studies (Dawson et al., 2007; Soulieres et al., 2010).  Participants 
included 106 TD individuals and 153 individuals with autism (AUT).  Data were 
available for each participant giving which answer choice they chose for each of the 60 
problems of the SPM, including a few instances in which an individual did not give an 
answer.  Using age data, the participants were grouped into children and adults.  I used a 
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cutoff of 17 years for the maximum age of the children groups.  One participant in the 
AUT group was excluded from all analyses, as he appe red to have adopted a strategy of 
answering “1” for more than half of the problems on the SPM. 
Table 24.  Breakdown of participant data by age (children versus adults) and group 
(typically developing versus autism versus the ASTI model). 
 Children Adults ASTI model 
 TD AUT TD AUT ASTI 
N 54 108 52 44 96 
































Note:  Not all participants had FSIQ data available. 
 
To obtain data samples from the ASTI model, I treated each configuration of the 
model described in Section 4.2 as an individual sample.  In this way, I had 96 ASTI 
model “participants” who could then be compared with the TD and AUT human groups.  
Table 24 summarizes SPM, age, and full-scale IQ (FSIQ) information. 
However, as noted in Section 5.1, if we wish to examine error patterns between 
groups, different overall levels of performance might be a confounding factor.  One 
approach to address this confound is to select subgro ps of participants who are 
individually matched on overall score.  Then, any differences in error patterns will be due 
to group membership only, and not to potential group differences in ability. 
This approach was applied to the child data along with data from the ASTI model.  If 
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multiple individuals had the same raw score, one was selected at random.  Each pairing 
differed by at most 1 point.  This resulted in groupings that share the same mean and very 
similar standard deviations.  Data from this group matching are given in Table 25.   
Table 25.  Score-matched subgroups used for analysis of children data. 
 TD AUT ASTI 
N 38 38 38 





Age in years:  mean (SD) 11.11 (3.30) 
10.76 
(2.71) n/a 







Comparisons of error types were conducted using three different analyses: 
1) Between-groups analysis, using matched child subgroups 
2) Between-groups analysis, using unmatched child groups 
3) Between-groups analysis, using unmatched adult groups 
5.4.1 Matched child subgroups 
Figure 36 shows the proportion of total errors of each conceptual error type made by 
participants in the matched child subgroups.  There is significant agreement in error type 
proportions between the TD and AUT groups, χ2(N = 826) = 1.89, p = 0.60, whereas the 
error type proportions made by the ASTI group differ significantly from each of the 
human groups, χ2(N = 826) = 91.62, p < 0.001 for TD, and χ2(N = 826) = 98.69, p < 
0.001 for AUT.  The relative scarcity of difference errors made by the ASTI model was 
one of the predictions made earlier, though the relative abundance of repetition errors had 
not been predicted for the ASTI model. 
Figure 37 shows errors for the three groups using specific error codes individually, 
without aggregating into error type.  Unlike the predicted outcomes, the proportions of 
individual IC errors do not differ significantly between the TD and AUT groups; again, 
across all error codes, performance between these two groups seems well matched.  Also, 
the ASTI model does make some errors of the IC-Fill, IC-Flip, and IC-Layout types, 
though as predicted, more errors are made in the IC-Inc category.  In addition, the ASTI 
model makes many more strict errors of repetition, ncluding the WP-copy type of error, 
than do either of the human groups.  The human groups, on the other hand, make 
significantly more WP-matrix errors.  This may indicate that human participants have 
some notion that simply copying a matrix entry does not usually lead to the correct 
answer, whereas the ASTI model
Figure 36.  Error types made by the three score
developing children (TD), children with autism (AUT), and the 
Figure 37.  Specific errors made by the 
developing children (TD), children with autism (AUT), and the 
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 has no such proscription. 
-matched subgroups of typically 
ASTI model







Figure 38 shows the proportion of total errors of each conceptual error type made by 
participants in the entire child groups, without matching subgroups based on total score
(top) and the three adult groups (bottom)
found for the matched child subgroups described in the previous section.
Figure 38.  Error types made by children (top) and adults (bottom) in the three 
groups: typically developing (TD), autism (AUT), and 
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5.5 Claims and Future Work 
Following the analyses presented in this chapter, i does not seem that error types 
alone provide a clear window into whether an indiviual is using a visual or verbal 
strategy on the SPM.  One major contribution of this chapter is the classification of error 
types on the SPM.  While earlier efforts to obtain such a classification were unsuccessful 
(Vodegel-Matzen, 1996), the current approach used a new set of more clearly defined 
classification criteria, as well as a new two-stage pproach to classifying errors.  Using 
this approach, an error classification for the SPM was obtained with 95% inter-rater 
reliability.  This classification will have utility for other studies of human or machine 
performance on the SPM, and it adds significant information for the RPM family of tests, 
as both the CPM and the APM already had error classifications, but the SPM did not. 
Future work on this topic should include addressing two important questions.  First, 
what factors do affect an individual’s particular choice of errors on a test like the SPM, if 
the visual/verbal nature of their problem-solving strategy does not seem to play a role?  
And second, what other behavioral markers may be useful to study the visual/verbal 
nature of an individual’s strategy?  Neuroimaging data from fMRI provides one avenue 
(e.g. Prabhakaran et al., 1996; Soulieres et al., 2011), as do eye-tracking studies or the use 
of verbal reporting protocols or qualitative observations (e.g. Bromley, 1957) to better 




This dissertation began with a discussion of problem solving, and in particular the 
types of knowledge representations and associated reasoning (i.e. cognitive strategies) 
that intelligent agents use to solve different kinds of problems.  The ensuing work centers 
on two key insights about classifications of cognitive strategies.  First, there is a 
difference between the way problem-solving tasks are typically or readily done and the 
way that they can be done.  While a majority of research in psychology, psychometrics, 
and artificial intelligence has focused exclusively on the former, problems with this 
approach can arise when assumptions about typicality dominate, for instance by finding 
their way into studies of atypical cognition and problem solving under the radar, so to 
speak, without explicit justification, or by suppressing the study of alternate strategies.   
The second insight has to do with what it means to “think visually,” a concept 
inspired in this dissertation by the “visual thinkig” accounts of many individuals on the 
autism spectrum.  A simple definition might be that thinking visually means doing well 
on visual tasks and poorly on verbal tasks.  However, th  standard classifications of tasks 
as “visual” or “verbal” represent how tasks are typically done.  Many of these tasks can, 
in fact, be done either visually or verbally, and so a more precise definition of thinking 
visually, from an information-processing perspective, is someone who 1) shows poor 
performance on tasks that can only be done verbally, 2) shows intact performance on 
tasks that are typically done visually, and 3) shows intact performance on tasks that are 
typically done verbally but can be done visually, b recruiting an atypical visual strategy. 
Using this kind of task classification coupled with general behavioral predictions in 
order to describe a form of cognition is, to my knowledge, new, and explicitly accounts 
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for the multiplicity of information processing strategies that can be successful in many 
problem domains as well as for the human brain’s incredible capacity to adapt, creatively 
drawing upon areas of cognitive strength to compensat  for areas that might be 
inaccessible or difficult to use.  One way to conceptualize how this approach can 
characterize a particular form of cognition is to think in terms of a “cognitive phenotype,” 
a notion recently coming into use to describe atypical forms of cognition, especially in 
neuropsychological disorders.  Just as an organism’s phenotype represents some 
presentation of physical characteristics that are tied o genetics and development, a 
cognitive phenotype represents a particular presentatio  of cognitive characteristics. 
Autism seems unusual in the space of psychological disorders in the heterogeneity of 
cognitive phenotypes that are exhibited by affected in ividuals.  While cognitive 
characterizations within autism seemed, for a time, to focus primarily on differences of 
degree (e.g. IQ, low- versus high-functioning, graded levels of language ability, etc.), it is 
becoming more apparent that there are also differenc s of kind, and these differences may 
represent distinct etiological subtypes within the autism spectrum (Charman et al., 2011).  
The notion of a “visual thinker” that I present in this dissertation attempts to describe one 
cognitive phenotype of autism that seems prevalent in introspective and anecdotal 
accounts.  While I focus mainly on the occurrence of this cognitive phenotype within 
autism, it may have utility in describing individual differences in cognitive styles among 
typically developing individuals as well, for instance along the lines of Gardner’s theories 
of multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1985).   
My characterization of a “visual thinking” cognitive phenotype, i.e. the Thinking in 
Pictures (TiP) hypothesis, specifies a set of behavior l predictions that can be used to 
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identify the occurrence of this phenotype in an individual.  While the work presented in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines these behavioral predictions in light of existing 
empirical studies, these predictions could also be us d to design new experiments that 
explicitly test for the presence of this phenotype.  This kind of assessment could yield 
numerous benefits for both the study of autism and for individuals on the autism 
spectrum, including 1) identifying a potential autism subtype defined by the presence of 
this cognitive phenotype, 2) tailoring the design of interventions to specifically recruit 
visual strategies, and 3) on an individual basis, informing the selection of certain 
interventions over others. 
However, there are many aspects of the Thinking in Pictures hypothesis that remain 
important open questions.  Clearly, reliance on a particular form of mental representation 
is only one aspect of cognition; studies of autism have also examined differences ranging 
from perception and sensory sensitivities to language nd metacognition, and with the 
advancement of neuroimaging technologies, these various cognitive differences are 
becoming more and more linkable to specific differences in neural development and 
activation.  If it is the case that there is a distinct visual thinking cognitive phenotype 
within autism, then it must ultimately be situated within an etiological framework that 
includes genetics, neurobiology, and development, as well as these other aspects of 
cognition and behavior. 
In Chapter 3, I present a computational model, the ASTI model, primarily as a proof 
of concept of how one particular visual strategy can solve a large proportion of problems 
from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) series of intelligence tests.  This model is 
fairly unique among computational models of the RPM, and indeed among AI models of 
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high-level problem solving in general, in its use of ic nic visual representations instead of 
propositional representations.  Perhaps the biggest question surrounding the ASTI model 
is to what extent it serves as a model of human cogniti n, including 1) human cognition 
in general, 2) autistic cognition in particular, and 3) the neural bases of cognition. 
In terms of general human cognition, the ASTI model is clearly a simplified model on 
many fronts.  Mainly, the ASTI model is a content model of solving RPM problems, not 
a process model, and so it does not include many procedural aspects of problem solving, 
such as attention, learning, iteration, or cognitive control, especially in consideration of 
taking the test as a whole and not just addressing individual problems.  On the content 
side, it provides a rather coarse-grained model of the kinds of operations that might be 
performed in mental imagery (or operations that are isomorphic in some sense); given the 
closed-world nature of individual RPM problems, and the visual simplicity of problem 
inputs (e.g. black-and-white shape and line drawings), this level of granularity appears to 
be appropriate, with the exceptions of operations of image scaling, filling, and 
segmentation that I mention in Chapter 3.  In terms of the specific reasoning content 
generated for each RPM problem, one limitation of the ASTI model is that it uses a 
purely feed-forward approach, predicting a single concrete answer before inspecting any 
of the answer choices.  This strategy of c nstructive matching is observed in humans but 
exists alongside the strategy of response elimination, which involves inspecting the 
answer choices up front, in conjunction with inspection of the matrix (Bethell-Fox et al., 
1983).  These two strategies, though ostensibly about the problem-solving process, also 
involve content as well, as they affect which aspects of the problem content (matrix vs. 
answer choices) are brought into play during various components of problem solving.   
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 In terms of autistic cognition, the ASTI model attempts to approximate the way in 
which individuals with autism who have a visual thinking cognitive phenotype might 
solve RPM problems, respecting the above mentioned limitations of the model, in the 
sense that these individuals would be expected to use a purely visual strategy on the test, 
whereas typically developing individuals would be exp cted to use a combination of 
visual and verbal strategies, akin perhaps to a combination of the ASTI model with a 
propositional RPM model.  One important question, however, is whether the kind of 
visual strategy used by individuals with autism who are visual thinkers would be the 
same as a typical visual strategy.  A recent paper looking at mental image comparisons 
and mental rotation has found superior performance i  individuals with autism (Soulières, 
Zeffiro, Girard, & Mottron, 2011).  Given the depth of cognitive differences in domains 
like language and perception that exist between individuals with autism and typically 
developing individuals, it would seem surprising if there were not also qualitative 
differences in visual processing as well, though what form these differences might take 
remains to be seen. 
In terms of its neural plausibility, the ASTI model in its current implementation 
makes no attempt to emulate aspects of neural computation.  However, there are several 
avenues that could be explored in this direction.  I  terms of its perception and internal 
representation, the ASTI model uses pixel-based images, which are essentially two-
dimensional intensity maps of rectilinearly arrayed points.  We know that at least a 
portion of the primary visual cortex is dedicated to hierarchically processing visual inputs 
into spatial features such as edges, corners, and poi ts, and the two-dimensional nature of 
this information is preserved according to the retinopically mapped structure of neurons.  
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If neural computation during mental imagery operates on this information in a way that 
preserves these two characteristics (Slotnick, Thompson, and Kosslyn, 2005), then these 
computations may, like those of the ASTI model, be described as combinations of affine 
and set transformations upon this information.  Clearly, both from an efficiency 
standpoint as well as from what we know of neural networks, such computations are 
likely to be implemented in the brain in a massively parallel fashion.  Again, this is an 
example in which the ASTI model as currently implemented is best described as a 
content model rather than a process model; it may be a le to perform a similar or 
isomorphic operation, but currently uses only serial processing.  The ASTI model could 
also be augmented to include features more similar to the edges and lines detected by the 
brain; computer vision offers many potential approaches in this direction. 
  Finally, in Chapter 5, I compare conceptual types of errors made on the RPM 
between typically developing individuals, individuals with autism, and various 
configurations of the ASTI model.  A striking finding is how similar the error patterns 
made by the two human groups are, especially given the differences observed in 
behavioral measures like comparative IQ performance and reaction time, as well as 
patterns of brain activation (Dawson et al., 2007; Soulieres et al., 2010).  One possible 
explanation is that whatever altered types of strategy or ability are causing the other 
observed differences, these alterations do not haveany effect on the types of conceptual 
errors that are made; for instance, error patterns may depend more on overall ability using 
any type of representation, rather than being independent of ability within a particular 
representational paradigm.  On the other hand, it may be that the error types themselves 
are not represented at a fine enough level of resolution or are capturing the wrong level of 
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abstraction needed to see the effects of strategy differences.  Additionally, the hypothesis 
that TD individuals and individuals with autism would exhibit different error patterns 
across the entire test assumes that strategy differenc s can be found on all, or at least 
most, problems.  Behavioral studies of the RPM have long observed that different 
problems seem to elicit different problem-solving strategies, and so there may be 
subclasses of problems on which error patterns differences are more pronounced.   
In sampling the types of errors made by the ASTI model, I chose to use an approach 
that does not explicitly model the decision-making process of the system choosing from 
among the given set of answer choices.  Instead, in keeping with conceptualizing the 
ASTI model as a content model instead of a process model, I examined what kinds of 
errors would be made across the space of variations in visual strategy that can be 
represented by systematic ablations of the ASTI model.  While the overall pattern of 
errors of the ASTI model is significantly different from both of the human group patterns, 
there are at least some similarities, and the differences seem to be explainable by 
particular features of the model.  In particular, there seem to be three types of errors in 
which we see the largest differences between the model and human groups: 1) difference 
errors are rarely made by the model, which is likely due to the fact that the model uses a 
purely feedforward approach to inspecting answer choices and does not compute the 
salience of answer choices, 2) repetition errors are made much more often by the model 
than by the human groups, which is perhaps because the model always uses single 
transformations of elements taken directly from thematrix in order to construct a 
predicted answer, and 3) the model is far less likely to make an error that represents a 
more complex transformation of a matrix entry, perhaps for the same reason.  Expanding 
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the ASTI model to include a response elimination approach that takes into account the 
saliency of particular answer choices, in addition t  the constructive matching approach 
that is currently used by the model, may increase the fidelity with which the model 
exhibits human-like error patterns. 
In summary, this dissertation began by examining a new hypothesis about visual 
thinking in autism, namely that certain individuals with autism may have a bias towards 
using visual instead of verbal mental representations.  I found evidence across several 
task domains indicating that this type of visual bias may be present in many individuals 
with autism, and that current cognitive theories of autism do not explicitly account for 
these findings.  To show the feasibility of this hypothesis in one domain, the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices test, I constructed the ASTI model, which uses purely visual 
representations to solve many RPM problems.  I tested the ASTI model against all three 
of the widely used Standard, Colored, and Advanced Progressive Matrices tests and 
found that the ASTI model correctly solves a considerable proportion of problems on 
these tests, with ceiling or near-ceiling performance on the Standard and Colored tests; 
future work will include incorporating mechanisms for image segmentation into the 
model, which is likely needed for improved performance on the Advanced test.  I also 
conducted ablation experiments with the model to derive a new data-based classification 
of problem types on the Raven’s Standard and Colored P ogressive Matrices tests.  Using 
this model, I then made predictions about the types of errors that might be made by 
individuals with autism versus by typically developing individuals.  This analysis 
revealed first, that looking at error types may need to be done at a finer-grained level of 
analysis to reveal the differences, if any, in errors made by the two human groups.  
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Second, this analysis uncovered some limitations of the ASTI model, namely that its 
reliance on constructive matching and its lack of measures of attention and salience seem 
to cause an unusual pattern of errors relative to human performance. 
This dissertation incorporates several theoretical and technical firsts, including: 
1) the first systematic examination of a visual thinking bias in individuals with 
autism across multiple task domains 
2) the first computational model that uses purely visual representations to solve 
problems from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices tests 
3) the first model of any kind to be tested against the entirety of all three of the 
Standard, Colored, and Advanced Progressive Matrices tests 
4) the first RPM problem classification based on model ablation experiments 
5) the first successful qualitative classification of c nceptual error types on the 
Standard Progressive Matrices test 
The main contribution of this dissertation lies in its integrated, interdisciplinary 
investigation into the role that visual mental representations can play in high-level 
problem solving.  As discussed above, this work hassignificant implications for the 
neuropsychological study of autism, for the design and interpretation of psychometric 
intelligence tests, for the construction of AI computational models that reason visually 
instead of propositionally, and finally, for the development of information processing 




APPENDIX A:     PROTOCOL FOR CODING SPM ERROR TYPES 
This appendix contains a copy of the protocol provided to the second independent 
coder to classify distracters on the SPM according to error type (see Section 5.2). 
 
(Protocol Page 1) Overview:  Error type classification on the SPM: 
 
There are four basic conceptual types of errors on the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Test:  1) 
incomplete correlate, 2) repetition, 3) difference, and 4) wrong principle. 
 
Incomplete correlate (IC) errors are those in which the distracter is almost, but not quite, correct.  For 
example, some IC distracters represent a rotation or reflection of the correct answer.  Other IC distracters 
differ from the correct answer in a single feature dimension, e.g. they might have four elements instead 
of three, or straight elements instead of curvy ones, or have the correct shape but the wrong texture.  
Alternately, an IC distracter might be only missing an element from the correct answer.  Oftentimes, an IC 
distracter might be correct in terms of a single row or column in the matrix, e.g. looking just at the right-
most column or just at the bottom-most row, but when both rows and columns are taken into account, it 
no longer fits the matrix pattern.  These kinds of errors are made when a test-taker more or less “gets” 
the problem, in terms of identifying and understanding the relevant matrix relationships, but then fails to 
fully account for all of the problem details when selecting an answer. 
 
Repetition (RP) errors are those in which the distracter is a copy of one of the matrix entries that is 
adjacent to the blank space.  Choosing an RP distracter may represent a sort of cognitive bias or fixation 
on the matrix entries, in which an answer is selected based on simple perceptual matching between the 
answer choices and the matrix entries closest to the blank space.  These entries may be privileged 
because of their proximity to the blank space.  Alternately, assuming a top-left to bottom-right visual 
scanning pattern, these adjacent entries may be the last viewed before the test-taker moves on to look at 
the answer choices, assuming a sequential inspection of the problem in a matrix-first, answers-second 
ordering.   
 
Difference (DF) errors are those in which the distracter is somehow qualitatively different in appearance 
from the other distracters.  DF distracters include those that are completely blank, as well as those that 
have extraneous shapes that are not found anywhere in the problem matrix.  In addition, a DF distracter is 
often the most complex-seeming answer choice, either combining all of the matrix entries together into a 
single agglomeration of matrix elements or taking some feature from the matrix and increasing its value 
until it surpasses all the other entries and answer choices.  A DF distracter might be chosen because it 
visually “pops” from among the other answer choices. 
 
Wrong principle (WP) errors are those in which the distracter is a copy of or composition of various 
elements from various matrix entries (with the exception of copies of adjacent entries, which would still 
fall under the “repetition” error type).  A WP distracter might be chosen if the test-taker does not 
successively educe the correct relationship from the matrix entries and instead combines the entries 






(Protocol Page 2) The following table gives specific criteria that can be used to distinguish among the 
various conceptual types of errors found on the SPM. 
Error type taxonomy and classification criteria for the SPM 
Error type Criteria 
Incomplete correlate 
1 Negative (color-inversion) of correct answer 
2 Change only in fill, texture, or style 
3 Rotation/reflection of correct answer 
4 Change only in spatial layout of elements 
5 Change only in size or scale 
6 Change only in number of discrete elements 
7 Incomplete, with missing element or portion 
Repetition 
8 Repetition of matrix entry to left of blank space 
9 Repetition of matrix entry above blank space 
10 Repetition of matrix entry to top-left of blank space 
Difference 
11 Filled completely white or black 
12 Union or agglomeration of all or most matrix entries 
13 Maximizes some feature value 
14 Differs qualitatively from matrix and other answers, or contains information not found anywhere in matrix 
Wrong principle 
15 Repetition of matrix entry not adjacent to blank space 
16 Rotation/reflection of matrix entry 
17 Transformation/combination of matrix entries 
 
  Note that these error type criteria can be broadly divided into two categories: 
1) If an individual does not know or guess the correct answer, even partially, then they may make 
repetition, difference, or wrong principle errors.  The distracters that represent these error types 
can be identified based on how the distracter is related to information in the matrix. 
2) If an individual does partially guess the correct answer, then they may make incomplete correlate 
errors.  The distracters that represent these error types can be identified based on how the 
distracter is related to the correct answer choice. 
 
Therefore, the scheme for coding error types on the SPM actually has two parts: 
1) Without consideration of the correct answer, first code each answer choice in terms of criteria 
#8-17, which represent how each answer is related to information in the matrix. 
2) Then, without consideration of the matrix, using only knowledge of the correct answer, code 




(Protocol Page 3) Here is an example problem, along with examples of the kinds of distracters that fall 






Mark any answer choice that is 
filled completely white or 
completely black. 
L 
Mark any answer choice that is a 
repetition of the matrix entry 
directly to the left of the blank 
space. 
T 
Mark any answer choice that is a 
repetition of the matrix 
directly to the top of the blank 
space. 
D 
Mark any answer choice that is a 
repetition of the matrix entry 
directly to the diagonal top
the blank space. 
C 
Mark any answer choice that is a 
copy of any matrix entry that is not 
directly adjacent to the blank 
space. 
 
Mark any answer choice that is a 













(Protocol Page 4) 
U 
Mark any answer choice that is a 
union or agglomeration of all or 
most of the matrix entries (or 
aspects of them). 
+ 
Mark any answer choice in which 
some particular feature found in 
the matrix is maximized or made 
more complex. 
X 
Mark any answer choice that 
contains new content not found in 
the matrix or other answer choices 
or is otherwise qualitatively 
different from the other answer 
choices. 
M 
Mark any answer choice that 
represents any other 
















(Protocol Page 5) 
 Mark the correct answers by circling the number choice.
N Mark any answer choice that is a negative (color-inverted) image of the correct answer.
F 
Mark any answer choice that is the same as the 
correct answer except with a change only in fill, 
texture, or style.
 Mark any answer choice that is a rotation or reflection of the correct answer.
L 
Mark any answer choice that is the same as the 
correct answer except with a change only in 
spatial layout of elements.
S 
Mark any answer choice that is the same as the 
correct answer except with a change only in s
or scale. 
# 
Mark any answer choice that is the same as the 
correct answer except with a change only in 
number of elements.
— 
Mark any answer choice that is the same as the 






















(Protocol Page 6) Part 1: How answer choices are related to content in the problem matrix: 
 
Instructions:  Part 1 uses Test Booklet A, which contains the complete matrix and answers for each 
problem.   
 
First, using the six codes found in Step 1 in the table below, go through each problem in the test and mark 
any answers that fit these six criteria.  If more than one criterion fits a particular answer choice, just mark 
the first one that applies using the order specified in the table below. 
 
Then, go through the test once more, this time marking answers that fit the codes and criteria listed in 
Step 2.  If an answer choice has already been marked during Step 1, skip it.  At the end, each answer 
choice should have exactly one code assigned to it. 
 
 
Step Code Criteria 
1) 
F Mark any answer choice that is filled completely white or completely black. 
L Mark any answer choice that is a repetition of the matrix entry directly to the left of the blank space. 
T Mark any answer choice that is a repetition of the matrix entry directly to the top of the blank space. 
D Mark any answer choice that is a repetition of the matrix entry directly to the diagonal top-left of the blank space. 
C Mark any answer choice that is a copy of any matrix entry that is not directly adjacent to the blank space. 
 Mark any answer choice that is a rotation or reflection of any matrix entry. 
2) 
U Mark any answer choice that is a union or agglomeration of all or most of the matrix entries (or aspects of them). 
+ Mark any answer choice in which some particular feature found in the matrix is maximized or made more complex. 
X 
Mark any answer choice that contains new content not found 
in the matrix or other answer choices or is otherwise 
qualitatively different from the other answer choices. 




(Protocol Page 7) Part 2: How answer choices are related to correct answer: 
 
Instructions:  Part 1 uses Test Booklet B, which contains only the answers for each problem.   
 
Step 0 has already been completed; the correct answers have been marked by circling the number of the 
appropriate choice.   
 
Using the seven codes found in Step 1 in the table below, go through each problem in the test and, for 
each answer choice other than the correct one, mark any answers that fit these seven criteria.  If more 
than one criterion fits a particular answer choice, just mark the first one that applies using the order 
specified in the table below.  Not all answer choices need to be marked; if an answer choice fits none of 
these seven criteria, then just leave it blank.  At the end, each answer choice (excluding the correct 




Step Code Task 
0)  Mark the correct answers by circling the number choice. 
1) 
N Mark any answer choice that is a negative (color-inverted) image of the correct answer. 
F Mark any answer choice that is the same as the correct answer except with a change only in fill, texture, or style. 
 Mark any answer choice that is a rotation or reflection of the correct answer. 
L Mark any answer choice that is the same as the correct answer except with a change only in spatial layout of elements. 
S Mark any answer choice that is the same as the correct answer except with a change only in size or scale. 
# Mark any answer choice that is the same as the correct answer except with a change only in number of discrete elements. 
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